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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is concerned with planning in China, 1949-61, 
and examines the cotton textile industry in order to reveal the actual 
operation of planning. The textile industry is discussed, for example 
its important role as an accumulator of capital and foreign exchange is 
considered, but this is not the main focus of attention. 
The variety of significant problems involved in the courageous 
attempt to establish a system of comprehensive planning before the 
Great Leap Forward is disclosed. Some of these, such as problems of 
allocation between different geographical regions, ownership systems, 
and mills of varying size and technological levels, are to some extent 
specific to the textile industry. Many of the problems in planning were, 
however, of general application throughout the economy. 
Various micro-planning problems are discussed. These occurred 
mainly at the level of the enterprise, and included poor collection of 
statistical information, problems of organising and running the unit, 
and a disproportionate growth in the number of staff. Numerous problems 
in incentives, sanctions and supervision methods, in order to encourage 
the managers to strive to fulfill the plans, were part of the syndrome. 
The responses of the managers to the plans they received are 
considered. The features of managerial behaviour in the Soviet Union 
known as simulation and the seeking of safety factors are shown to have 
been widely used in the Chinese cotton textile industry, but blat was 
apparently less pervasive. 
Finally, the inability to implement properly a system of comprehensive 
planning, together with the increasing rigidities involved, is established 
as an important factor in the change in the strategy of development and 
the emergence of the Great Leap Forward. The disruptive effects of this 
movement on the cotton textile industry are then traced. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is about planning in China, and uses the cotton 
textile industry as an example of how planning worked, the problems 
encountered, and the responses to these problems. Much of the 
dissertation is descriptive, in order to provide a basis for analysis. 
As has been remarked [Reynolds L.G., 1969:402] 
'....surely our central task is to understand the economic 
mechanism of the less developed countries. We are 
scientists before we are engineers. Our comparative 
advantage lies in building a systematic body of knowledge 
about how an economy operates, which improves our power to 
predict the consequence of policy actions.' 
The main focus of attention is on the planning process rather than the 
plans themselves. Waterston A. [1965:106-107] pointed out, 
'The document, whether a list of policies, a budget, a 
partial or a comprehensive plan, is far less important 
than the planning process....Development planning, then, 
is not the same as a development plan. Those who confuse 
the two mistake a product of the planning process for the 
process itself. Planning as a process is an indispensable 
precondition for the formulation of effective development 
policies and measures. Whether or not the bases and rationale 
for these policies and measures should be set forth in a paper 
plan is a seperate matter.' 
The cotton textile industry was selected for study for several 
reasons. It is the oldest modern industry in China and was the largest 
modern industry inherited by the Communist government in 1949. There 
is a conspicuous deficiency in our knowledge of this industry which 
remains to be filled. Finally, the information available on the 
industry is great; although not all the information desired has been 
released,the situation is better than in the case of many other industries. 
The major sources used in this study are Chinese books, newspapers and 
industrial, economic, planning and statistical journals, supplemented 
by interviews with refugees carried out in Hongkong and Macao. 
There are four main objectives of the dissertation. The first 
is to trace the efforts to introduce a system of comprehensive planning 
in a larqe underdeveloped country and to reveal the difficulties in-
x'olved in this ambitious attempt. 
The second objective is to penetrate the level of undemanding 
aenerality by examination of one industry in depth, in order to show 
the planning system in operation, and by SO doing^ to itgvssI th,G p3r3.cti.c6 
of planning rather than the theory. In this sense the study is positive 
X I V 
rather than normative, dealing with what happens rather than what 
should happen. 
The third objective is to examine the major policy changes 
with regard to planning, to reveal the reasons and to discuss the 
results. This applies in particular to the set of major changes 
which occurred during 1956-57 and reached a climax with the emergence 
of a new strategy of development in 1958. 
The fourth objective is to show to what extent certain managerial 
practices, known as simulation, the seeking of safety factors, and blat, 
undertaken by tolkachi, which are known to be prevalent in industry in 
the Soviet Union and other centrally planned economies in Eastern 
Europe, existed in the cotton textile industry in China. 
The results of the research undertaken indicate several things. 
Comprehensive planning was extremely difficult to establish in China, 
it was never fully set up, and proper plan implementation was poor. 
Planning in general was slack, but, rather paradoxically, contained 
certain rigidities, which increased as China moved closer towards the 
full establishment of comprehensive planning. The change in development 
strategy which emerged slowly in 1956-57, culminating in the Great Leap 
Forward, had powerful economic causes, in addition to the ideological 
ones. The formal abandonment of the Soviet model of development in 1958 
was due in part to the inability to implement properly what proved to 
be an unsuitable strategy for Chinese conditions. 
Finally, during the period when China was actively trying to 
establish and operate the Soviet model of development, certain features 
of managerial behaviour common in the Soviet system also existed in China. 
Simulation and the seeking of safety factors was no less common in China 
at that time than it is in the Soviet Union. The evidence on blat and 
tolkachi did not prove conclusive, but in the case of the textile industry 
it appears that both may have been less pervasive in China than in the 
Soviet Union. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE EARLY YEARS 
This Chapter considers the textile industry in the period of 
rehabilitation,1949-52, when comprehensive planning did not exist. The 
general problems existing in 1949 are first considered and the inherited 
cotton textile industry is described. The early views on the anticipated 
role of the industry are then discussed and, finally, the course of 
restoration of production in the textile industry is traced. 
I. THE INHERITANCE 
General problems 
China in 1949 had endured several decades of warfare and had suffered 
great devastation of life and property. As a result, the dislocation of 
the economy was extremely serious. Three broad groups of problems existed 
in and shortly after 1949: administrative problems, political, military 
and social problems, and economic problems. The administrative problems 
were to set up a viable network of government, to staff the government 
agencies and economic units with competent and reliable people, to extend 
the mass organisations, such as the Party, The Communist Youth League and 
the trade unions, to the whole country, and to introduce and implement a 
large range of new laws and decrees. 
The political, military and social problems consisted primarily of 
consolidating the power gained and controlling the population, followed 
by ending the lawlessness, crime and bandit operations, terminating the 
fighting in the south and establishing control in Tibet, supporting the 
engagement in the war in Korea, building up defences against a possible 
invasion by the Kuomintang from Taiwan and developing the military in 
general, discovering and eliminating spies, saboteurs, counter-
revolutionaries and remnants of the Kuomintang in China, and changing 
the social power structure, particularly in rural areas. 
Given the dislocations in the war-torn economy, the economic 
problems were numerous. Po I-po [1952:4] described the economy in 1949 
as beina 'as full of holes as a sieve.' The problems consisted of a 
verv low level of output in 1949, the existence of hyper-inflation, 
disrupted and partially destroyed communications and transport systems, 
damaged water conservatory schemes, a fragmented economy with little 
rural-urban trade and a tendency to revert to subsistence aqricultur^^ , 
corruption, speculation, hoardinq and black market activities. Other 
problems were the existing location of industry (largely in coastal 
areas), lack of knowledge of the overall economic situation, a raw 
material shortage at the factories, the United States blockade and 
embargo, a limited market for output owing to the low purchasing power 
of the people, and the flight of capital and managerial personnel abroad. 
Additional problems were large scale unemployment in towns and under-
employment in the villages, poor labour discipline, and private managers, 
who being uncertain on their position and role, were afraid to make 
decisions or bear responsibility. Finally, some of the new policy 
measures adopted, such as land reform, raised new problems for the 
government. 
A major effort was made to solve these problems, and the endeavour 
to restore the economy and to raise the level of output between the 
end of 1949 and 1952 was generally successful. 
The textile industry 
The textile industry made a considerable contribution to the economy 
of China. In 1944 over one quarter of all existing factories were 
reported to be textile mills, and 41.5 per cent of industrial employees 
were in the textile industry [ C.M.I., 1947:364] . By 1947 little had 
changed, and according to a survey of principal cities [N.E.C., 1948:28], 
textile mills still made up more than one quarter of all factories, while 
employment in textiles was 43.8 per cent of all industrial employment. 
In short, the textile industry was the most important modern industry in 
China. 
In 1949, the textile industry is believed to have contributed over one 
third of gross industrial output value, and about one quarter of value-
added by industry (see Table 1). Employment in textiles had been reduced 
to one quarter of industrial employment but the industry was still the 
largest industrial employer. 
The size of firms in the texile industry 
The ease or difficulty of central control, socialisation and planning 
is closely related to the size and number of mills. The average size of 
mill in the modern textile industry varied with the nationality of the 
owners. Chinese-owned mills tended to be relatively small, Japanese-owned 
Table 1 : The Place of the Textile Industry in the Chinese P'conomy 
in 1949-50 
Percentage of value-added in 
'''iross output value^ all industrial production^ 
All Textile 
industry industry 
All modern Textile 




















25.22 1 6 . 6 8 
1. The remaining 32 per cent was contributed by handicraft industry, 
Sources: a. IS.S.B., 1960:92] . 
b. [Field R.M., 1967:274]. 
c. ] Emerson, J.P., 1967:466]. 
d. 1 S.S.H., 1958a:182]. 
U) 
mills were considerably larger and British mills were the largest. 
It has been remarked [Liang L.S., 1955:123] that 'In the cotton 
manufacturing industry in China, a tendency has existed for the average 
size of the Chinese-owned mills to be roughly 25,000 spindles and of 
the Japanese-owned mills, 35,000.' In pre-Communist China, a mill of 
35,000 spindles was considered to be of optimum size, although, according 
to Liang L.S., relatively little attention was paid to this concept. In 
the early 1930s [Lee B., 1933:605] it was believed in general that 
Chinese-owned mills had about 30,000 spindles, Japanese-owned about 
45,000 spindles and British-owned about 60,000. In 1936, of the 148 
modern cotton textile mills in China, 96 were Chinese-owned with an 
average of just over 30,000 spindles each, 48 were Japanese with an 
average of 52,000 spindles, and 4 were British-owned with an average 
of 58,000 spindles [ Meng C.Y.W., 1950] . Blanchard F.S., [1944:22] 
reported that one year later there were 14 3 cotton mills; the 74 Chinese-
owned mills averaged under 29,000 spindles, the 49 Japanese-owned 
averaged 46,000 spindles, and the 3 British mills averaged almost 74,000 
spindles. 
The size of mills also varied on a regional basis. The largest mills 
were located in East China and in the Central-south. By 1949 there were 
247 cotton textile mills, with an average of under 21,000 spindles each, 
so that the average size of mill had reduced since the 1930s as the 
number increased [ Meng C.Y.W., 1950] . 
The above dicussion refers to modern industrial mills, but the 
textile industry also contained a large handicraft sector. By 1952, 
almost half of the labour in the textile industry was in the handicraft 
sector. Since the proportion in the handicraft sector was falling 
steadily, probably half of the labour employed in textiles at Liberation 
was engaged in handicraft production. Blanchard F.S [1944:23] had earlier 
reported that before 1937 some four-fifths of weaving was done on hand-
looms. The State Statistical Bureau [ 1958a:151,155] reported that in 
1936 cloth produced by handicraft methods was 52 per cent of all cloth 
output, while native cloth production (cloth woven from homespun yarn) was 
oi^ r^ cent of all cloth production. Yen Chung-p' ing [1963:251] 
estimated that cotton cloth output from handicraft industry in 1934-35 was 
73 per cent of all cloth output if measured in linear yards or 61 per cent 
if measured in square yards. 
The actual number of handlooms was apparently not known, but a report 
in 1953 stated that 'incomplete statistics' revealed the existence of 
approximately 180,000 handlooms, producing over 20 million bolts of cloth 
per annum [ J.M.J.P., 1953/12/23] . 
The equipment in the mills 
The new government inherited approximately 5,000,000 spindles and 
127,000 looms in 1949. Official figures were 4,996,000 cotton spindles 
and 127,000 power-driven looms, of which 64,000 were in comprehensive mills 
[S.S.B., 1958a:154] . Meng C.Y.W. [ 1950]had earlier reported the existence 
of 5,156,987 spindles and only 68,869 looms. The condition of the 
machinery was not good; most of it was old and obsolete in design, and 
in addition it had been allowed to deteriorate physically. Little 
inspection and repair had been done in the eight years prior to 1949 
[H.W.J.P., 1951/7/19], [J.M.J.P., 1951/9/22]. Systems for machine 
maintenance were frequently non-existent, a feature critically commented 
upon by a Russian expert in 1950 [F.C.C.S.Y.K., 1950]. 
A further characteristic of the existing equipment was an imbalance 
between spindles and looms. Traditionally in China, much of the machine-
spun yarn was sold to the handicraft weaving industry and thus left the 
modern sector. The existing power looms were naturally insufficient to 
deal with the potential output of the spindleage. Based on figures in a 
survey conducted in 1933, where it was revealed that one loom working for 
twenty-four hours required twenty-seven spindles working for the same 
period to supply the loom [Myers R.H., 196?:42], the existing spindles 
could supply 185,000 looms. The shortage therefore amounted to about. 
58,000 looms at inheritance. This would not have been important on an 
input-output basis if the old relationship with handicrafts had been 
maintained, but it would have been a serious problem for the planners to 
try to build the handicraft industry into their calculations. In practise 
the handicraft weaving sector was deliberately cut back in the First Five 
Year Plan, so that the imbalance was real. 
The capacity in use 
All industries were working well below capacity in 1949. There are 
several different ways to measure capacity in use, although, given the 
restricted data available in China, only two fairly crude measures are 
1 
See Phillips A., [1963] and the subsequent discussion pp.309-313. 
possible. The first is to measure the output of 1949 as a percentage of 
the peak output before the war with Japan, and the second is to express 
the actual output of 1949 as a percentage of the estimated total capacity 
output possible for the given equipment. Both measures are open to obvious 
objections. In the case of the first method, the historical peak output 
might not have entailed full capacity working; and the capacity in 1949 
was unlikely to have been identical with that of the previous peak years 
ov/ing to damage and destruction in the war, increased age and obsolescence, 
and new investment. The main practical objection to the use of the second 
method is that the capacity in 1949 was unknown owing to lack of information, 
Judging by the frequency df use, the Chinese authorities prefer the 
first measure. Yarn output in 1949 was 73.7 per cent and cloth output 
67.8 per cent of the corresponding pre-war peak level of production 
[S.S.B., 1960:103]. Earlier official figures gave 72.4 per cent for yarn 
and 72.65 per cent for cloth output [Li Fu-ch'un 1951]. Measuring 
capacity in use, apparently by the second method, official figures reveal 
that spinning was working at 61.2 per cent capacity and weaving at 61.9 per 
cent in 1949 [S.S.B., 1958a:156]. Unofficial estimates from Taiwan give 
45 per cent capacity working for spindles and 52 per cent for looms in 
1949 [Lin Li-chien, 1964:5]. It would appear that between one-third and 
one-half of the capacity was not in use when the industry was acquired. 
The degree of state control 
The cotton textile industry was quite centralised and under government 
control after 1945, when reportedly over 46 per cent of the spindles and 
83 per cent of the looms in China were handed over to the Kuomintang by the 
Japanese [ Chu Hua, 1959] . These Japanese cotton mills were run by the 
Chinese Textile Construction Company until 1949. In 1947, 43.7 per cent 
of yarn output and 72.6 per cent of cloth output came from mills under the 
Chinese Textile Construction Company [ S.S.B., 1958a:149] . In 1949, less 
than half the yarn output and only two-fifths of the cloth output, measured 
in value terms, was from private run mills [ S.S.B., 1958a;158] , so that a 
quite large degree of state control was already a feature in the cotton 
textile industry at Liberation, which undoubtedly facilitated the tasks of 
the planners. 
II. EARLY VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN DEVELOPMENT 
Relatively little information is available about this and it appears 
most probable that in the period 1949-52 no detailed overall policy on 
development strategy had been formulated, other than that industrialisation 
was accepted as essential and a policy of priority to the development of 
heavy industry would be pursued. 
The Common Programme [C.P. 1949] laid down a policy of industrialisation 
with the focus on heavy industry, although some development of light industry 
and textiles was to be encouraged in order to meet the needs of consumers. 
The concept of industrialisation was accepted without open discussion, since 
it was felt that agriculture was poor, agricultural techniques were backward, 
mechanisation had not been developed, and prior development of industry 
was necessary to promote agriculture [Li Chu-chen, 1950]. Liu Shao-ch'i 
[ 1951] advocated the transformation of China from an agricultural into an 
industrial society. 
Li Chu-chen, a 'distinguished industrial specialist of the Central 
People's Government', was optimistic about the future of the textile 
industry, which already possessed a sound basis and could easily be 
developed. Ts'eng Shan-ching [1949] had been even more optimistic for a 
variety of reasons, and foresaw great development in textiles. On the 
demand side he pointed to a rising purchasing power, as well as to the fact 
that textiles were a basic necessity. On the supply side he expected that 
Soviet assistance would lead to increases in production, and large increases 
in cotton output would be obtained. He also pointed to the large linkage 
effect on other industries, which rendered future development of the textile 
industry very desirable. Po I-po [ 1952] indicated that the demand for 
textiles was income elastic, without using the term, since increases in 
income generated even larger increases in demand. 
Such isolated references were made, but no overall policy on the 
strategy of development emerged until about 1953 with the start of the 
First Five Year Plan period and the formulation of the 'general line'. 
It was 1955 before the First Five Year Plan was actually completed and 
published. 
There were four major reasons for this absence of a well-formulated 
and published policy. The first was that it simply takes time to work 
out such a strategy and the collapse of the Kuomintang at the end of the 
civil war came with a suddeness which was rather surprising at the time. 
The second was that it is not fully rational to take policy decisions 
affecting several years ahead, in the absence of information that could 
be obtained and upon which the decisions should be based. Not until 
the situation had been assessed with regard to destruction in the war, 
existing capacities, stocks of materials and so forth, could a detailed 
policy be drawn up. The third reason was that the Russian advisers 
themselves had to gain familiarity with the Chinese economy before they 
could tender useful advice. Finally, and more importantly, the 
existence of other problems of an economic nature, together with the 
major political, military, social and administrative problems which more 
urgently needed solution, took priority over the formulation of a 
detailed development strategy for the first few years. 
III. RESTORATION OF THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY, 1949-52 
A major economic goal of this period was to restore production and 
revitalise the economy, and a general objective was to restore output in 
each industry to the highest historical level. The peak years in textiles 
were 1933 for yarn and 1936 for cloth; the output of these years was 
surpassed in 1951. 
Table 2 : The Restoration of Output in the Cotton Textile Industry, 1949-52 
Units Prewar peak 




Cotton yarn thou. 2,447 
bales 
1,803 2,408 
Cotton cloth^ Mill. — 2,787 1,889 2,522 
metres 
2,683 3,618 200.7 
3,058 3,829 202.7 
Note: a) Includes handicraft production. 
Source: [S.S.B., 1958a:155]. 
The rate of growth in the period 1950-52 was extremely rapid and as 
a result the output of both yarn and cloth doubled in these three years. 
The explanation of this impressive increase in output is found in two 
seperate but related fields: the general restoration of the economy, 
from which the textile industry benefited automatically, and the operation 
of certain factors specific to the textile industry. 
The general improvement of the economy is attributable to various 
factors. The inflation was brought under control, the transport and 
communications network was restored, markets widened as urban-rural 
trade resumed, and hoarded•stocks were released. The existence of 
peace and stability in a unified country for the first time in several 
decades also played a part. Not the least important element was the 
general support of the new government, which had carried through the long-
delayed Chinese revolution and united the country. 
The specific factors which assisted the textile industry in its 
recovery were the gradual exploitation of the underused capacity 
available, an increase in the supply of labour together with an improve-
ment in labour productivity, the construction of numerous new mills, an 
increase in the supply of raw materials, governmental assistance to 
private firms, and an improvement in work enthusiasm, working methods, 
and management. 
Between 1949 and 1952, the capacity in use increased by almost one-
half: in the case of spinning, from 61.2 per cent of existing capacity 
to 89.1 per cent, and in the case of weaving, from 61.9 per cent to 89.4 
per cent. This understates the take-up of existing capacity, since the 
number of spindles and looms was also increasing at this period (see 
Table 3). In Shanghai the 'rate of utilisation of equipment' of spinning 
frames increased from 53.9 per cent in 1949 to 84.1 per cent in 1952 [Yen 
Tzu-ch'ing, 1958]. 
Table 3 : Installed Cotton Spindles and Looms, 1949-52 
Unit 1949 1950 1951 1952 Index 1952 (1949=100) 
Cotton spindles mill. 4.996 5.128 5.284 5.610 112.3 
Cotton looms 
(powered) thou. 127 132 137 142 111.9 
Source: [S.S.B., 1958a:154] . The 1950 and 1951 figure for looms is 
estimated by means of geometric progression. The result is 
identical with that obtained by means of arithmetic progression 
owing to the short period and rounding. 
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The number of days worked each week and the number of shifts each 
day also increased, although erratically, over the period. In 1952 the 
three shift system really began to be adopted, although some mills, 
especially in the North-east, began to work three shifts in 1950 [T.P.J.P. 
1950/2/6] . The first major effort to encourage this commenced in 1951 
[J.M.J.P., 1954/9/10] . The number of staff and workers increased by almost 
one-third from 1949 to 1952, contributing to the increase in output, and 
the numbers of engineers and technicians increased at an even faster rate. 
At the same time striking improvements were recorded in labour productivity. 
Table 4 : The Supply of Labour and Productivity of 
Labour in the Textile Industry, 
1949-1952 
1949 1950 1951 1952 Index 1952 (1949=100) 
All staff and workers 745,105 794,267 864,448 969,803 130 
Workers 583,259 622,032 686,193 777,528 133 
Engineers and 
technicians 7,989 9,532 11,257 16,068 201 
Average output per 
head of worker (in 
yuan) 
6,812 7,463 8.680 10,309 151 
Source: [S.S.B., 1958a:156-157]. 
Investment in the cotton textile industry increased rapidly from 21.3 
million yuan in 1950 to 121.1 million yuan in 1952. By the latter year, 
some 520 new textile mills had been built, but of these only 4 were large 
scale enterprises [S.S.B., 1958a:154] . However, only a small portion of 
the extra output can be explained by the use of new equipment and the 
construction of new mills. The number of spindles and looms in 1949-52 
each increased by some twelve per cent but the output of yarn and cloth 
doubled. 
Great efforts were made to increase the supply of cotton, in terms 
of both increasing output and of increasing the quantity in state hands 
for delivery to mills. Price adjustments were made so that growing cotton 
became relatively more profitable than growing grain [Perkins D.H., 
1966:33-38] . Exhortations to grow cotton rather than other crops were 
made, as were advance payments to farmers, and at certain times priority 
in the supply of fertilizers and tools to cotton producers was adopted. 
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In addition, state purchases of cotton commenced in 1950, guaranteeing 
a market for the produce. This was done by means of quotas, and any 
surplus output could be disposed of privately. Largely as a result of 
these efforts, the area under cotton doubled in 1949-52 and output 
increased almost three-fold. 
Government assistance to private mills included loans, but mainly 
took the form of provision of raw materials, at a price claimed as being 
below the purchase price to the state, and the purchase of output by 
means of orders from the state. Thus a guaranteed market and perhaps an 
element of subsidy were the main methods used. By 1952, 7 3.2 per cent of 
the output of all private run textile mills was on state orders 
[S.S.B., 1958a:158] , as opposed to only 49.6 per cent for private run 
industry in general [Ch'ien Hua etc. 1957:42] . In the first three years, 
output from private run mills increased, and at the same time a degree 
of control was established by the state. 
Labour enthusiasm, the organisation of workers by the mass 
organisations, the holding of emulation drives, the commencement of 
honorary awards and the soliciting of rational suggestions played a 
part in increasing output. The tackling of labour indiscipline and the 
reforms of management also contributed to this. 
Of the specific reasons for the rapid restoration of the cotton 
textile industry, the prime explanatory factors were the increase in 
the supply of raw materials and the exploitation of existing and unused 
capacity. Despite the notable success in obtaining rapid increases in 
output, the importance of the textile industry in the economy began to 
decline. Measured by shares of gross value of industrial output, in 1949 
the textile industry contributed 36.9 per cent and in 1952, on the eve 
of the First Five Year Plan period, it contributed 29.7 per cent, although 
it remained the leading m.odern industry [S.S.B, , 1960:92] . The tendency 
for the share of the textile industry to diminish continued throughout 
the first decade, as development of other industries proceeded. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PLANNED AND'ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE TEXTILE 
INDUSTRY, 1953-57 
This Chapter is concerned with the development of the textile 
industry, largely during the period of the First Five Year Plan. The 
general policy for the development of light and heavy industry is 
considered, then the specific expectations for development of the 
textile industry are discussed. The annual plans and results are 
examined, then the actual developments in the industry 1953-57 are 
compared with the plan. Finally, two sections deal with the importance 
of the textile industry as a means of accumulating capital and raising 
foreign exchange. 
A start on drafting the First Five Year Plan was made in spring 
1951 [J.M.J.P., 1955/4/5] and the plan was announced by Chou En-lai 
[1952] at a meeting of the National Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference. The draft plan was approved at a 
National Conference of the Communist Party of China in March 1955 
[C.P.C., 1955] and, after some minor revisions, was adopted at the 
Second Session of the First National People's Congress in July of that 
year. The late finalisation of the plan, halfway through the period 
covered, was caused by such difficulties as lack of experience in the 
work of planning, lack of knowledge of basic resources, low technical 
levels, and the co-existence of different economic groups, such as state 
run and private run firms [ J.M.J,P., 1955/4/5] . Further reasons were 
the involvement in the Korean War and uncertainty about Soviet aid. Of 
the 156 projects built with the assistance of the Soviet Union, a decision 
on the final 91 was not made until May 1953 [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:9]. The 
plan was said to be based on the 'general line', proposed in 1952, which 
in turn was loosely based on Lenin's theory of the transition period. A 
reasonably cautious approach to development was evident. It was anticipated 
that it would take fifteen years to achieve a socialist society and about 
fifty years to become a powerful, industrial country [ J.M.J.P., 1955/4/5] , 
I Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:18]. Three years later a very different mood was to 
sweep ovor China during the Great Leap Forward. 
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I. THE POLICY ON LIGHT AND HEAVY INDUSTRY 
The policy adopted was priority to heavy industry together with 
some development of light industry. This strategy determined the general 
position of the textile industry in development. Since the investment 
planned for the textile industry was the most important part of investment 
for light industry as a whole [Ch'en Lin, 1953:35], the arguments used to 
justify the strategy do refer to the textile industry. The debate on 
investment preferences to heavy or light industry occurred essentially 
because capital was in limited supply and it was important to attain the 
best allocation of this scarce resource. However, suitable investment 
criteria seem to have been lacking. Although couched in general terms, 
the debate progressed as far as the rate of reinvestable surplus, capital-
output rations, gestation periods, and supply constraints, even if these 
were described rather than used as terms. 
It was generally accepted without much discussion that heavy 
industry should receive priority in development. As Kao Kang put it [ 1952] 
'There are two contrary paths for industrialisation of a 
country. To commence with light industry and to rely on 
accumulation of light industry for assisting the develop-
ment of heavy industry is the general path of capitalism to 
developing industry and is a path which can only lead to 
genuine development of industry over several decades and 
even a century. The other path commencing with heavy 
industry and the development of industries producing the 
means of production is the socialist path to development 
of industry. Without any do\ibt we must build our industry 
along the socialist path of construction of industry.' 
It was later remarked that the only two feasible ways of industrialising 
were either absolute priority to heavy industry and ignoring light 
industry, or else priority to heavy industry together with some development 
of light industry [ Wei Yi, 1957] . 
There were many reasons for adopting the strategy of priority to 
heavy industry. The first was that this pattern had been set by the 
Soviet Union with apparent success [Jung Wen-tso, 1955:16-20] . The 
proportion of investment funds allocated to the means of production 
(loosely heavy industry) in China was 88.8 per cent, even higher than the 
85.9 per cent in the Soviet First Five Year Plan. 
The second reason for the adoption of the strategy was that develop-
ment of heavy industry was seen to be essential for defence purposes 
and for the production of modern weapons [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:13-15] . 
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Both Lenin and Stalin had said this and the necessity of achieving the 
liberation of Taiwan made the reason particularly significant [ Jung 
Wen-tso, 1955:19-20]. 
These two reasons appear to have been the most important, but there 
were others. A third reason was a somewhat vague feeling that China 
virtually lacked heavy industry; the bulk of industrial output was from 
light industry and this was irrational or undesirable [Li Fu-ch'un, 
1955a:47-48]. Development of heavy industry was therefore required to 
rectify an existing imbalance. 
A fourth reason was that there was little use in pouring large 
amounts of investment funds into light industry. Surplus capacity 
already existed in much of light industry, which was supply constrained, 
owing to the shortage of agricultural produce. It therefore was sensible 
to allocate funds elsewhere, particularly, or so it was argued, in heavy 
industry [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:47-48] , [ Wei Yi, 1957] . It is clear that 
alternative sectors existed, and in particular agriculture and the transport 
system could easily and usefully have absorbed more capital. 
A fifth reason was that the gestation period for heavy industry was 
often long, and projects had to be planned well in advance. It was easy 
and quick to build light industrial factories when, and if, bumper harvests 
solved the raw material shortage, which meant that many light industrial 
factories did not have to be planned well in advance and put in the plan 
[Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:47-48] . This implies that extra-plan investment would 
be made available if required unless funds could be diverted from other 
sectors. It was also pointed out that the large handicraft sector could 
be used to supplement the output of light industry, which reduced the need 
to develop it greatly [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a: 48] ,[ Wei Yi, 1957] . 
A sixth reason was the strongly held view that prior development of 
heavy industry was essential in order to assist other sectors of the 
economy. The transport and communications sector required locomotives, 
steamships, aircraft, and motor vehicles; light industry required machinery, 
fuel, chemicals, and buildings; and agriculture required socialisation 
and mechanisation in order to achieve technological transformation of 
traditional methods [Jung Wen-tso, 1955:2-22]. It was not possible to import 
all the necessarv machinery from abroad [H.H., 1955]. Ma Yin-ch'u [1957a] 
confirmed this with respect to iron and steel, which he believed could not 
be supplied by either socialist or capitalist countries. It was held that 
in order to solve the problem of cotton shortage, priority development 
of heavy industry was essential. This would supply fertiliser and machinery 
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to agriculture and thereby increase the output of cotton [Mao Tsung, 1955] , 
[Chiang Kuang-nai, 1955al , [Chang Fang-tso, 1955] . Chiang Kuang-nai added 
that new technology was needed in textile machinery, and this required 
heavy industrial development. Chang Fang-tso felt that the production of 
dyes and man-made or synthetic fibres was necessary and this required a 
strong chemical industry. 
A seventh reason was that development in heavy industry was needed 
to ensure notable advances in technology, which in turn improved labour 
productivity generally and caused all-round growth [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a: 
13-15] . The argument is faintly reminiscent of the one sometimes proposed 
in more developed countries for large scale development of aircraft and 
space research, in order to achieve a 'spill-over' of technical advances. 
Wei Yi [ 1956] felt that priority to heavy industry resulted in more 
extended reproduction and faster growth in general: priority to light 
industry '....would make it inconceivable that the national economy would 
develop and even less conceivable that it could develop quickly.' 
An eighth argument for developing heavy industry involved the 
creation of a market for light industrial produce. It was held that 
developing heavy industry would lead to an increase in agricultural output 
and peasant incomes. In turn this would create a growing market for light 
industrial products in rural areas, the largest market [Jung Wen-tso, 
1955:22], It is clear, however, that this misses the point that light 
industry was supply constrained and not limited by insufficient demand. 
Despite the many arguments above, a good case was made for some 
development of light industry. Most of those engaged in the debate allowed 
for a subsidiary role of light industry. The first reason was the simple 
one that the Soviet Union had allowed some development of light industry 
[Jung Wen-tso, 1955:24-25]. This gave it a respectable air at that period 
in China. In the mid-1950s the Shansi Daily [H.H., 1955] reported that some 
people, and named two, wanted to give absolute priority to light industry 
and felt that the Soviet method of heavy industry first was neither 
necessary nor desirable, since China faced a much more favourable inter-
national situation than the Soviet Union had faced. 
The second reason, or set of reasons, was the one most frequently 
used. This was that construction of light industrial factories was quick 
and easy, investment needs were small, the recoupment period was short, and 
substantial profits meant that a large amount of capital could be 
16 
accumulated for the state^ [ Jung Wen-tso, 1955:2-3, 27] , [ Wei Yi, 1957] , 
[Ma Yin-ch'u, 1956]. Wei Yi pointed out that the capital-output ratio in 
light industry was small and was sometimes even less than unity. 
A third reason for allowing development of light industy was that 
it was necessary in order to increase the standard of living. Production 
per head of cotton cloth in 1956 was only 9.42 metres, as compared with 
16.68 metres in India and 27.24 metres in the Soviet Union [S.S.B., 1958a; 
195] . Population increase had to be catered for and the demand for textiles 
was apparently income elastic. When the income of peasants increased, 
apart from ploughing back into production and increasing expenditure on 
food, the most important thing the peasants did was to purchase textile 
products [Ch'ien Chih-kuang, 1956]. 
A fourth reason for allowing some growth in light industry was that 
increasing amounts of light industrial goods were necessary in order to 
sell them to the peasants in exchange for the food and raw materials that 
they produced. Development of light industry would also reduce the price 
of consumer goods and help to close the well-known 'scissors-gap' between 
the price of industrial and agricultural products. In economic terms, the 
availability of light industrial products acted as an incentive to peasant 
producers and was one means of increasing the size of the agricultural 
surplus and skimming it off. In political terms, in the absence of an 
increase in the supply of light industrial goods, the people would be 
discouraged from building socialism, the peasants would be dissatisfied, and 
this would damage the worker-peasant alliance [Jung Wen-tso, 1955:29-31] , 
[Wei Yi, 1957] , [Ma Yin-ch'u, 1956] . 
A fifth reason was that allowing development of light industry would 
help avoid inflation. The gestation period in light industry was short. 
As Blass W.P. [1962] pointed out: 
'From the point of view of the time lag involved in the 
productive flow of money in an underdeveloped country, 
particularly in its inflationarv impact, the more quickly 
the product is obtained after the investment of funds the 
more efficient the operation and the less inflationary is 
the impact of the investment.' 
Maintenance of stable prices was a major economic goal of the new ruling 
elite. One of the causes of the defeat of the Kuomintang had been 
the social, economic, and political problems caused by inflation after 1937. 
1 
An estimate of capital accumulation in the textile industry 1950-61 is 
presented below, p.32. 
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The anticipated rise in incomes owing to development would cause an increase 
in demand and the output of consumer goods therefore had to increase [ Wei 
Yi, 1956] . The average increase in wages in 1950-52 was 70 per cent and 
in 1953-57 was 42.8 per cent [Ma Wen-shui, 1959]. The wage reform of 1956 
was responsible for an average rise in wages of 14.5 per cent, which 
resulted in an immediate increase in the demand for textile products 
[Ma Yin-ch'u, 1956] . Wei Yi [ 1957] also made the point that if demand 
increased faster than supply prices would rise and the markets would be in 
chaos. 
A further reason adduced for developing light industry was that the 
textile industry was a source of exports for earning foreign exchange^ 
[Chung Wen-tso, 1955:27-28] . 
In the absence of good investment criteria and in view of the 
considerable political ramifications, the debate was conducted in general 
terms. Apart from the two men named in the Shansi Daily, the contributors 
all supported the policy of heavy industrial priority but were sometimes 
trying to obtain a slightly better balance. About 1956 an increase was 
made in the proportion of investment funds allocated to consumer goods 
industries. The original ratio of investment in producer and consumer 
goods in the First Five Year Plan was 8:1 and this was reduced to 7:1 
[ J.M.J.P., 1956/7/9] in order to increase the output of consumer goods. 
II. THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN 
The targets for the textile industry in the First Five Year Plan 
reveal the anticipated development 1953-57. These targets fell into 
two groups: targets for yarn and cloth output, and the targets of various 
items that would enable their accomplishment. The latter group of targets 
were mainly investment allocation, labour supply and cotton supply. All 
targets were for 1957 only and annual breakdowns were not published in the 
plan. 
The textile industry was planned to grow at a relatively slow rate. 
The expected annual compound rate of growth in output value of all consumer 
goods industries 1953-57 was 12.4 per cent, as compared with 17.8 per cent 
for industries manufacturing the means of production. No figure in 
1 
Foreign exchange earnings by the textile industry 1950-61 are discussed 
below, DO. 33-37. 
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con-.parable value terms was released for the textile industry alone, but 
targets for physical output by 1957 give an expected average compound 
annual rate of growth of 6.7 per cent for yarn,8.0 per cent for cloth if 
cloth made from homespun yarn is excluded, and 5.3 per cent if such cloth 
is included, owing to the planned reduction in cloth produced by native 
methods. Not only was the cotton textile industry to grow slower than 
heavy industry, but it was also to grow slower than the average for light 
industry. Of the forty-eight industrial items with specific targets 
[F.F.Y.P., 1955:48-49] , only three had a planned increase lower than cloth 
(including homespun). This was not because investment within light 
industry was to go to other industries, for in fact the textile industry 
was to receive the largest share. The real reason was that cotton supply 
was insufficient, and it was apparently not expected that this problem 
would be solved during the period of the plan [ Wang P'^^a-kun, 1955] . Since 
the textile industry was so large, this reduced the average industrial 
rates of growth in the plan. The Chinese First Five Year Plan contained 
lower targets for industrial growth than had the Soviet First Five Year 
Plan. The four explanations given were that the textile industry was so 
much larger in importance in China that its relatively slow growth pulled 
down the average; private run industry was larger in China and would grow 
slowly; China had no lag between the period of rehabilitation and the start 
of the First Five Year Plan, whereas the Soviet Union had an interim period 
in which heavy investments were made in large scale industry; and technical 
levels in China were lower than they had been in the Soviet Union 1928/29-
1932/33 [Wang P'ei-kun, 1955] . 
Table 5 : The Targets for the Cotton Textile Industry in the First 
Five Year Plan 
1952 1957 change change 
output target % p.a. % 
thou. bales 3,618 5,000 38.2 6.7 
thou. bolts 111,634 163,721 46.7 8.0 
thou. bolts 26,270 15,000 -42.9 -10.6 
thou. bolts 137,904 178,721 29.6 5.3 
Cotton yarn 
Cotton cloth 
Homespun cloth b 
a. Excludes cloth made from handicraft yarn; includes cloth from 
individual handicrafts and handicraft co-operatives if the 
cloth contained, in part or whole, yarn which was machine spun, 
b. Anproximate figure. 
Source: [F.F.Y.P., 1955:48-50]. 
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Possible means of achieving these targets were tangible and 
intangible. The former consisted of planned increases in investment, 
labour supply, and cotton supply, together with taking up underused 
capacity in existing enterprises; the latter included mobilisation of 
labour, emulation and production drives, exhortations, and socialisation 
of the economy. Socialisation was seen as a way of releasing a flood of 
energy fettered by private ownership. The intangible means are dealt with 
largely in Chapter 5. 
Of the total state investment in the First Five Year Plan of 76,640 
million yuan, some 42,740 million yuan was intended for capital 
construction. A further allocation of 5,300 million yuan was also to be 
made available for capital construction in various departments, making 
48,040 million yuan in all. Of the original 42,740 million yuan, the 
industrial departments were to receive some 24,850 million yuan (58.2 per 
cent). The textile industry was to receive 1,160 million yuan, or 4.4 per 
cent of the funds for industrial departments. 
Table 6 : The Planned Allocation of Investment, 1953-57 
Mill, yuan 
Total state investment in economic, cultural and 76 ,640 100. 0 
educational sectors 
Investment in industrial capital construction 26 ,620 34. 7 of which: 
Ministry of Textiles 1 ,160 4. 4 
Ministry of Light Industry 690 2. 6 
Ministry of Heavy Industry 6 ,490 24. 4 
Ministries of fuel industry 6 ,790 25. 5 
Ministries of machine building industry 6 ,930 26. 0 
Ministry of Geology ^ 200 0. 8 
Ministry of Building Industry 690 2. 6 
Local Industry 1 ,990 7. 1 
Industrial investment of non-industrial ministries 1 ,770 6. 6 
a. Includes local building enterprises. The figures exclude some 
anticipated investment by private firms and by joint state-
private firms using their reserve funds. 
Source: [F.F.Y.P., 1955:27-39]. 
Planned state investment in the textile industry was not large, which 
was in line with the relatively slow growth in output planned. Total 
investment in the textile industry would exceed the figure in Table 6, 
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since some investment in textiles could be expected out of the 1,990 
-illion yuan for local industry (textiles and food were the major two 
industries run by local authorities), and some new joint state-private 
mills would be built, while some private mills might undertake some 
investment. 
In physical terms, the textile industry was to build fifty-three 
above-norm mills in the five year period, of which thirty-nine would be 
new and fourteen would be rebuilt existing mills [F.F.Y.P., 1955:88] , 
[S.S.B., 1958a:150] . Each category of capital construction had a figure 
set by the state which represented a 'normal' figure. Every project 
could then be classified as 'above-norm' or "below-norm', depending on 
whether or not the planned investment funds exceeded the norm. The norm 
naturally varied from industry to industry and by type of project within 
an industry. Examples of norms set are: iron and steel, motor vehicles, 
and tractors - ten million yuan; power stations, coal mining and oil 
refining - five million yuan; rubber and paper-making - four million 
yuan. The norm for the textile industry was five million yuan, [ the only 
light industry to reach that figure] [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:2l]. Any project 
needing an investment total above the norm required approval by the State 
Council, whereas a project below the norm could be approved by the 
ministry, province, municipality or autonomous region. 
Of the fifty-three mills, it was anticipated that forty-eight would 
be in operation by 1957. Thirty-eight of these forty-eight would be cotton 
mills. These would add an extra 1,650,000 spindles and 47,100 looms, all 
to be operating by 1957. The total number of spindles and looms in the 
plan was 1,890,000 and 54,500 respectively but some would go into operation 
during the Second Five Year Plan period. By comparison with the number 
existing in 1952, the planned increase in the number of spindles was 29.4 
-er cent (operating) and 33.7 per cent (total), and of looms 33.1 per cent 
cirerating) and 38.4 per cent (total). 
The second tangible method of achieving the planned increase in yarn 
and cloth was to increase the supply to and productivity of labour in the 
textile industry. The supply of labour was barely mentioned in the First 
Five Year Plan. This was because ordinary labour is not a scarce resource 
in underdeveloped countries such as China, and industry can usually obtain 
all the ordinary workers it needs. The provision of employment to absorb 
labour is more usually a cause for concern. As a result, detailed target 
figures for employment were not provided in the plan. Educated and 
skilled labour was scarce, and there was more about this in the plan. 
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The section on education broke the figures down by course, such as 
'engineering', rather than by trade or industry, A figure was revealed 
for engineering students specialising in light industry 1953-57. Of the 
214,600 engineering students enrolling, some 4,400, or 2.1 per cent, were 
for light industry [F.F.Y.P., 1955:179-180]. 
It was stated that over 920,000 skilled workers would be trained by 
the Ministries of Industry, Agriculture, Forestry, Transport, Posts and 
Telecommunications, and Labour. The Ministry of Textiles was expected to 
train 55,400 skilled workers, or 6.0 percent of the total. This exceeded 
the numbers to be trained by any one of the Ministries of Light Industry, 
Geology, Building Construction, Agriculture, Forestry, Communications, or 
Posts and Telecommunications, but was less than those to be trained by 
any one of the Ministries of Heavy Industry, Machine Building, Railways, 
or the Ministries in charge of fuels. In view of the rather low growth 
targets for the textile industry, the planned provision of skilled labour 
appears relatively generous. 
Increasing the productivity of labour can be regarded as an 
alternative to increasing the level of employment in a labour surplus 
economy [E.C.A.F.E., 1961:3]. Both employment and productivity were 
planned to increase in China. With regard to state run industry as a 
whole, almost two thirds of the expected increase in output value during 
the period of the First Five Year Plan was to come from improved labour 
productivity [F.F.Y.P., 1955:171]. 
1953-57 
Ministry of Textiles 
< 
10 ,4 
Ministries in charge of fuel 63 .6 
Ministries in charge of machine building 65 .2 
Ministry of Heavy Industry 67 .9 
Factories and mines under other ministries 68 .5 
Ministry of Light Industry 75 .5 
Factories and mines under local authorities 87 .9 
Source: [F.F.Y.P., 1955:171]. 
The low target for labour increases in labour productivity in the 
textile industry is revealed in Table 7. No reason for this low target 
was given in the plan, but certain possibilities exist. First, labour 
productivity was already high in textiles as it was a well established 
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industry, with skilled labour possessing experience: in a sense the other 
industries had to catch up. Second, the capacity worked in textiles in 
195 3 was quite high, so that there was perhaps less opportunity to increase 
productivity by taking up unused capacity. Third, the textile industry wss 
constrained by the potential supply of raw materials, especially cotton. 
Fourth, the textile industry was to receive relatively little investment 
funds in the period which made it more difficult to increase the 
productivity of labour. Fifth, much of textile output was to come from 
local run industry, so that examination of the targets for central run 
industry is misleading. 
Of these possible explanations the first is probably the weakest: 
gross value output per production worker was lower in textiles in 1952 
than in electric power and paper-making, marginally higher than in iron 
and steel, but considerably higher than in metal processing [ Chen Nai-
ruenn, 1966:486]. This is not enough to establish higher productivity in 
textiles. The relatively small amount of investment is better explained 
by the existing capacity and raw material shortage, and cannot be said 
to be a strong element in the low targets for productivity. It is not 
possible to be dogmatic about the other three possibilities, and all 
seem to have played a part. 
The planned increase in cotton supply was an important means of 
helping to achieve the planned output of yarn and cloth. From Table 8 
it can be seen that the output of cotton was expected to increase faster 
than the output of food crops, and both sown area and yield of cotton 
were expected to increase, but the increase in area was slightly more 
important than yield in achieving the greater output. 
The final means of attempting to reach the planned output of yarn 
and cloth was to intensify the use of capacity of existing enterprises. 
This was a major hope for industry in general, where about seventy per 
cent of the increase in value output 1952-57 was expected to come from 
existing enterprises [F.F.Y.P., 1955:51]. The more intensive use of 
existing equipment in light industry was a main hope for the anticipated 
increase in output [ M. of T., 1953] , [ Chih Shui-shan, 1956] . By 1957 
the increase in operating spindles of 29.4 per cent and operating looms 
of 33.1 per cent could not be expected on its own to produce the target 
for increased yarn (38.2 per cent) and industrial cloth (46.7 per cent). 
This was partly because the increase in equipment was to be less than the 
increase in output and also because the new mills were less efficient than 
the old (see below. Chapter 4, pp.73-78). In 1956 some 19.2 per cent of 
Table 8 : The Planned Output, Sown Area and Yield of Cotton, Industrial Crops 






(chin per mou): 
1957 index 1957 index 1957 index 
1952 target 1952=100 1952 target 1952= :100 1952 target 1952=100 
Cotton 2,610 3,270 125.4 83, 636 95 ,000 113. 6 31. 2 34.4 110.3 
Industrial crops^ • • • • 178, 446 226 ,858 127. 1 • • • • • • 
Food crops 327,830 385,620 117.6 1,859, 683 1,914 ,792 103. 0 176.3 201.4 114.2 
a. Aggregation of output and yield of different crops is meaningless; figures for other industrial crops 
are given in the same source. 
Source: [F.F.Y.P., 1955:115]. 
ro U) 
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yarn and 17.1 per cent of cloth output came from new mills or those that 
had undergone major reconstruction [S.S.B., 1958a:156]. With the retrench-
ment of investment in 1957 and the deliberate delaying of putting new mills 
into operation, it is unlikely that these percentages materially increased, 
and could have fallen in that year. 
III. THE ANNUAL PLANS AND OUTCOME, 1953-57 
The planned annual production of yarn and cloth is presented in 
Table 9, together with the actual production. Since targets were normally 
released in the form of percentage increases over the previous year, 
rather than in physical terms, most of the targets have been estimated 
from various statements. Several conflicting statements on targets exist 
with respect to 1956. The most probable explanation is that the plan was 
changed several times as more information became available, so that 
statements in percentage terms can refer to different absolute figures. 
It is known that the plan was changed, but it is not clear how many times. 
It can be seen from Table 9 that the yarn plan was unambiguously 
filled in four of the five years and only in 1957 were some of the 
earliest targets for yarn unfulfilled. The cloth plan was clearly fulfilled 
in three years; in 1954 it was not fulfilled, while in 1957 the earlier 
target was not fulfilled but the revised (lower) target was achieved. 
Table 9 : The Annual Plans and Outcome for Cotton Yarn 
and Cotton Cloth, 1953-57 
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Year Cotton yarn (thou, bales) 
Plan Target Outcome^ 
Cotton coth (mill, metres) 
Plan target Outcome 
1953 3,989^ *4,100 
1954 4,583^ *4,600 
1955 3,954^ *3,970 





















Note: Reported figures are marked with an asterisk; where more than 
one figure was reported, the latest figure bears two asterisks; figures 













Estimated: output was 102.77 per cent of the plan 
[J.M.J.P., 1954/1/15] 
Estimated: the target was 11.77 per cent above 1953 
[M. of T.,1954a]; where the original source was 
unclear the percentage is taken as referring to the 
actual output of the preceding year. 
Estimated: output was expected to be 100.4 per cent 
of the plan [Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, 1956]. 
Reported: [Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, 1956]; the 4,800 was 
revised up to 5,000 by January 1956. 
Reported: [T.C.K.T.T.H., 1956f]. 
Estimated: the target was 29 per cent above 1955 [Li 
Hsien-nien, 1956]. 
Estimated: the target was 30 per cent above 
actual output in 1955 [Yang Ch'eng, 1956]. 
Reported: the 4,635 was later revised to 4,400 
, 1958]. 
[N.C.N.A., 1956b]. 
output was 103.04 per cent of the plan 
1954/1/15]. 
the target was 12.6 per cent above 1953 
1954a]. 
output was expected to be 100.24 per cent 
of the plan [Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, 1956]. 
Estimated: output was expected to increase by 28 per cent 
approximately [S.S.S.T., 1956]. 
Reported: [Tu.C.Y.C., 1952]. 
Reported: [N.C.N.A., 1956b]. 
Reported: [S.S.B., 1958c:166]. 






[K. of T., 
Estimated: 
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IV. THE OUTCOME OF THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN 
The most important targets for the textile industry in the First 
Five Year Plan were output of yarn and cloth, and the supply of invest-
ment funds, labour, and cotton. The simplest way of evaluating how well 
the output targets were achieved is to compare the planned and actual 
outputs for 1957. This suffers from the disadvantage that an unusually 
good or bad year, quite common in underdeveloped countries relying heavily 
on agriculture, can yield misleading results. Since 1957 was a poor year 
in the textile industry, the First Five Year Plan targets were not reached. 
The targets had been set at 5 million bales of yarn and 163,721 million bolts 
of cloth (excluding homespun). The plan took one bolt of cloth as equal to 
36.576 metres, so that the cloth target for 1957 should have been equal 
to 5,988 million metres. However, the State Statistical Bureau [ 1958a:192] 
reported that the target in the First Five Year Plan was for 5,773 million 
metres in 1957, and this figure is accepted, since the higher figure is 
inconsistent with other statements. Actual production in 1957 was 4.65 
million bales of yarn and 5,050 million metres of cloth [S.S.B., 1960:99], 
so that the planned target was not met. It was claimed that the target 
for 1957 had been surpassed in 1956 for both yarn and cloth [S.S.B., 1957]. 
The yarn output in 1956 of 5.25 million bales did surpass the target for 
1957 in the First Five Year Plan; the cloth output of 5,770 million metres 
was very close to but less than the target of 5,773 million metres, but 
the discrepancy could easily be caused by the rounding process. It must 
be concluded that the First Five Year Plan targets for cotton textile 
output were fulfilled one year early, but, owing to a fall in cotton output in 
1956, the running down of stocks in that year, and the subsequent poor 
year in the industry, it was not possible to achieve the targets in 1957. 
In some respects the investment achieved was as important as the 
output, since the investment laid a foundation for future growth over what 
was intended to be a series of plans. In the First Five Year Plan the 
textile industry was to receive 1,160 million yuan or 4.7 per cent of 
investment in basic construction in all industries [F.F.Y.P., 1955:29-30] . 
A later source gave a target figure of 1,2 37.12 million yuan for investment 
in the textile industry 1953-57 [S.S.B., 1958a:159] . It seems probable 
that the later figure represents a revision in the First Five Year Plan, 
but no revised versions of the plan were published. 
In the first four years, the textile industry invested 1,251.92 
million yuan which was equal to 7.0 per cent of industrial investment, 
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not only exceeding the planned investment target for five years but also 
achieving more than the average [S.S.B., 1958a:159] . However 1957 was a 
year of recession in construction in textiles and investment funds were 
supposed to be retrenched. This proved difficult to enforce and as a 
result the investment total in textiles over the whole five year period 
was 1,550 million yuan. This exceeded the target [Ch'ien Chih-kuang, 
1959] . Investment in the textile industry as a percentage of all 
industrial investment fell slightly to 6.4 per cent, but was still well 
above the original target [Chiang Kuang-nai, 1959]. 
The planned installation of 1,890,000 spindles and 54,500 looms 
over the five years was convincingly beaten. By 1957 some 2,400,000 
spindles and 61,000 looms had been installed [C.K.F.C., 1958b]. A later 
report [ Ch'ien Chih-kuang, 1959] gave a figure for newly installed 
spindles 1953-57 of 2,010,000, which still exceeded the plan, although by 
a smaller margin. 
Of the fifty-three above-norm textile mills to be built during the 
period, thirty-eight were for cotton textiles. This target was also 
exceeded. By the first half of 1956, construction work had actually 
begun on three cotton mills originally scheduled for the Second Five 
Year Plan period [N.C.N.A., 1956a]. Between 1949 and 1957, some sixty-
nine new textile mills were built, and two were rebuilt. Of these, 
forty-four were cotton mills and four were dyeing and printing mills 
[Chang Fang-tso, 1957] . A report early in 1958 [ C.K.F.C., 1958b] declared 
that, in the textile industry, sixty-eight above-norm units had been put 
into production or were just starting production. 
Between 1952 and 1956, the number of employees in the textile 
industry increased from 969,803 to 1,219,693 [ S.S.B., 1958a:174] . With 
base 1952=100, this gives an index of 125.8 for 1956. A reported change 
in the number of textile employees in percentage terms can be used to 
estimate the numbers in 1957 at 1,184,457 approximately [Chiang Kuang-nai, 
1957b]. This yields an index for 1957 of 122.2. It is possible, but 
unlikely, that the number of workers decreased greatly in 1957, for state-
ments on the handling of the problem of that year made much of reductions 
in shirt numbers or days worked, and use of substitute raw materials. With 
regard to surplus workers in that year it was pointed out that the new mills 
could take on workers transferred from mills with too many workers, although 
some workers could be admitted into technical schools and temporary workers 
could be dealt with according to their individual contracts [ Lo Jih-yiin, 
1957] . In addition, managers preferred to retain labour even if there 
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was not really enough work for them all. Shao Ching-wa [1958], the vice-
chairman of the Textile Trade Union of China, gave a figure for textile 
workers in 1957 of 1,282,440, but the figures may not be comparable, since 
his figure for 1952 was 801,278 workers, less than the State Statistical 
Bureau figure for employees and greater than the Bureaus' figure for 
production workers. If Shao Ching-wa's figures are used, the index for 
1957 stood at 160.0. 
In the absence of a target in the First Five Year Plan, these results 
cannot be compared with the intentions. However, the results can be 
compared with the index of all industrial workers; in 1957 this stood at 
182.4 [S.S.B., 1960:183]. Clearly the textile industry increased employment 
at a rather lower rate than average. 
The productivity of labour increased markedly faster than the 
intentions expressed in the Five Year Plan. The target was a 10.4 per cent 
increase in labour productivity in five years. By 1956, the productivity 
of labour had increased by 15.7 per cent measured in value of production 
[S.S.B., 1958a:170], or by 31.6 per cent with no indication of method of 
computation [ Shao Ching-wa, 1958] . Corresponding figures for 1957 have 
not been found. 
The planned increase in the supply of cotton was the final important 
target for the development of the textile industry. Cotton yield was 
planned to increase by 11.9 per cent to 3,270 million chin, cotton yeild 
to increase to 34.4 chin per mou, and the sown area to increase to 95 
million mou in 1957. Actual cotton output in 1957 was 3,280 million chin, 
exceeding the target; the yield increased to 38 chin per mou, exceeding 
the target; and sown area increased to 86.63 million mou, not attaining 
the target. The shortfall in sown area was more than compensated for 
by the increased yield. 
Overall, the hopes for the textile industry as expressed in the First 
Five Year Plan were fulfilled. 
V. THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY AS AN ACCUMULATOR OF CAPITAL 
The textile industry played an important role as an accumulator of 
capital for the state. This section, like the subsequent one on the role 
as an earner of foreign exchange, deals with a period longer than that of 
the First Five Year Plan. An estimate has been made of the amount of capital 
accumulated, and it seems needlessly restrictive to confine this to 1953-57. 
Consequently the estimates were extended to cover the period 1950-61. The 
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extensions to 1950-52 and 1958-61 are almost certainly less accurate, 
particularly in the case of the latter period, but the degree of inaccuracy 
is uncertain. 
There are two main issues involved in the amount of capital 
accumulated by the textile industry: an apparent inconsistency in 
certain statements covering the profits and investment in the industry, and 
the size of accumulation together with its importance to the state. 
The apparent inconsistency was first pointed out by Donnithorne A. 
[1967:371]. It was reported that the textile industry remitted profits 
to the state amounting to 2,900 million yuan during the period of the First 
Five Year Plan, and this was equivalent to 240 per cent approximately of 
state investment in the industry in the same period [Chiang Kuang-nai, 
1957a]. This yields an estimate for investment of approximately 1,208 
million yuan. This is inconsistent with a reported figure of 1,600 
million yuan invested in the textile industry in the period of the First 
Five Year Plan [Chiang Kuang-nai, 1959]. This latter figure appears to be 
a rounded version of the 1,550 million yuan reported elsewhere [Ch'ien 
Chih-kuang, 1959]. 
A second possible inconsistency was that the total accumulation of 
the textile industry, which included profit, depreciation reserves, 
industrial and commercial taxes, return of surplus working capital,receipts 
from any sale of fixed assets and receipts from any other business activity 
engaged in, was reported as being 10,000 million yuan [ Yeh Fang—t'ien, 
1961] . This seems rather high when compared with the 2,900 million yuan 
forwarded as profit to the state. 
Two hypotheses were developed to explain the problem, both based 
on confusion caused by different coverage of the statistics which was not 
made clear in the original statements. Hypothesis one, later rejected, 
was that the profits forwarded were 2.4 times the planned investment 
rather than the actual investment. Two different figures exist for planned 
investment in the textile industry: 1,160 million yuan [ F.F.Y.P. , 1955:30] 
and 1 ,237.12 million yuan [ S.S.B., 1958a:159]. Using these figures the 
percentages of profit forwarded to planned investment are 250 and 234 
respectively, bracketing the stated 240 per cent but not particularly close. 
The hypothesis was therefore rejected. 
Hypothesis two, which was later accepted, was that the figure of 
2,900 million yuan profit referred only to the mills directly under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Textiles, and did not refer to the entire 
industry. This appeared plausible, as the figures were all issued by the 
Ministry, which did not cover local run textiles, nor did it know much 
about local industry as late as 1958. (See Chapter 3, pp.41-42. The 
hypothesis was confirmed by an editorial in Chinese Textiles [C.K.F.C., 
1958b] in which it was stated that state run mills directly under the 
control of the Ministry of Textiles could hand over about 3,000 million 
yuan in the period of the First Five Year Plan. This figure for central 
run mills had earlier been given by Ch'en Wei-chi [ 1958] with the 
additional informat ion that the target in the First Five Year Plan for 
central run mills' profit forwarding was 2,780 million yuan. 
Both the apparent contradictions, can thus be resolved. The 
reported 2,900 million yuan profit is 2.4 times the investment in central run 
mills only. This yields a figure for such investment of 1,208 million yuan. 
This is close to the original 1,160 million yuan target in the First Five 
Year Plan, and to the revised target of 1,237 million yuan, which also 
suggests that the hypothesis is valid. If 1,208 million yuan were invested 
in central run mills, then of the total investment in the textile industry 
of 1,550 million yuan, 342 million yuan must have been invested in textile 
mills under local control. This figure may appear small in relation to the 
1,208 million yuan invested in central run mills, but the First Five Year 
Plan dealt largely with central run industry, local run industry tended 
to be ignored prior to 1956, and relatively little investment went to 
coastal areas where most of the inherited textile industry was located. 
Most of the new investment was in non-coastal areas and was done by the 
central state authorities. 
The second apparent inconsistency, that 2,900 million yuan profit 
forwarded was small in relation to total accumulation of 10,000 million 
yuan, is explained, as the profit figure refers only to one section of the 
industry, not to it all. The estimates below suggest that total profit 
handed over was of the order of magnitude of 5,655 million yuan, a more 
acceptable figure. 
The amount of capital accumulation and its importance, 1950-61 
The estimates were first made for the period 1953-57 and then 
extended forward and backward. The results are presented in Table 10, the 
methods of estimation are given in Appendix A. Examining the period of 
the First Five Year Plan, the textile industry played an important role as 
an accumulator of capital. The 10,000 million yuan accumulated was 
equivalent to 40.2 per cent of the target for state investment in capital 
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construction by all industrial departments in the First Five Year Plan 
and was more than 5 times the reported actual investment in the textile 
industry of 15,500 or 1,600 million yuan. Despite this important role, 
the food industry achieved even more, reportedly accumulating 15,000 
million yuan, or twenty times the state investment in the food industry 
in that period [ J.M.J.P., 1958/4/11] . These two branches of light 
industry together accumulated funds equivalent to 100.5 per cent of the 
target for state investment in capital construction by all industrial 
departments in the First Five Year Plan. 
Table 10 : Estimated Capital Accurr.ulation in the Textile Industry, 1950-61 
(mill, yuan) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Total 
A. Central Run Kills 
Profit 287 349 437 
Industrial and 
commercial tax 173 197 217 
Depreciation 
reserves etc. 58 71 101 
Accumulation by 




626 492 669 578 652 856 687 343 6,511 
352 281 369 305 361 473 380 190 3,636 
111 93 118 155 115 143 135 68 1,277 
982 1,089 866 1,156 1,038 1,128 1,472 1,202 601 11,424 











331 415 508 595 468 635 
187 
68 
206 321 334 267 350 
96 104 106 89 112 
549 620 815 652 326 6,187 
290 343 
148 109 
450 360 180 3,452 
136 128 64 1,215 
586 717 933 1,035 824 1,097 987 1,072 1,410 1,140 570 10,854 
C. Total accumulation 
by the textile 
industry 1,010 1,203 1,472 1,915 2^124 1,690 2,253 2,025 2,200 2,873 2,342 1,171 22,278 
a. Depreciation reserves and any other income. 
Source: See Appendix A. to 
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The capital accumulated by the textile industry during the period 
of the First Five Year Plan made a useful contribution to state revenue. 
The contribution by this industry was larger than many receipt items in 
the state budget. 
Table 11 : State Budgetary Receipts, 1953-57 
(mill, yuan) 
Agricultural taxes 14,978 
Salt taxes 2,566 
Customs receipts 2.385 
Industrial and commercial taxes 47,345 
Miscellaneous taxes^ 234 
Profits from state enterprises 47,007 
Depreciation reserves and other income 
from state enterprises 9,663 
Receipts from foreign loans 3,119 
Receipts from domestic bond sales 2,712 
Receipts from insurance operations^ 233 
Other income 4,723 
$134,965 
a. Excludes 1956 which is not available. 
Source: Ecklund G.N. [ 1966:20] . 
It can be seen that the 10,000 million yuan accumulated bv the textile 
industry exceeded the individual receipts from salt taxes, miscellaneous 
taxes, and receipts from customs, foreign loans, domestic bond sales, and 
insurance operations. This contribution was not inconsiderable by one 
industry which was a single branch of the low priority light industry. 
VI. THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY AS AN EARNER OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
The textile industry played an important role in the foreign trade 
of China. Textile trade with non-Communist countries is first examined, 
followed by trade with the Soviet Union, and finally the two are combined 
together. A good discussion of problems of trade data and exchange rates 
can be found in Eckstein A. [ 1966:779-300] . 
The textile industry was a net loser of foreign exchange in trade 
with non-Communist countries 1951-61. The deficit over this period 
amounted to US$138 million; until 1956 a textile deficit was recorded each 
Table 12 : Trade with the Non-Communist World, 1951-61 
($US mill.) 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Total 
Textile raw materials -44.2 -104.4 -38.5 -66.3 -76.8 -38.3 -77.1 -88.2 -74.0 -105.1 -74.1 -787.0 




- 8.7 8.4 22.7 12.7 26.4 54.1 72.1 102.3 92.8 148.8 141.1 
Total net textile 
exports -52.9 - 96.0 -15.8 -55.1 -51.5 11.3 - 8.3 9.6 14.4 42.5 64.0 -137.8 
Gross textile 
exports 62.4 26.2 49.7 49.2 75.2 130.2 137.5 150.5 161.7 214.8 192.3 
All gross exports 524.7 367.9 432.7 379.7 487.1 641.4 624-0 755.8 698.3 776.6 732.4 
Textile exports as a 
% of all exports 
(gross) 
11.9 7.1 11.5 13.0 15.4 20.3 22.0 19.9 23.2 27.7 26.3 




year, in 1956 a small surplus was earned, in 1957 a small deficit emerged 
and in and after 1958 small but increasing surpluses were earned each year. 
Disaggregation of trade with non-Communist countries provides a 
clearer picture. Semi-finished and finished textile products v/ere a net 
earner of foreign exchange in every year after 1951, and earnings on this 
item increased rapidly to US$141.1 million in 1961. The remainder of the 
textile industry, raw materials and machinery, was a net loser of foreign 
exchange in every year 1951-61. Raw material imports were particularly 
high and recorded a total deficit of US$787 million over the period 1951-61. 
A general policy existed of increasing the degree of self-sufficiency and 
carrying out import siibstitution, but imports of textile materials 
increased from an average of US$63.3 million in 1951-54 to $85.3 million 
in 1958-61. In view of the increase in size of the textile industry and 
of exports of textile goods, the increase in raw material imports does not 
seem unreasonable. 
The trade pattern with the non-Communist world can be described as 
large importation of raw materials, accompanied by smaller exportation 
of finished and semi-finished products to the same area. The raw materials 
were destined for processing for internal use and particularly for 
processing and re-export to the Communist world. 
Textile trade with the Soviet Union was significantly more important 
than with the non-Communist world, both absolutely and as a percentage of 
all Chinese exports to each. 
Identified exports of textile products were a relatively small 
proportion of total Chinese exports to the Soviet Union in 1950, amounting 
to nine per cent only. Textile exports increased rapidly and became the 
dominant export to the Soviet Union; by 1961 some fifty-eight per cent of 
all Chinese exports to the Soviet Union consisted of textile products. 
China ran an overall trade deficit with the Soviet Union in 1950-55 
and a surplus in each year 1956-61. Textile earnings were positive 
throughout the entire period. During the years of positive trade surplus, 
textile earnings were of major importance in this surplus. 
Textile earnings exceeded the total trade surplus with the Soviet 
Union in all years except 1957 and 1958. In these two years the textile 
surplus made up 98.1 per cent and 99.7 per cent of the trade surplus with 
the Soviet Union, or virtually all of it. The most exceptional year was 
1960, when the textile surplus was twelve-and-a-half times the overall 
trade surplus with the Soviet Union. To put into perspective the role of 
Table 13 : Trade with the Soviet Union, 1950-61 
($US mill.) 









All gross exports 
Textile exports as 
a % of all exports 
16.7 27.1 31.4 43.4 42.3 43.8 44.7 44.8 36.9 38.8 31.0 14.8 415.8 
-3.7 -11.2 10.1 16.1 34.0 57.6 92.3 135.8 209.6 376.6 358.6 305.4 1,581.3 
12.9 15.8 41.5 59.5 76.3 101.4 137.0 180.6 246.5 415.4 389.7 320.3 1,997.0 
16.7 30.6 44.8 59.9 78.0 102.8 137.2 181.0 247.2 415.9 390.0 320.3 2,024.2 
188.3 331.3 413.8 474.7 578.3 643.5 764.2 738.1 881.2 1,100.3 848.1 551.4 7,513.4 
8.8 9.2 10.8 12.6 13.5 16.0 17.9 24.5 28.0 37.8 46.0 58.1 
Note: Minor inconsistencies result from rounding. 
Roubles vjere converted to dollars at the official rates of exchange. 
Source: [M.F.T., 1967:210-212]. 
LO cr. 
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the textile industry as an earner of foreign exchange, between 1950 and 
1961 China incurred a deficit with the Soviet Union of US$172 million, but 
the textile industry earned a surplus with the Soviet Union of US$1,997 
million. This was sufficient to repay 88:9 per cent of all Soviet long 
term loans to China, if the reported loans of 5,294 million yuan [ Li Hsien-
nien, 1957] are converted at the rate of 2.355 yuan to the dollar, to 
yield a figure for loans of US$2,247 million. If the reported figure for 
loans of 1,816 million roubles [ Suslov M.A. , 1964] is converted at the 
official rate of exchange, then the loans totalled US$2,018 million and the 
textile earnings with the Soviet Union 1950-61 were sufficient to repay 
99.0 per cent of the Soviet loans. 
Putting together the textile trade with the non-Communist world and 
the Soviet Union, the industry was still an important earner of foreign 
exchange. The large surplus with the Soviet Union far exceeded the 
deficit with the non-Communist world. Deficits were recorded in 1951 and 
1952, after which an overall textile trade surplus was earned each year, 
reaching a peak of US$432.2 million in 1960, and declining in 1961 to a 
level which was still above that of 1958 or any preceding year. 
The total trade surplus with the Soviet Union and the non-Communist 
world 1950-61 amounted to some US$920.2 million, far less than the 
identified textile trade surplus of $1,859.5. This figure is slightly 
enlarged owing to the inability to identify textile trade with the non-
Communist world in 1950, almost certainly a deficit item. Leaving aside 
1950, the textile trade surplus 1951-61 amounted to US$1,846.5 million 
which was approximately twice the total trade surplus. Without the export 
earning ability of the textile industry, the overall trade surplus v;ould 
have been turned into a substantial deficit. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PLANNING AND THE PLANNERS (1) 
A great number of problems existed in the attempt to establish a 
system of comprehensive planning. These are referred to as problems for 
the planners, but in fact they could appear at all levels: in top level 
decision making by the Central Committee, at national planning bodies, at 
ministries, and at lower level government and planning agencies. The 
problems faced by the basic level enterprises are examined in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
This Chapter considers first the structure of planning, then the 
plans themselves, including their compilation, niamber and content, 
punctuality, changes, and the realism and accuracy of their targets. It 
concludes with a discussion of a series of problems of a rather mixed nature, 
These include the shortage of trained men, attitudes adverse to planning, 
the lack of attention to implementation, statistical and data problems, 
the effects of the harvest, the wastes in investment, the lack of co-
ordination, poor financial planning, inadequate local planning, dilatory 
procedures combined with increasing burdens of work and the effects of 
abrupt changes in policy. Many of these problems existed in industries 
other than textiles; planning problems specific to the textile industry 
are considered in Chapter 4. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF PLANNING 
In order to establish a system of planned economic development, it 
was necessary to set up a planning apparatus at national, regional and 
local levels. There were four institutional structures which could have 
participated in the planning of industry: the administrative structure, 
the Communist Party, the trade union and the Communist Youth League. 
The latter two organisations had various functions, including the trans-
mission of policies to the workers, listening to their response, mobilising 
them for specific tasks, and raising the level of productivity. Neither 
institution appears to have taken an active role in the preparation or 
implementation of plans, although they had some indirect effects in 
implementation. They held competitions among the workers, encouraged 
them to set targets to try to beat, and the union was in principle involved 
in draft plan compilation discussions on the factory floor. Attention is 
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focussed on the two major institutions: the administrative structure 
and the Party. In principle, an organ of the former must issue the 
orders to lower levels, but in practise the Party frequently had the 
real power of control. Since the relative division of power between 
administrators and Party varied over time, the distinction was not 
always clear cut. 
The administrative structure 
Some confus ion of systems and overlapping of organs existed in 
the early years up to 1954, as first efforts were made to establish a 
planning system and to set up other administrative and political systems. 
The planning structure can conveniently be discussed at three levels, 
national, regional (intermediate) and local (province, municipality or 
autonomous area, and below 
At the national level, the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee 
was the supreme planning authority at the start, under the jurisdiction 
of the Government Administrative Council. The North-east alone had a 
different system. It had its own Financial and Economic Committee 
which succeeded in drawing up a rough plan in 1949, predating the 
national achievements. In 1951 a Planning Commission was also established 
in the North-east [ Ku Tso-hsin, 1959] . In the national system, the 
Central Financial and Economic Planning Bureau, part of the Financial 
and Economic Committee, produced control figures in 1951 and 1952, and 
these served as an approximation to an annual plan. In the industrial 
section the figures were produced mainly for state run enterprises. 
The State Planning Commission was established in November 1952, and 
the first annual plan was made in 1953. This may have been more the 
result of greater experience in the Financial and Economic Affairs 
Committee than the establishment of the Planning Commission, since Wang 
Kuang-wei [ 1956] reported that the Planning Commission became the 
assistant of the State Council in national planning work after September 
1954, His statement is a little ambiguous, as the State Council itself 
was established at that time. Wang Kuang-wei reported that until 1956 
the State Planning Commission had seven functions, including drawing up 
1 
Henceforth in the Chapter references to the province level include 
municipalities directly under the central government and autonomous 
regions, unless otherwise stated, as these were regarded as being of 
the same level. 
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annual and perspective plans, examining draft plans produced by 
ministries and provinces, examining how ministries and provinces fulfilled 
their plans, compiling an annual plan for resource allocation and state 
stocks, compiling annual and perspective financial plans and examining 
the state budget and the financial plans of the economic departments, 
setting up methods and procedures for planning, and conducting research 
into major economic problems. 
By 1954 the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee had become 
redundant, and in thG iTiB-jor" 3.ciniinist3ra.ti.vG changes 3.nd, adootion of s. 
constitution in that year, the Committee was abolished, and the State 
Planning Commi ssion took over the responsibility for planning the 
economy. By 1956 the planning system was still not functioning 
efficiently enough, and in order to secure an improvement, perspective 
and annual planning were separated. The State Planning Commission 
henceforth dealt only with perspective plans; the newly established 
State Economic Commission dealt with annual plans. This separation is 
unusual in countries that plan the economy. Waterston A. [1965:388] 
pointed out that 'In every country with a central planning agency, the 
agency which prepares the medium- and long-term plan also prepares the 
annual operational plan' He continues with the statement that Russia 
separated them in 1960 but rejoined them in 1964. He seems, however, 
to be unaware of the Chinese counter-example. 
At the intermediate level, China was divided administratively into 
six Large Administrative Areas between 1949 and 1954. Until 1952 this 
level appears to have been effectively responsible for controlling all 
enterprises, in all but the North-east. The central ministries were 
not able to undertake the task of running enterprises nominally under 
them, and so they were given to the Large Administrative Areas or the 
Military Administrative Commissions to run [Wang Hong-Ting etc. 1958]. 
Local state run enterprises also came under these, as these commissions 
were the highest level of local government in China. In November 1952 a 
major change occurred, and industrial control was divided into two parts: 
the central ministries took over the running of central state run 
enterprises, and industrial bureaus under the Large Administrative Areas 
ran local state run enterprises. In the same year the enterprises 
became separate units responsible for their own profit and loss account-
ing [ C.K.F.C.K.J., 1957d] . In 1954 the Large Administrative Areas were 
in turn abolished and local state run industry was completely run by 
the provinces, which seem to have come under the Local Industry Ministry, 
set UP in 1954 and then abolished in 1956. 
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Planning at local levels was mainly centred at the provinces, 
although a good number of hsien set up a simple structure below the 
province level. Industrial enterprises of any size were controlled by 
the province, and the hsien level was supposed to concentrate on 
agriculture [Yang Ying-chieh, 1955a]. With the termination of the Large 
Administrative Areas in 1954, most provinces and many hsien set up 
planning committees for local run industry. All local state run, local 
joint state-private run, handicraft run and private run enterprises 
came under this system of planning. The local organisation was often 
quite a close duplicate of the central government organisation. 
Superficially there appear to have been two planning systems before 
the Great Leap Forward, locally planned and centrally planned, but it 
is more realistic to say that there were three. The ministries under 
the State Council compiled a plan for all the enterprises that they 
controlled, and the various levels of local government compiled a plan 
for the enterprises they controlled. Both of these two systems were 
quite separate. The third 'system' was grouped on a remainder basis 
and consisted of all firms not in the main two systems. These were 
industrial firms under the non-industrial ministries, industry run by 
the public security service for labour reform, industrial co-operatives, 
and enterprises processing for supply and marketing co-operatives^ 
[ S.S.B. , 1954a] . 
As far as can be gathered, the plans for central and local run 
industry were totally separate and the central ministry did not even see 
the plan for local industry. Yang Ying-chieh [1955a] pointed out that 
the Heavy Industry Planning Bureau of the State Planning Commission had 
a wider task than the Ministry of Heavy Industry, since the former also 
covered local run industry plans; in short it covered the plan for the 
whole iron and steel industry. By implication, the Ministry was not 
concerned with the plans of local run firms. 
If in heavy industry, relatively easy to plan, the Ministry did not 
see the local run industry plan, it is even less likely that the Textile 
1 
Industrial investment by non-industrial ministries alone made up a not 
insubstantial 6.6 per cent of the total investment in the First Five Year 
Plan. To put this in perspective this was 54.3 per cent of state invest-
ment in capital construction by the three Ministries of Agriculture, 
Water Conservancy and Forestry [F.F.Y.P., 1955:30,114]. In 1957, 13.1 
per cent of total industrial output value came from this third section, 
which provided 28.4 per cent of central run industrial output value 
[ Ch'i Chiin, 1957] . 
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Ministry saw the plan for local run textile firms, as planning was more 
difficult owing to sheer number and different techniques in the mills. 
Liao Li-li [ 1958] also reported that central ministries did not make 
arrangements for or a comprehensive plan for local run firms. A further 
piece of indirect evidence is that as late as 1958 the Ministry of 
Textiles was unable to include any local run mills in a competition it 
was holding, owing to the fact that the Ministry did not know enough 
about the local run firms [C.K.F.C., 1958d]. This suggests that not only 
did the Ministry not see the plan, but it did not receive reports on the 
mills either, otherwise it is difficult to see why the Ministry had 
such poor information. It seems so obvious that local plans should go 
to the central industrial ministries that it is tempting to assume with-
out question that they did. A report on the effort in 1955 to improve 
the system for passing up reports and tables from the enterprises stated 
that statistical materials from local run enterprises went to the 
provincial level and were then forwarded to the State Statistical Bureau. 
The Ministry was only involved in receiving reports from central state 
run enterprises [ T.C.K.T.T.H., 1955a] . Yang Ying-chieh [1955a] reported 
that the two plans, central and local, went to the State Planning 
Commission for balancing and co-ordinating. These examples also suggest 
that information on local firms by-passed the industrial ministries 
concerned. 
The Party structure 
The Party maintained a structure which closely paralleled the 
administrative structure. The Central Committee was the highest organ 
of the Party and represented the real seat of power in China. Below 
this were the Provincial Party Committees and below these were the town 
and hsien Committees. The basic unit of the Party at grass root level 
was the branch in factories, mines and other establishments. In 
addition to the Party structure parallel to the administrative structure, 
there was a Party unit within each organ of the administrative structure, 
which could receive instruction and information from the level of Party 
above it, both directly within the structure and from Party organs outside 
this structure. It was in this way that control over the administrative 
side was exercised. The existence of this system provided the possibility 
of, but did not ensure, tight control of industrial planning. The degree 
of control varied from time to time.^ 
1 
See Chapter 5,pp.98-101 for the shifts in power as it affected the mills. 
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The organisation of financial planning 
There were two institutions closely concerned with financial 
planning and control of industry: the People's Bank and the Ministrv 
of Finance. There was some overlap of function between the two, but 
the People's Bank was more concerned with day to day running as money was 
moved between the accounts of firms, while the Ministry of F'inance 
tended to take a broader view. 
The People's Bank had many functions. All enterprises maintained 
an account with the Bank in which all funds were deposited, with the 
exception of sufficient cash for (normally) three days running. All 
accounts were settled through the Bank. The Bank had responsibility 
for seeing that inter-entemrise payments were in accord with the 
plans, and supervised and inspected financial discipline in general. 
The People's Bank could inspect anything relevant to the control of 
industrial funds.^ 
The People's Bank rapidly established a network of branches. It 
is believed that in 1955 there were 43 main branches, over 2,200 branches 
and more than 20,000 sub-offices employing in all over 700,000 people. 
The Ministry of Finance also established offices at national, 
provincial and hsien levels. The Ministry had wide ranging powers over 
the control of industrial financial planning. It examined financial 
policy, directives, systems and plans, and it could inspect budgets 
and financial statements of all enterprises and the imnlementation of 
the enterprise budget. It could also look at the use of capital, tax 
payments, the audited enterprise accounts and even the financial 
work of the People's Bank. Rather surprisingly, the finance office 
within an enterprise was not part of this system but was part of the 
administrative controlling system [S.S.B., 1954a]. 
The People's Bank and the Ministry of Finance, together with their 
subordinate organs, constituted the major part of financial control. 
There were other institutions that also possessed some power in this 
area. The planning organs themselves had the power to visit any enter-
prise and inspect all the plans, including financial plans, and their 
fulfillment [Ming Chi, 1950] . 
The State Economic Commission had a Financial Planning Bureau v/hich 
compiled the national annual financial plan and had the power to 
1 
A useful description of the other functions of the People's Bank is 
given by Donnithorne A.[ 1967 :402~407].. 
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supervise and inspect implementation, and to suggest ways of improving 
weak areas in financial work. The State Council had a Finance and 
Trade Office which also had a supervisory and directing role over 
financial affairs. No evidence was found that these bodies were at all 
important in the supervision and inspection of financial work. 
II. THE PLANS 
An economic plan has been defined as "the entire complex of develop-
ment activity contemplated for a year or a multiyear period' [ Hagen E.E., 
1963:19]. Plans are customarily divided into long range (or perspective), 
medium term and annual; in western literature, perspective plans are 
commonly defined as covering ten years or more, and medium term plans 
as anything between two and ten years. In China an attempt was made 
to formulate a Twelve Year Plan for the period 1956 to 1967. A T\^elve 
Year Plan for textiles was mentioned once [Yang Ch'eng, 1956] , but 
nothing further was reported and it seems improbable that it was 
completed, unlike the plan for agriculture. In western terms, the 
medium term plans in China cover five years. Only the First Five Year 
Plan (1953-57) was ever completed in detail and published. An outline 
of proposals for the Second Five Year Plan was published but the plan 
appeared to be abandoned during the Great Leap Forward. The Third 
Five Year Plan, due to commence in 1963, was deferred until 1966. It 
was rarely mentioned and never published. The Fourth Five Year Plan 
(1971-75) has so far followed the example of its immediate predecessor. 
This section considers the short term plans, annual and shorter. 
Annual plan compilation 
In a centrally planned economy of the Soviet type, the admin-
istrative level at which targets are set is important. If targets are 
set by the central authorities, the results are extremely likely to be 
a plan remote from reality, but if the targets are set by the enter-
prises, the result is the abandonment of centralised planning. As a 
consequence of this, an up-and-down process is commonly practised in 
plan compilation. 
In China a four stage process, known as 'two down and two up', was 
practised in the first half of the 1950s. Under this system, the enter-
prise first suggested rough figures for production in the following 
year to the controlling authority, either central bureau or local 
government bureau. These suggestions were synthesised into one plan 
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for the area and sent to Peking, preferably in May, but often later: 
in 1953 it was July before the central run plan was sent [ Lo Jih-yun, 1954] 
At the second stage, control figures prepared by the highest planning 
authority of the time were passed down from Peking through one of the 
control systems, central or local, to the bureaus and thence to the 
mills. At the third stage, a draft plan was compiled in the enter-
prises and forwarded to the bureau, which synthesised all the draft 
plans into one. This, in the case of central mills, was sent to the 
Ministry of Textiles, and in the case of local run mills was sent 
apparently direct to the highest planning authority of the time. At 
the fourth and final stage, a formal annual plan was sent down from the 
Ministry of Textiles, or the highest planning authority, to the bureaus, 
and finally to the mills. The first draft plan at the top was broad 
in nature and contained aggregate figures, more details being added as 
the appropriate part of it passed to successively lower levels. 
This system persisted until 1955, according to one report [Fang Fa, 
1956] , or until 1958 according to another [Chen Ta-lun, 1958]. It 
seems possible that the earlier reference did not represent general 
current practice and that the 'two down and two up' system carried on 
until changed at the time of the Great Leap Forward. The whole system 
was found to be cumbersome and it was suggested in 1957 that it would be 
an improvement if a national planning meeting could allocate control 
figures directly to the bureau, which, after discussion with the mills, 
could itself make the formal plan [ Shou Han-ch'ing, 1957] . There is no 
evidence that this suggestion was ever implemented; such a national 
meeting was not well-publicised, and the change to 'one down and two up' 
suggests that it was not. The 'one down and two UD' system commenced with 
control figures from the top being sent down, an enterprise draft plan 
going up and a final formal plan going down. In short, the first stage 
of the older method was dropped. This system was still operating in 
the early 1960s. 
Plan formulation in practice seems to have been rather less neat. 
Informant number one, a high level mill manager, said that in his mill 
there was a two stage process, plan suggestions up and a formal plan 
down. Lin Li-chien [1964:77] reported that a simple one stage system 
of passing plans down was actually in operation, despite the talk of ups 
and downs. Informant number ten described a somewhat complex system of 
passing plans in local industry down. The Ministry sent a draft plan 
to the province, which considered it before returning it with suagestions 
to Peking for discussion and revision. It then came back to the province 
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as a formal plan. On this basis, plans were drav/n up for enterprises 
directly run by the province and became their formal plans. If any 
enterprises were run at sixb-province level, such as hsien, a plan was 
sent to the hsien, which returned it to the province with suggestions, 
which after consideration might or might not be embodied in the final 
plan for the hsien. The hsien level then drew up formal plans for its 
enterprises. 
When an enterprise was compiling a draft plan, the workers and 
masses were supposed to take a prominent part in discussions and to 
make suggestions which could be incorporated. In practice this was 
rarely achieved and constant complaints were made that workers were 
largely excluded from plan compilation. Indeed, they often did not 
see the current plan until it became formal and it was too late to 
suggest changes.^ 
It is obviously desirable that an enterprise should receive its 
formal annual plan as early as possible in the year, and preferably 
at the start of the year. In fact, plans were usually very late in 
arriving at the mills, partly because the national plans were compiled 
late and partly because enterprise plans were held up in the bureau-
cratic machinery. The control figures for the forthcoming year's plan 
were normally set about August or September by the state planning 
organs : a start on compiling the draft national economic plan was 
made in November; and it was not possible to send down the formal plan 
before March-April at the earliest or June-July at the latest [C.H.C.C., 
1957] . Richard Diao [ 1966:42] reported that it was not possible to 
secure approval of the state budget and national economic plan before 
February, as in 1953 and 1958, while it was March or April before 
approval was given in 1956 and 1960, and June or July in 1954 and 1957. 
Approval of enterprise plans could be slower, as they were a breakdown 
of the national plan. Towards the end of a year some enterprises had 
still not received a formal plan. This late transmission of formal 
annual plans to enterprises was adversely commented upon by Richard 
Diao, Li Fu-ch'un, [1956a] ,[ 1956b] and Wang Ssu-hua [1958] . The latter 
reported that it was frequently the second half of the year before 
the annual plans were sent down. Informant number eight corrobated 
the fact but not the degree of lateness; he felt that the formal plan 
1 
See for example [ C.C.H.H.J.P., 1952/3/29], [ Ch'i Wu, 1953:45] , [M.F.J.P., 
1954/4/16] , [ Lo Jih-yiin, 1954] , [Yen T'ao., 1957] . 
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usually arrxved in textile mills about March, although there were 
exceptions to this. Yang Ying-chieh [ 1956] remarked that not only were 
plans not made on time, but even when the plan had been formally approved 
some units did not send it down for a long time, so that some basic 
units had no formal plan to follow. 
The delay in making and securing approval for the national economic 
plan was caused by the planners being forced to wait for the harvest 
before beginning to plan for the forthcoming year, by the time lags in 
statistical information being available to the centre, and by a shortage 
of planners. The extra delay in getting a formal plan to the mills was 
caused partly by some units not passing down the plan, but largely by 
the time needed to break do^ vn a simple aggregate plan into a detailed 
operational plan for enterprises, when good planning personnel were 
scarce. Faced with the non-arrival of a plan, the managers carried on 
work as well as they could, using the earlier control figures as guide-
lines until the formal annual plan arrived. 
Changes in the plan were also a matter for concern. It is not 
necessarily the case that revisions in annual plans are a sign of poor 
planning. Such revisions may be necessary and desirable if later and 
better statistics become available, if there are unforeseen domestic 
changes - such as poorer second or later harvests, or in government 
policies - or if international markets suddenly change. The latter 
reason perhaps applied less strongly in China, in view of the state 
monopoly in international trade and small involvement in international 
trade. Hov/ever if there were any effect it would occur more commonly 
in the case of textiles than most products, since textiles were 
prominent in international trade. 
In China, changes in the plans were too frequent for the planners 
and the enterprises to cope adequately, but, rather ironically, were too 
infrequent to deal effectively with a changed situation. Li Fu-ch'un 
[ 1956a] referred to this by criticising the changes in plans when 
handed over and also the inability to adjust plans quickly to meet chanaed 
conditions.^ Plan changes at the enterprise level caused difficulties 
of adjustment in output and some losses; Chiang Kuang-nai [1955b]reported 
1 
Statements that plans were changed too much are more corrjnon t: 
charge that they were not adjusted enough: see for example [ Chou En-lai, 
1954:9] , [K'ung Sang, 1957] , [Huang Yen-p'ei, 1957] , [C.H.C.C., 1957] , 
[ H H.P.Y.K. , 1957] . 
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that if raw materials could be supplied as planned and if production 
plans were not changed, state run textile mills could save about sixty 
million yuan in 1955 alone. At the planning level, the planners were 
apparently unable to cope with the necessity for adjustments in many 
plans if one part were changed. One undesirable feature was a tendency 
in some enterprises to change their plans on their own initiative, 
without requesting approval from higher levels. Some units even had 
several plans for the same year, a situation which caused 'chaotic 
conditions' in the unit and that should never have occurred [Yang Ying-
chieh, 1956] . 
The number and content of plans 
There would normally be several plans covering different time periods 
at a cotton mill. A long range plan might exist, for three, five or 
ten years,^ although as late as 1963 it was held that for some enter-
prises the compilation of a long range plan was still an unfamilar 
problem [Li T'ieh-ch'eng etc., 1963:33] . Reference to a Two Year Work Plan 
in statistics was made once in 1956 [ T.C.K.T.T.H., 1956b] . A simple 
annual plan existed in state run enterprises after 1953, becoming more 
detailed and complex as time went by. This plan was set by the state. 
Informant number one reported a six month plan in his mill, but said 
that it was unusual to have one. He was uncertain why they received one 
but felt it might be because his mill was very large, modern and 
efficient and the authorities wanted closer control over it as a result. 
There would also be a quarterly plan, set by the state, usually at lower 
levels, such as by an administrative bureau of the ministry, or by the 
province. Shorter plans than this existed, usually for the period of a 
month and one third of a month. All plans for periods less than the 
quarter were referred to as 'domestic plans' and were normally drawn up 
in the mill for its own internal use. They were in effect work schedules 
to be followed so as to attain the longer period state plans. Some 
informants reported that the monthly plan was sent by higher levels, not 
made in their mill. A directive was issued in 1957 which allowed 
controlling departments to decide which enterprises could make their own 
quarterly and monthly plans, and which must be compiled by the ministry or 
bureaus [S.C., 1957b] . It would seem that the. controlling bodies took 
advantage of this to increase their sphere of operations. 
1 
In the west a three or five year plan is often considered to be meaium 
term; they are referred to as long term in China. 
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In terms of operational significance, only the quarterly and annual 
plans can be considered to have been important for the enterprise 
managers. Although the literature in 1956 and 1957 is full of references 
to overfulfilling the First Five Year Plan, it was the annual and 
quarterly plans that contained the specific targets to achieve the 
broad goal. The plans for one month or less were not set by the state 
before the directive late in 1957; it would be 1958 before state 
institutions could draw up monthly plans, there is no indication of how 
many mills actually had monthly plans set by the state, and the Great 
Leap Forward intervened shortly afterwards. All internal plans were 
important within the mills, especially for the workers, but had less 
significance for the director except as a guide to how well the quarterly 
plan would be achieved: the state authorities did not concern themselves 
with plans of less than a quarter before late 1957. 
A casual reading of the literature suggests that annual plans had 
much operational significance because the fulfillment of them was so 
frequently mentioned. This view can be deceptive. If the quarterly 
plans when added together equal or exceed the annual plan, as they 
should,then fulfilling the quarterly plans automatically guarantees that 
the annual plan will be achieved. In addition, changes made during the 
course of a year, such as in government policy, are made in the quarterly 
plans [C.K.F.C.K.J., 1957b] and the old annual plan is no longer relevant. 
The quarterly plans provide"for necessary flexibility, which annual plans 
were unable to provide, and therefore in many ways became nore important. 
Informant number six reported that in ten years in his mill, the annual 
plan was laid aside as soon as there was any change in policies or a 
movement began, and the plan was forgotten and never even mentioned by 
anyone after that. It would seem that the quarterly plans had far more 
operational significance than the annual plans. 
The bonus systems, considered in Chapter 5, pp.109-121, are closely 
related to the degree of the operational significance of different plans 
in most planned economies. In China, bonuses to workers were paid monthly 
or quarterly, varying in different enterprises. Some bonuses were 
calculated monthly and paid quarterly, others calculated quarterly and 
paid monthly. Judging by the evidence of frequency of mention, monthly 
bonuses were probably more common than quarterly in internal worker 
bonuses, but quarterly bonuses were more common in socialist emulation 
competitions between firms. Textile mills were allowed freedom to 
decide many practical aspects of bonus payments, including the period 
covered, and no unified bonus system was ever achieved in the textile 
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industry 1949-61. This suggests that operationally significant plans 
could be either monthly or quarterly as far as the ordinary workers were 
concerned. 
The content of plans changed over time, so that sources from different 
periods can be slightly contradictory. In 1953 it was said that in 
industry in general six plans should exist: a product plan, a labour and 
wage plan, a material supply plan, a cost of products plan, a financial 
plan, and a technical organisation and measures plan [ Chi Wu, 1953:38-40] . 
A Russian expert reported in 1954 that plans in textiles mills should 
have nine items, but did not specify the number of plans themselves 
[C.K.F.C., 1954] . Lo Jih-yiin [1954] reported that there were eight 
plans in textiles in 1954: total output value, products, labour, costs, 
wages, supply and sales, finance, and basic construction. Other 
references exist, each with similar but not identical lists of plans. 
These reports were concerned with the ideal, but in practice the 
number of plans could be less. In 1956, very many local state run 
enterprises in Shanghai only had a poor quality production plan and 
totally lacked material supply and financial plans [ Kuo Chien, 1956] . 
By 1957, the year when comprehensive planning had been developed 
as far as it ever would be, six plans stood out as the most important. 
These were commonly called 'the six big plans' or sometimes 'the production, 
technology and financial plans'. They consisted of plans for production, 
labour and wages, material supply (or material and technical supply), 
costs, finances, and technical organisation and measures [ C.K.F.C.K.J., 
1957a]. The latter plan was regarded as a means of helping to fulfill 
the first five. 
In principle the contents of these six big plans were quite detailed 
and were published in Chinese Textile Worker [ C,K.F.C.K.J., 1957aJ . The 
production plan included physical outputs of the various kinds of yarn, 
cloth and dyed products, together with their quality standard, the total 
output value, value of different products, and various techno-economic 
norms, such as the number of machines to be used and their speed of 
running, output of yarn per spindle hour, and the quantity of cotton to 
be used per bale of yarn. This plan also included some fixed capital 
items, such as materials for factory housing, and a major overhaul plan. 
The production plan was the basis for the compilation of all other plans. 
The labour and wage plan included the total number of staff and 
workers, a breakdown of total workers by types (e.g. production workers, 
technicians), the total wage bill and the average wage, the total value 
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output per worker and output per production worker. It also included 
a training plan for staff and workers. 
The material supply plan included the quantity of raw materials 
to be supplied and used, the supply of other materials, fuel, power, 
semi-finished products and the size of material stocks. 
The cost plan was divided into three parts; first, the budget 
of expenditures for production purposes, which included the total value 
of raw materials, other materials, fuel, wages and other expenditures; 
second, the cost plan, which included total cost and cost per unit for 
the various different yarn counts and cloth products, and the wage cost 
of the various products; third, the size of cost reduction in the 
planned period compared with the previous period. 
The financial plan consisted of a plan for income and expenditure, 
a plan for the use of circulating capital, a profit (or loss) plan and 
a plan for tax payments, the depreciation of fixed assets,^ bank loans 
and the enterprise bonus fund. 
The technical organisation and measures plan was meant to improve 
production techniques and methods, and covered such items as quality 
improvement, increasing labour productivity, economising on materials, 
reducing costs and speeding up the circulation of capital. 
In addition to the six big plans, a mill might possess several others, 
such as a basic construction plan, an equipment maintenance plan, a 
2 
subsidiary plan, a transport plan, a new products trial manufactiire plan, 
and an increase output and economise plan. The last was drawn up in 
the enterprise for its own internal use. 
Naturally not every item of all these plans carried the same weight. 
In 1957, there were twelve norms regarded as having commanding force, 
i.e. that the centre insisted must be filled. These were total output 
value, the output of major products, trial manufacture of new products, 
major techno-economic norms, the rate and size of cost reduction, the 
number of staff and workers, the number of workers employed at the year 
end, the total wage bill, the average wage, the productivity of labour, 
and profits. The actual preferences of state planners and mill managers 
are considered in Chapter 6. 
1 
Some versions put depreciation in the financial plan, others put it in 
the cost plan. 
2 
This plan only existed if the mill was a major subsidiary supplier of 
a parent mill, or was a subsidiary producer for materials handled on 
\ state unified allocation. 
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The question remains as to how realistic and accurate were the 
plans. At the factory level there were two types of plan norms, chih-
which were set at higher levels and had the force of an 
instruction, and ting-eh, which were drawn up within the mill, were 
much less important, and could be altered by the mill. Both sets of 
norms had quite a low accuracy level. As Yang Ying-chieh [1956] remarked, 
'The major deficiency [in planning work] is that the plan is "incomplete, 
superficial and inaccurate".' Parts of a plan were often missing: even 
at the level of the State Planning Commission some plans lacked all the 
private run industry section, while some even lacked the state run 
industry part [Yang Ying-chieh, 1955a],. Presumably these two situations 
rarely coincided or there seems little left for inclusion. Plan targets 
set for private run industry and for the individual economy were very 
poor, as they were most often estimates by higher levels, based on 
samples rather than on actual reports. This procedure was recommended 
[Yang Ying-chieh, 1955b] . [ Zielinski J.G., 1968:5] has suggested that 
the operative plans must be complete, but that the perspective plans 
need not be. It would seem that the First Five Year Plan, on the 
whole a reasonable document, was better made and more complete than the 
annual and quarterly plans in China between 1953 and 1957. 
There were several reasons for the inaccuracies and lack of 
completeness in plans. There was a dire shortage of skilled statisticians 
and planners, compounded by the extension and increasing complexity of 
the planned part of the economy. Targets sent down were based in part 
on statistical reports sent up, and these were often of indifferent 
quality. In addition, the norms were frequently set by a few people 
sitting in an office with no real recognition of the actual problems 
in production. The practice of factory management of seeking low 
targets by making minimal suggestions affected the accuracy of norms, 
as did the occasional occurrence of target inflation at intermediate 
levels when passing down plans. The stimulatory element in plans, that 
is to say, the habit of setting 'advanced' plans or ones difficult to 
achieve, common in 1958 and 1959, also had a distorting effect on 
realism of targets. One problem in standardisation and target realism 
was the custom of staff in different mills of drawing up norms in 
different ways and on different bases; in 1957 this still occurred in 
the Shanghai textile industry [E.C.A.B., 1957c] . 
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III. PROBLEMS IN PLANNING 
A major problem in planning work was the extreme shortage of skilled 
men, coupled with backward personnel practices which resulted in a 
misallocation of part of the pool of available talent. Lo Jih-yun 
[1954] commented on the textile industry that, 
'....the plan organs and organisation are unhealthy, the 
planning cadres are insufficient, the experience of 
planning personnel is insufficient, the various scientific 
intellectuals are poor, obviously planning work at present 
cannot catch up with the needs of objective reality.' 
The people engaged in economic planning had been transferred from other 
work and received no training in the new work they had to undertake. 
The higher levels were unconcerned about this and did not even hold 
specialist meetings, at which experiences could be exchanged. In 
this respect, planners were in an even worse position than the 
statistical and accounting personnel [Ch'uan Kuang-t'ai, 1956]. 
The shortage of well-trained professional men was general. In 
1956 there were over 60,000 graduates of higher education released for 
work, but the needs were for over 190,000 such graduates in that year 
[ J.M.J.P., 1956/8/2] . Despite the efforts in education, described by 
Orleans L.A. [ 1961] and Cheng Chu-yiian [ 1965] , the shortage of well-
educated personnel persisted. Some of the graduates were placed in 
unsuitable positions: of the 1606 requests for a change in work received 
between January and May 1956, 735 (45 per cent) complained that they 
were irrationally employed. 
The private managers in joint state-private enterprises were often 
underused; they had position but no power and their suggestions were 
frequently ignored [ Hu Tzu-ang, 1957] . Non-Party men were excluded from 
certain work [Shou Mo-ch'ing, 1957] . Hsia Hsiin-yiian [ 1957] stated that 
in the textile industry sectarianism existed, that relations between 
Communist Party cadres were very easy and they joked together, but they 
treated non-Party cadres as 'unsuitable guests.' Wu Pen-fan [1957] 
pointed out that in the relationship between Party and non-Party cadres, 
superficially they treated each other politely but actually there was 
little mutual respect. Some non-Party cadres felt that some of the Party 
cadres were not good enough at both business and study, while some Party 
cadres felt that non-Party cadres had backward ideology and bad attitudes. 
If a group of either Party or non-Party cadres were standing talking and 
one of the other group came up, talk immediately ceased. Huang Yu-ch'eng 
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[ 1957] reported that many old engineers and specialists had been trans-
ferred from the provinces to the Ministry of Textiles, but their new 
work was irrational and they were dissatisfied. 
The discrimination against non-Communists was admitted by Chou 
En-lai [ 1957] in his report to the National People's Congress in June 
1957, although he tempered his remarks by also criticising non-Party 
people who stood aloof, while conceding that the Party had often made 
insufficient attempts to approach them. Hsii Chang-ch'ing [ 1957] said 
that in his experience the old cadres were easier to approach, and it 
was the new Communist cadres that were more difficult. 
Labour was often misallocated between mills even under the same 
controlling body. Some mills would have surplus labour, others would 
have a labour shortage. In an effort to alleviate this, the East 
China Textile Administration Bureau [E.C.A.B., 1957b] divided the 
twenty-eight state run and fifty joint state-private run mills under 
its jurisdiction into nine groups. One cadre from a mill in the group 
was given the power to transfer workers within the group, and the 
Bureau could transfer workers between the groups. In the first half of 
1957 some 350 such transfers were made, which undoubtedly helped the 
situation in this part of China. 
Despite the overall shortage of educated personnel, there existed 
overstaffed departments with insufficient work for all their employees.^ 
The problem had been recognised as early as 1951 by Chou En-lai [1951], 
but matters did not seem to improve. Five years later, Chou En-lai 
[ 1956:57] reported that: 
'At present the various departments of the State Council are 
overstaffed and divided into too many levels, causing the lower 
organisations to be inundated with official documents, telegrams 
and forms. There are leading cadres in certain departments who 
are not even aware what directives have been issued from and 
what regulations have been made in their departments.' 
The People's Daily [ J.M.J.P., 1954/2/24] reported that the administrative 
organs tied up many cadres while many factories, mines and middle schools 
were short of cadres and teachers. Cadres in the organs with insufficient 
work did less than half a days work and sometimes had nothing to do for 
even longer periods. The First Five Year Plan [1955:231] had indicated 
that some state organs did not comply with state regulations concerning 
1 
The situation at the level of the enterprise is described in Chapter 5, 
pp.101-108. 
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personnel and freely enlarged their administrative apparatus and staff 
numbers. 
The Ministry of Textiles was criticised by Hsii Chang-ch'ing [ 1957] . 
Although the Ministry had not released figures on personnel numbers, he 
alleged that simple inspection of the Ministry dining room revealed that 
personnel numbers increased each year. In 1955 the Basic Construction 
Bureau of the Ministry of Textiles had discussed a reduction in their 
seventy-five employees, but by the spring of 1957 the figure exceeded 
ninety. The personnel were numerous but had little to do except read 
newspapers, in groups or individually, or else sit and talk. Many 
bureaus within the Ministry had their own personnel department and the 
Basic Construction Bureau even had four such departments. Hsii Chang-
ch'ing simply asked 'Is it necessary?' As Yuan Chi-ch'in [1957] put it 
when discussing the talked-about, but not achieved, streamlining of 
personnel within the Ministry of Textiles, 'One only hears the sounds 
on the stairs, but one can see no one descending.' The Ministry of 
Textiles appears to have been no better than the average government 
department in the matter of overstaffing. 
A second problem in planning was that for some years attitudes 
adverse to the concept of planning persisted in China. The attitude 
of the people involved can help or hinder the establishment of a planned 
system of development. Planning really commenced in 1953 and immediately 
it was reported that 'Some cadres still do not regard planning seriously' 
[T.K.P., 1953/7/26]. Opposition to domestic planning was common when 
trial efforts to introduce it were made in the textile industry in 1953 
[ Kao Fen, 1954] . The leaders of the Kwangtung Textile Mill were 
criticised for having a weak planning standpoint and lacking a serious 
attitude of responsibility towards the state plan [N.F.J.P., 1954/4/16] . 
A Russian expert criticised the leading personnel of some textile mills 
v;ho felt that they could work without any production plan [C.K.F.C., 1954] , 
as well as the attitudes of not wanting, or wanting to defer the intro-
duction of, domestic plans. Yang Ying-chieh [1955a] criticised various 
areas (apparently provinces) where planning work was not taken seriously 
and planning could not develop properly. He also criticised some 
ministries for not paying enough attention to compiling labour, cost, 
and financial plans, some non-industrial ministries for being deficient 
in making plans for industrial enterprises under their control, and some 
ministries that ' basically do not compile certain plans.' As late as 
1957 some planning cadres felt that they had little function and their 
morale was low [Kao Hsiang-chang,1957]. The lack of wholehearted acceptance 
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of planning undoubtedly hindered the establishment of a viable system. 
A third problem was that the people who made the plans rarely 
left their offices and saw what conditions were really like, nor did they 
investigate implementation, but were satisfied merely to draw up plans. 
Although objection to this was partly ideological, the lack of adequate 
information for planners, owing to poor data, added weight to the case. 
As Lo Jih-yiin [ 1954] remarked: 
'We do not know much of actual conditions in enterprises, we 
only know if a plan was fulfilled or not, but we do not know 
the reasons for how the plan was fulfilled or unfilled; V7e 
also do not know if the plans we make are good or bad.' 
Yang Ying-chieh [ 1956] said that fairly large resources were devoted to 
compiling a long period plan and annual plans up to 1956, but not enough 
attention was paid to inspecting the conditions of plan implementation. 
Wang Kuang-wei [ 1956] reported on the State Planning Commission: 
'In the past our deficiency was spending much time sitting 
in offices compiling plans, and spending little time going 
out to understand conditions and to inspect the situation 
of plan implementation." 
The general charge was repeated one year later [ Shou Han-ch'ing, 1957] . 
He Wen-t'ao [1958] made the same criticism and alleged that the state 
planning personnel not only did not listen to the opinions of scientists, 
technicians or engineers, but also paid insufficient attention to those 
of the central ministries and various provincial bodies. 
A fourth problem concerned poor statistics and data.^ It is 
generally agreed that knowledge of present conditions and reasonably 
accurate data are most desirable in planned economies [ Zielinski J.G., 
1968:127-129] , [ Lange 0., 1962b:28] , [ Waterston A., 1965:170-172,198] . 
The data available to planners v/ere generally of low accuracy and 
frequently out of date, owing to the time lags in getting information 
from the lowest levels of the system. Monthly reports were often late 
and quarterly and annual reports were frequently greatly delayed. When 
the central planners had to compile the 1958 plan the latest full 
year reports were for 1956. The statistical organisation sent a plethora 
of forms and tables, often complex and containing duplication, for the 
mills to fill in, but the result was generally poor. The statistical 
1 
The situation at the level of the enterprise is considered in Chapter 5, 
pp.92-96. 
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sysze-^ , v-as rarely able to study and adjust the data in order to turn the 
mass of figures into useful reports; the numerous reports and tables were 
little read and of little value [ Chou En-lai, 1953] , [ Hsiieh Mu-chino, 
1^ 5^61 , [Chen Yun, 1956:174] , [ Wanq Ssu-hua, 19581 . In addition to tlie 
problems of inaccuracy and lags, the statistical definitions, and form 
of calculation, used by the statistical system were not appropriate 
to the needs of the planners, and this reduced the usefulness of the 
data collected, [s.P.C., 1954],. [Li T'i, 1954]. 
A fifth problem was the major effect of the harvest in one year on 
the economy in the subsequent year. The clearest statement of the 
problem was probably given in Planned Economy! [C.H.C.C., 1957] : 
'....because our country is an agricultural country, the 
current year's harvest being good or bad has a great 
influence on the development of the national econom^^ in 
the forthcoming year, and the degree of goodness or badness 
of the agricultural harvest can only be seen in September 
and October, and this affects the time of compilation of the 
annual plan.' 
It is true that the fluctuations in harvests caused undulations in plan 
targets; this was not the fault of planning, as the harvest effect 
remains whether the economy is planned or not, but it did cause 
difficulties of target setting. The prime difficulty was that the 
national plan could not be commenced until late in the year. Planning 
resources were insufficient to allow the compilation of several alternate 
plans, earlier in the year, on a contingency basis. The fluctuations 
in annual outputs and targets could have been offset to some extent if 
sufficient stocks of materials had existed. Unfortunately it was not 
possible to maintain sufficient stocks in the textile industry as cotton 
supply was insufficient to run the industry at full capacity, and a 
sizeable surplus could not be built up. The absence of a stockpile of 
cotton in 1953-57 was commented on in 1959 [ Shen Hai-ch'ing and Fei 
K'ai-lung, 1959] . It was estimated in 1958 that cotton stocks of some 
three to four million tan (150-200,000 metric tons) would be necessary 
to even out the fluctuations caused by poor harvests [Ch'ang Yiian, 1958] . 
A sixth problem which affected development, as well as being a 
problem for the planners, was the wasteful use of capital. This was 
a scarce resource and it was desirable to allocate it to the best 
possible use. Much of the investment funds destined for productive 
use was wasted in non-productive ways. Some wastage was the result of 
a deliberate attempt to build a 'showpiece' establishment, other losses 
v/ore duo to sheer inefficiency. Chou En-lai [1954:10-11] referred to 
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the amount of waste as 'Another vital problem facina industry ' in 
the construction of one pov/er plant, he reported that over 14,400 
million yuan were tied up through unplanned buying of materials, 2,570 
million yuan were lost by a failure to apply promptly for allocation 
and delivery of materials, 1,800 million yuan through wasteful use, 
over 2,350 million yuan as a result of low working efficiency, and 2,300 
million yuan were lost as a result of building temporary buildings of 
too high quality on the construction site. Li Fu-ch'un [ 1955a:51-53] 
criticised the building of non-productive projects,excessively high 
building standards, too many auxiliary buildings, offices, living 
quarters, canteens, auditoria and club houses, and 'civic "beautifica-
tion"' . It was reported in the People's Daily [ J.M.J.P., 1955/5/5] 
that six central industrial ministries in 1953-54 spent 24.9 per cent 
of their total investment in non-productive ways, and based on returns 
from twenty-three provinces and municipalities, in 1954 the amount of 
non-productive investment was 47.6 per cent of total investment. 
Li Fu-ch'un returned to the attack in the People's Daily [Li Fu-ch'un, 
1955b] and the problems indicated in the article were deemed to be 
important enough in the textile industry for the article to be reprinted 
in Chinese Textiles [C.K.F.C., 1955]. After a general criticism along 
the lines he used earlier, he reported that non-productive investment by 
six central industrial ministries was 23.2 per cent of their total 
investment, compared with an average for the Soviet Union in its ^irst 
Five Year Plan of only 14.5 per cent. This is close to, but not 
identical with, the 24.9 per cent mentioned in the previous month. He 
also criticised new enterprises in particular, said that essential 
dormitories, health departments, canteens and schools were acceptable, 
but that with regard to other welfare facilities, such as clubs, rest 
rooms, sports fields, and areas planted with trees, the enterprises must 
submit requests for approval to develop them, and then only after the 
enterprise had started production. 
The Minister of Textiles, Chiang Kuang-nai [1955b], reported to the 
\ational People's Conaress that there was much waste in constructing, 
and eauipping'the mills. 
'Some units only just set up wanted to buy motor cars, sofas, 
radios, and carpets and of the best quality. One nill con-
sidered homo-made sofas costing 160 yuan as unworthy, and 
sent men to Tientsin to buy leather ones. Apart from this, 
some units' under construction blindly purchased things with-
out considering whether or not they could be used. For 
instance, one unit with 20 barbers bought 104 hairclippers and 
scissors and 128 razors, and people said they were enough for 
fortv vears use.' 
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The Chengchow State Run Number Three Cotton Mill was an example of 
a grandiose approach to construction. It was described as large, 
rich in nationality—style architecture, with asphalt roads running throucrh 
tree-lined grounds, spacious courtyards adorned with luxurious growths 
and Dotted plants, a 300-bed hospital within the grounds, and a workers 
cultural palace, including a theatre, library, auditorium, gymnasium and 
chess rooms, in the residential area [Cheng Hsin, 1959]. 
The Tsingtao Textile Administrative Bureau [T.T.A.B., 1955] investi-
gated waste in the mills under its jurisdiction. Between 1952 and 1954, 
various state run mills built new dormitories, canteens, nurseries, 
medical departments and bathing pools, for eleven million yuan, which was 
sixty-five per cent of all their basic construction investment. An 
attitude of wanting new buildings and at the same time slackening off 
on control of existing buildings (even new ones just built) was reported. 
Some people were described critically as renting out or selling their 
houses and applying for dormitory accommodation. The allocation of 
dormitories was itself criticised for irregularities. For example, some 
staff and workers who were in trouble did not receive accommodation, 
while some without any troubles were allocated a place. 
The trade unions contributed to the use of funds for non-productive 
purooses. Lai Jo-yu [ 1955b] reported at the Third Plenary Session of the 
Seventh Executive Committee of the A.C.T.F.U., that the unions spent 
profusely on high standard welfare projects, such as sanitaria, club 
houses, cultural palaces and creches, which were 'built magnificently 
and furnished lavishly', but many of the genuine problems of the masses 
remained unsolved. 
Po I-po [ 1958] reported that the efforts since 1955 to reduce overly 
high standards in construction and omit part of the construction projects 
had resulted in a reduction in the percentage of non-productive 
expenditure in total construction investment from over thirty to around 
twentv per cent. However, non-productive investment in the entire 
period of the First Five Year Plan was still 23.4 per cent. This figure 
is very close to the 23.3 per cent spent on non-productive investment by 
the six industrial ministries reported by Li Fu-ch'un in 1955. In 1958 
the amount of non-productive investment in new textile mills was still 
being criticised as excessive [C.K.F.C., 1958b]. 
A seventh oroblem in planning work was one of inadequate organisaticr. 
and lack of co-ordination between departments and units. Some examples 
of this have been touched on elsewhere, such as the fact that small 
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private run mills sometimes did not send reports to anv organisation 
before 1956, and the inability to transfer cotton between mills under 
different controlling bodies. 
Many more examples of the lack of co-ordination exist. It v/as 
difficult from the beginning to bring all the scattered production 
units under control and to co-ordinate them. During the long vears of 
war, many organs, such as various levels of local government, schools, 
army units. Party factions and the people's organisations, set up 
industrial, agricultural, commercial and construction units. After 
1949 it was not easy to bring these units together, as they were 
scattered, localised, aim.ed at profits, and preferred to be independent 
f w.H.Y.P., 1952b] . 
In 1952 the mills under the Chengchou Bureau received cotton with 
an illegally excessive water content from the Shantung Cotton, Yarn and 
Cloth Company. Despite being told by the town's Financial and Economic 
Committee, not to send more and to pay for drying costs, the Company 
continued to despatch poor cotton. This was reported to the Ministry 
of Textiles and to the Tsingtao Financial Committee. The latter came 
up v/ith an equitable compromise, but the Ministry replied that it was 
the responsibility of the recipients to use the cotton delivered, and if 
losses were made the mills could discuss it with the despatchers. As a 
result of this, a letter went in the People's Daily [Ting Chien-lo, 1953], 
in which the receiving Bureau openly criticised the Company and "linistry 
for their handling of the matter. 
The major effort to develop heavy industry was reportedly under-
mined by the actions of some. It was qovernment policv to transfer many 
of the better cadres to take part in building up heavy industrv, but 
some industrial and mining enterprises would not release such men. Not 
onlv would some firms not help in this cadre allocation, but some v/ould 
not co-ooerate at all with heavy industrial departments and refused to 
deal with their leqitimate requests [ J.M.J.P., 1954/3/3]. The lack of 
co-operation was therefore important enough to offset partially this 
f'undamental policy of the state. 
Lo Jih-yiin [ 1954] referred to the lack of co-ooeration between 
other departments and the planning departments; the other departments 
would not help the planning departments, largely because of proud self-
satisfaction, departmentalism, and lack of an overall viewpoint. 
Chang Shih-hung [ 1956] referred to many problems and lack of co-
ordination. Some departments of government were at loggerheads,- for 
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example, the labour insurance part may have agreed to the purchase of 
equipment to reduce temperatures in enterprises but the financial part 
refused to sanction it without a delay. This particular case required 
eleven communications and a letter to a newspaper to reach a solution. 
Within a town, factory A may have had a surplus labour and factory B was 
short, but men could not be freely transferred, although the 'welfare' 
of both factor ies could have been increased. The highest level control 
organs generally monopolised all power, irrespective of whether or not a 
matter was important, which led to poor control and understanding. By 
not agreeing to suggestions for improvement made by people below and bv 
refusing to make suggestions themselves, the higher control organs 
became a centre of resistance to solving problems. When some firms in 
Shanghai needed devices to reduce temperature in the factories, the 
Changming Industrial K'eh volunteered to supply them, as some were 
surplus to their requirements. They had no power simply to send them, so 
first requested permission from the Special Companies and were informed 
that such devices could only be transferred between firms under one 
Special Company. They then asked the municipal Light Industry Bureau 
and Heavy Industry Bureau for permission and were informed that the 
idea was a good one, but since the firms came under different Bureaus, 
it was impossible to do anything. A request then went to the highest 
local organs, the Third and Fourth Offices of the People's Committee, 
which also had no power to allow the voluntary transfer. 
The State Planning Commission itself was not in close contact with 
central ministries and provincial planning departments, despite the 
fact that the Commission had the task of balancing and co-ordinating 
their plans into a single national plan. The Commission also gave 
little help to these bodies in planning work [Wang Kuang-wei, 1955]. The 
planning departments were also estranged from the statistical departments, 
and, as late as 1956, neither knew what the other wanted or even what 
they did [ Lo Jih-yiin, 1956] . The industrial firms under the non-industrial 
ministries were in rather a peculiar position: their plans were very poor 
(some departments had no one specialising in the planning and control of 
these firms), their own draft plans were the latest of all to be sent 
up (in 1957 their suggested draft plans for that year only arrived at 
the State Economic Commission in March) and between 1953 and 1957 
co-ordination was poor: the firms kept being transferred from central 
to local control and vice-versa [ Ch'i Chun, 1957] . 
The period of One Hundred Flowers produced several reports of 
Door co-ordination. Huang Yii-ch'eng [ 1957] referred to poor co-operation 
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between the planning office and the basic construction bureau of the 
Ministry of Textiles. Kung Ming-an [1957] pointed to the habit of 
'mutually shuffling responsibility on to someone else' [ 'buckpassing' 1 
in textile administration. Li Ch'i-wan f1957] reported that the Peking 
State Run Number One Mill received the same directives on financial work 
as an administrative bureau, and it was felt that the Ministry was not 
giving enough concrete help to the mills. He also said that sometimes 
different mills received identical instructions but the managers in 
different mills sometimes interpreted the instructions differently, and, 
owing to poor communications, different results would emerge. Lack of 
co-ordination between different departments of the Ministry sometimes 
caused them to contradict each other in their directions to the mills. 
Chou Tao-hung [ 1957] pointed to the problems of lack of co-ordination 
in development of the different provinces and towns. Many of them 
asked the higher levels for large quantities of textile equipment but 
there was no long run plan for the future of the different areas, which 
made it difficult for the decision-makers when deciding who should 
receive the equipment. He indicated that if even a provisional plan 
existed, then areas with surplus equipment could send it to those areas 
with the anticipated fastest growth in needs. As things stood, areas 
with surplus equipment kept it while other areas with a shortage had to 
order new machinery, either domestically or from abroad, thus wasting 
capital. 
An eighth problem in planning was that the control and planning 
of finances was fairly poor. In principle financial control should 
have been close, given the two main institutions and their powers. Close 
control might also be expected because central planning could be better 
if financial regulations were followed, and serious inflation was in 
practise avoided, suggesting that finances were in good order. At 
least one western authority believes financial control was tight: 'The 
state bank exercises a close degree of financial control over 
industrial and marketing units, ' [ Ecklund G.N., 1966:36], 
In practise close financial control was never generally achieved in 
the textile industry in the period under consideration. This is also true 
of industry in general. Before 1954 very little assistance with financial 
work had been given by higher levels to the administration bureaus or 
the mills. In turn, the bureaus did little in the way of inspection of, 
or control over, the financial activities of the mills.[ M. of T., 1954c] . 
It was stated that the order of priority followed in the Shanghai textile 
industry as 'output first, quality second, and costs third.' This was 
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regarded as not being a correct attitude [Chang Ch'eng-tsung, 1954]. 
Quality, rarely an important goal of managers, ranked above finances in 
their eyes. 
In 1955 the First Five Year Plan [1955:195] revealed that the 
People's Bank was not yet in a position to control the enterprise wage 
fund and asked that this should gradually be begun. The same source 
stated that state organs frequently violated the financial principles 
of the state [1955:231]. Close financial control was difficult for 
technical reasons. Unsuitable systems,or the absence of systems 
encouraged corruption and theft. Several examples were supplied by 
the People's Daily [ 1954/6/4] : an accountant in a firm might keep the 
money and the official seals and act as purchasing agent of the firm, 
with no one checking on what he did; factory directors were in the 
habit of affixing the official seal on books of blank cheques and 
leaving them lying about. The poor standard of non-financial plans 
meant that it was extremely difficult to operate a financial plan in 
any case [N.E.A.B., 1956] . 
Before 1957, the finance plan and cost plan were not on the same 
basis; the former were divided into quarters but the latter (together 
with certain other plans) were, not so divided. As a consequence, it 
was most difficult to compare fulfillment of the cost plan with that of 
the financial plan. Changes in the output plan during the course of a 
year added to the confusion [ Chu I-chao, 1957] . 
Financial plans were often either ignored or actively opposed in the 
mills. 'A small number' of mills only controlled output and never 
considered finances [Fang Chen-yiian, 1955] . In one mill that established 
a monthly financial plan in late 1954, the financial department was 
obstructed by the top level management, which would aive no assistance. 
Other departments also ignored the finance department, causing the 
latter to be forced to estimate figures that were actually available 
in other departments in the mill. By 1956 the finance department still 
had little idea about income and expenditure, finances could not be 
controlled, and the monthly financial plan was dropped. Some improvement 
o c c u r r e d only after the bureau criticised the mill [N.E A.B., 1956] . This 
situation was typical of the general situation in the mills under the 
North-west Textile Administration Bureau. The effort to introduce 
monthly financial plans in 1955 had been resisted by management, as 
the use of funds had previously been uncontrolled and the change would 
mean that funds could no longer be used freely [Chiang Hsi-sheng, 1956]. 
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By 1956 all mills had reportedly established a monthly financial plan 
but some people doubted its value, did not like its specific form, and 
generally had little faith in the idea [M. of T., 1956d]. 
The Party organisation in the mills was also antagonistic to 
financial controls. In late 1956 and in 1957, after the Party Committee 
had established itself in command of management some Party members wanted 
to abolish the Financial Statement Meetings, as they were associated 
with the defunct one-man management system, were too restrictive, were 
undemocratic, pressured the cadres and masses, and their content over-
lapped that of other meetings [Ming, 1957] . 
In 1957 the effort to impose financial control ended in the Great 
Leap Forward when the Party eroded the position of the People's Bank 
and the masses took charge of such items as the control of the working 
capital in the mills. 
Richard Diao [1966:15,40] admitted that in the period 1953-1957 
financial planning was never taken seriously either by the planning 
organs or the finance organs themselves, while in the 1960s the finance 
plans were inferior to both production and technical plans. Informant 
number seven believed that the People's Bank could not send personnel 
to the mill to inspect the books, nor could it prevent anything from 
being done. His reason for believing this was that it simply never 
happened in his mill. Informant number eight reported that the People's 
Bank could send people to the mills but that it very rarely did so - it 
was far more likely to be the administration bureau, the tax office, or 
if applicable, the export company that sent such personnel. 
In 1957 the problem was well described by Tso Ch'un-t'ai and Li 
Hai-chu [ 1957:74-75] . 
'But with regard to the general situation, the control of 
finances in socialist enterprises is a new job for us, and 
is still a weak link in our work. And so there are many problems 
existing in the financial and credit systems. For instance, at 
present of the income of state run enterprises (including tax 
and profits for forwarding), the situation in handing up tax to 
the state treasurv (this is handed up as the enterprises please) 
is thirty-five per cent, and the situation for profits forwarding 
to the state treasury (this is forwarded monthly;) is sixty-five 
per cent. The total profits of enterprises are large but the 
forwarding is slow (one months profit is kept in the enterprises 
before forwarding to the state treasury at the month's end), 
the profit plans of most enterprises are easy to fulfill and 
enterprise managers do not feel any pressure on financial work.' 
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Some enterprises did not send up the profits for as long as six months. 
The Ministry of Finance had no special department responsible for over-
seeing profit forwarding and this made supervision very difficult. In 
any case, punishment was not applied for such financial indiscipline 
[ C.H.C.C. , 1956c] . 
The use of trade credit provides an example of the generally slack 
control of finances. Such credit between enterprises was forbidden as 
early as 1950 [ Wang Lan, 1950] , although the regulations were to be 
introduced gradually. In 1953, trade credit relations still existed 
and measures for controlling it were brought in,but by 1955 trade credit 
was still a widespread phenomenon in several industries, including 
textiles [C.L. Regs., 1955] , and the credit figure of some firms was as 
high as seventeen per cent of their working capital. Further efforts to 
curb trade credit were made, but it still continued in 1959, when 
another attempt to stop it was made [ J.M.J.P., 1959/8/16] . The use of 
trade credit was still being struggled against in 1964 [ Tuan Yiin, 1964] . 
Simply declaring a legal ban on trade credit was insufficient to prevent 
its use on quite a large scale. 
In view of the low regard of financial planning in industry and 
the inability of the People's Bank and Ministry of Finance to maintain 
close control over trade credit, enterprise wage funds and working 
capital, it might have been expected that inflation would have been a 
likely outcome. This was, however, avoided in general. Diverting 
part of the wage fund and working capital to other uses, mainly investment, 
was not particularly inflationary: the total money supply did not 
increase and consumer demand might have been lessened. In addition, the 
gestation period was short in light industry, so that increased capacity 
would result in a rapid increase in the output of goods, as long as 
materials for processing could be obtained. A further possible reason 
for the avoidance of inflation is that the central authorities had such 
a high degree of awareness of the political (^angers of allov.-ing 
inflation to be reintroduced that the aggregate financial management 
of the economy was most conservative. This has been true of the ruling 
elite in Taiwan during the last twenty years. It seems probable that in 
China ex ante aggregate demand was maintained so much below supply 
potential, that even with slack financial control, and the unwanted 
existence of trade credit, aggregate demand ex post was still not greatly 
in excess of aggregate supply, so that general inflation was by and 
large successfully avoided. 
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A ninth problem for the central planners was that local planning 
was very weak. Yang Ying-chieh [1955a] pointed to the poor state of 
planning for local run firms; the work of establishing planning 
committees for provinces was only just beginning, and there were areas 
with unhealthy planning organs, unclear division of resnonsibility 
between units, and insufficient cadres. In 1955, over twenty per cent 
of the hsien had set up neither a planning committee nor a planning and 
statistics office, and planning was not being done. Of those hsien that 
had some planning organs, some were in a very poor state, with tasks 
not clear, no duties laid down, and organs not knowing what they were 
supposed to do [ Chou Chung-fu, 1955] . Shanghai was the largest centre 
for textiles in China and had the largest concentration of private run 
mills. A speech by Kuo Chien, Director of the Shanghai Municipal Planning 
Committee [ 1956] , revealed that in Shanghai industry, many of the 
enterprises which had a production plan totally lacked a material 
supply or finance plan. The level of planning work in Shanghai was very 
low and the charge of 'incomplete, superficial and incorrect' was 
justified. Co-ordination was poor. All central enterprises were outside 
the scope of the local plan; there was imbalance not only between central 
and local run firms but also between output, transport and construction 
activities. In textiles, cotton yarn was supplied by the East China 
Textile Administrative Bureau, but knitted products, cloth, and dyeing 
and printing were controlled by the Municipal Textile Administrative 
Bureau, which situation adversely affected the planning of the cotton 
textile industry. Of the local state run and new local joint state-
private run firms of all kinds in Shanghai, formal plans only existed 
for 243 units in 1956, which was equivalent to a mere 23 per cent of 
local industry total output value; the remaining firms had targets 
based on estimates only. There were over 20,000 local run firms in 
Shanghai, which means that a maximum of 1.2 per cent of these had formal 
plans. 
Local planning was still very poor in 1957 [ Kao Hsiang-chang, 1957] . 
Towards the end of 1958, local planning in Shensi Province was weak, 
mistakes and deficiences were reported, and the people even felt that 
'the planning organs do not have a plan' [C.H.C.C., 1958]. 
There were several reasons for the poor state of local planning 
in China before the Great Leap Forward. The first reason was that the 
effort to establish a planned economy was seriously restricted to the 
central run economy. As Hsiieh Mu-chiao [ 1957] remarked, 
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'...we paid rather a lot of attention to the state run 
economy, and paid rather scant attention to the other 
parts of the economy; we paid rather a lot of attention 
to enterprises and undertakings run by the centre, and 
rather scant attention to the local economy and local 
undertakings.' 
This problem had been recognised in 1955 [C.H.C.C., 1955b] but little had 
apparently been done to correct this in the subsequent two years. As a 
consequence of the general attitude, local planning began to be set 
up later than central planning, and with less vigour. 
A second reason for poor local planning was that local run firms 
by their nature were more difficult to plan. Local plans covered many 
types of enterprises: local state run, joint state-Drivate run, and 
handicraft. These were most numerous, very varied in size, technology, 
and efficiency, and were different industries. Poor statistics and 
lack of information was common, which frequently forced the planners 
to make estimates and guesses, which were used as the basis for compiling 
plans. The 'high tide' of socialisation in late 1955 and early 1956 
resulted in a big increase in work for local planners but barely affected 
the Ministry of Textile's planners. Central run mills were much easier 
to plan: they were more homogeneous, fewer in number, larger in size, 
and more modern in technique. The ^Ministry of Textiles only concerned 
itself with textile firms, and data on these central run firms was better. 
A third reason for poor local planning was that some local areas 
did not perceive what the central government was trying to achieve, 
they misunderstood central directives, and were not clear about the 
targets and specific policy statements sent down from the centre or 
given by the local Party Committee. This situation was reported to have 
existed in Shensi province [ C.H.C.C., 1958] . The same article alleged 
that the Party had been largely excluded from planning in the Province 
before 1958, and that this was a reason for the lack of ideological work 
and for the undesirable emphasis on materials and investment rather than 
on people. In this respect it was a product of its time. 
A tenth problem in trying to run a planned economy in an efficient 
manner was the presence of dilatory procedures and time consuming 
processes. Documents frequently required the signatures or chops of many 
people. Other examples of time consuming running methods are given in 
Chapter 5, pp.104-105. 
A final problem faced by the planners at all levels was the occurrenc; 
of abrupt changes in policy or the commencement of movements by the ruling 
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elite. The new policies were often introduced after the start of the 
year and had not been incorporated in the annual plan. It was necessary 
to try to fit them into the quarterly plans and to adjust or else ignore 
the original plan. The sudden call for rapid socialisation by Chairman 
Mao Tse-tung in 1955 is a good example of this kind of problem. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PLANNING AND THE PLANNERS (2) 
Various problems which were faced by the state planners and 
administrators and were common to almost all industries in China were 
considered in Chapter 3. In addition, the planners had to contend with 
several problems of allocation. The fundamental economic problem of 
allocating resources between competing sectors and industries is well 
known, but in a planned economy the problem of sub-sectoral allocation 
is most important, and the market cannot be relied upon to handle this. 
The major problems of allocation within the cotton textile industry were 
by location, by ownership and control of mill, by size and by technology. 
It is probable that planners also had to decide on the amount of 
production for the home market and for export. It appears likely that 
they would have to strike a balance between the maximum textile exports 
possible and the minimum amount required for home consumption. It is not 
clear how this was done, as the problem has not been found discussed 
in the literature. 
I. ALLOCATION BY LOCATION 
This section also covers allocation between new and old (inherited) 
mills, as virtually all old mills were in coastal areas and most new 
mills were away from the coastal areas. There were two major reasons 
for the existing pattern of location. The primary reason was that most 
mills were in the colonial settlements built up since the nineteenth 
century, and these settlements were in coastal areas. These settlements 
were the recipients of most of the foreign investment in China and were 
the site of foreign owned enterprises. Additionally they attracted a 
good many domestically owned firms because of the political security, 
relatively efficient administration (including of foreign trade), growth 
of less restrictive traditional social attitudes among the local Chinese 
and economic advantages of concentration of industry. The second reason 
for coastal location was that after the invasion of China the Japanese 
built up an industrial base in Manchuria. Since this mainly consisted 
of heavy industry, it was clearly less important as an explanation of 
textile location. 
The degree of regional concentration was high. The modern textile 
industry was almost exclusively located in coastal areas and was 
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particularly heavily concentrated in three cities: Shanghai, Tientsin 
and Tsingtao. In 1949, approximately two-thirds of all spindles and 
looms were located in these three cities alone. L^n industrial survey 
before Liberation [N.E.C., 1948:27-28] revealed that of 14,078 factories 
in urban China, 3773 were textile mills, and of these, 2,786 were in 
Shanghai. Details of the regional location of textile equipment are 
given in Table 14, page 72. 
The existing pattern of industrial location was felt undesirable 
for several reasons. One was a rather vague idea that such an imbalance 
was irrational and that all areas should be roughly of the same decree 
of development. A variation of this was argued on humanitarian grounds 
or, in a related form, that it was politically desirable to assist the 
the peasants in the rural areas of the interior. National defence was 
strongly argued as a reason for relocating further from the vulnerable 
coastal cities, v/hich were well within reach of foreign invasion, 
either by the Kuomintang or, in view of the Korean War, possibly by 
America. Economic arguments for locating nearer rural markets and supplies 
of fuel and raw materials were mentioned, although the concept of 
absorbing rural under-employment was apparently developed later, about 
1957, as mention of the latter was not found in the literature of the 
early period. An economic argument of perhaps more siibstance was that 
the old dual economy, in which foreign-owned firms, located on the coast, 
imported materials for processing in China, had been broken. The newly 
created national economy, together with an autarchic view of development, 
meant that coastal location might in any case no longer be optimal. 
This was never clearly laid out in the literature of the textile industry, 
but was perhaps appreciated, since the new government was well aware of 
the previous pattern. 
The textile industry was specially mentioned as one that could 
materially assist in the policy of relocation of industry [F.F.Y.P., 
1955:42] . The three methods adopted were to move some equipment 
physically, to transfer skilled labour to new areas, and to build new 
mills away from old areas. The physical movement of mills and equipment 
was the least important method. It was never taken up as an issue in 
press or journals, it was never a subject for campaigns, and most old 
mills remained on the coast. References to moving mills are scarce, but 
the Chung Yuan Textile Company was reportedly one of a number of firms 
moved to Honan from the old coastal areas [N.C.N.A., 1954]. 
The transfer of skilled labour from old to new areas and mills was 
quite substantial in view of the shortage of this resource. From 1949 
71 
to 1956, Shanghai sent over 270,000 people to the interior, of whom 
28,000 were technical engineers and over 170,000 were technicians 
[Liu Chih-ch'eng, 1958] . In the textile industry, over 3,400 managerial 
and technical personnel, together with more than 1,100 high grade 
technicians, were transferred from Shanghai between 1953 and late 1956 
[T.K.F., 1956/11/5] . The same source reported that all the major 
managerial and technical personnel of the thirteen new mills being built 
or completed in Peking, Chengchou,Shihchiachuang and Sian in 1956 were 
transferred from Shanghai. It had earlier been reported [N.C.N.A., 
1953b] that in 1953 more than 2,300 workers, technicians and administrat-
ive personnel had been sent from Shanghai to new textile mills in Peking 
and Chengchou. Shanghai was clearly used as a recruiting ground for 
the new areas. As very few transferred personnel were replaced, this 
eventually began to denude Shanghai industry, which suffered as a result 
[Ma Yin-ch'u, 1957a] . Old mills also suffered since they generally sent 
young workers and were eventually left with an ageing workforce, which 
was described as consisting of 'old and weak remnant troops'. This 
resulted in a lower attendance rate, increased welfare expenditures and 
difficulty in increasing productivity in old mills [Chang Han-ch'ing 
and Chao Hsiang-shih, 1957]. 
The third method of relocation, building new mills away from the 
old areas, was the most important. Priority on the allocation of 
industrial investment went largely to the new areas. Of the 825 above-
norm industrial projects built in the First Five Year Plan period, 530 
were located in the interior [ Yang Ching-wen, 1957] , while only one 
per cent of industrial investment in new enterprises went to Shanghai 
and Tientsin [ T.C.K.T.T.H., 1956e] . Most new textile mills were built 
away from the old areas. Five new textile areas were developed during 
the First Five Year Plan period: Peking, Shihchiachuang, Hantan, 
Chengchou and Sian [Chang Fang-tso, 1957]. The Chinese apparently used 
the terms 'coastal' and 'interior' in a loose fashion; the former some-
times referred to old areas, the latter to new ones. Some areas regarded 
as interior were actually in coastal provinces. The coastal provinces 
consist of Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Shantung, Hopei, and 
Liaoning. The new centres of Hantan and Shihchiachuna regarded as 
interior, are in coastal Hopei Province. Twenty-four of the thirty-eight 
new cotton mills in the First Five Year Plan were to be located in non-
coastal provinces, but on an old and new industrial basis, thirty-five 
of the thirty-eight were in new areas. 
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Development of the existing textile areas was virtually ignored 
throughout the period of the First Five Year Plan [Liu Chih-ch'eng, 1958]. 
These areas were exploited for their ability to accumulate capital by 
means of high profits, but the capital was directed into other areas; 
in short, they financed much of the development of the interior. 
Industry in Tientsin supplied enough capital to the state between 1949 
and 1955 to build six textile mills [Sha Ying, 1956]; it should be 
recalled that only thirty-eight new mills were included in the First 
Five Year Plan. Shanghai achieved even more. Chih Yin [1956] pointed 
out that since 1949 shanghai industry had supplied profits and taxes 
amounting to 20.9 per cent of all investment in basic construction in the 
First Five Year Plan. Liu Chih-ch'eng [1958] gave a later figure for 
accumulation in Shanghai during the First Five Year Plan period of over 
one third of all basic construction investment and over one half of all 
industrial basic construction investment in China. P'an Hsiieh-min 
[1959], a member of the Shanghai Municipal Economic Planning Committee, 
reported that Shanghai accumulated over 18,900 million yuan during the 
period of the First Five Year Plan, which was equivalent to 38.5 per 
cent of state investment in capital construction in that period. 
As a result of the policy to relocate industry, a discernible 
change had occurred in the location of textile equipment by 1956. 





















1936 5.10 58. 44 87.7 90.0 12.3 10.0 68.0 69.9 
1947 4.92 66. 41 85.5 92.1 14.5 8.9 63.2 68. 5 
1949 5.0 127 87.2 92.1 12.8 7.9 62.4 70. 4 
1952 5.61 142 81.8 90.1 18.2 9.9 56.7 65.1 
1956 6.82 175 73.6 74.2 26.4 25.8 47.2 46.5 
1957 8.01 203 70 69 30 31 
Note: 1. The figures for looms exclude those in independent weaving 
mills and in dyeing mills. 
2. Total spindles and looms in 1957 obtained by adding the 
reported increases in 1953-57 to the figure for 1952, see 
[C.K.F.C., 1958b]. 
Source: [S.S.B., 1958a:150,154,162,187]. [ Ch'en Wei-chi, 1958]. 
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A noticeable fall occurred in the percentage of spindles and looms 
in coastal areas, and especially in the three major cities. The oolicy 
of relocation was apparently being successfully implemented by 1956, 
and it had been anticipated that satisfactory relocation would not be 
obtained by the end of the First Five Year Plan period [Li Fu-ch'un, 
1955a:41] . It IS not commonly appreciated that more cotton was grown in 
coastal areas than in the interior, or that the state was able to 
purchase a higher proportion of the cotton produced in coastal areas. 
In 1955, of the total cotton production, some 58.2 per cent was grown 
in coastal areas, and of this coastal cotton, the state managed to 
purchase 88.3 per cent. Of the 41.8 per cent of cotton grown in the 
interior, the state could only purchase 72.5 per cent [S.S.B., 1958a:189] 
In other words, of the state purchases of cotton in 1955, 62.9 per cent 
came from coastal areas and only 37.1 per cent from the interior. The 
imbalance between the location of equioment and cotton purchase was 
real, but by 1957 was not serious. 
The policy of diverting so many resources to new areas was open to 
several points of criticism. The new areas merely duplicated existing 
and unused capacity in the old areas, labour productivity was higher in 
old areas, the level of technology was higher in old areas, produce 
quality was better in old areas, input-output ratios were more favourable 
in old areas and the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) was lower 
in old areas. In short, it was inefficient to leave the old areas under-
used and not to develop them further. 
The capacity of industry in the old coastal areas was underused, 
which was pointed out several times. The First Five Year Plan itself 
[F.F.Y.P., 1955:229] indicated that the utilisation of existing equipment 
was low and at the same time new enterprises were demanded. Sha Ying 
[ 1956] favoured greater use of the under-utilised coastal industry; Liu 
Shao-ch'i [1956:51] asked that full use be made of coastal industry, as 
did Chou En-lai [1956c:68] , although the latter cautiously advocated new 
industrial bases also. The rapid expansion of new textile mills, along 
with underuse of old mills, some of which actually reduced their output, 
was criticised by Chang Han-ch'ing and Chao Hsiang-shih [ 1957] . 
The situation of underused caoacity in the old coastal areas was 
well known in Shanghai, where it was examined more than once. One 
survey revealed that heavy industry in Shanghai worked at high capacity, 
but that industry in general worked below 70 per cent, cotton cloth at 
61 per cent and cotton yarn at only 54 per cent [ Chih Yin, 1956] , In 
Shanghai in 1956, the plan for the production of several products. 
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including knitwear, was for less than fifty per cent of capacity 
[C.H.C.C., 1956b] . The situation in Tientsin was no better, for this 
source revealed that a survey of thirty-eight products showed that six 
industries were at 70-80 per cent capacity, seventeen were between 41 
and 60 per cent, while fifteen worked below 40 per cent capacity. None 
of the industries of the thirty-eight products examined exceeded 80 per 
cent capacity working. In the One Hundred Flowers movement the problem 
was again referred to, and, although it had begun to be corrected in 
heavy industry, it was said that it had not been tackled properly in 
textiles [ Chou Ch'un-tsuo, 1957] . 
The productivity of labour was higher in the old coastal areas. 
Informant number eight attended an important meeting on labour product-
ivity in the textile industry in 1958. He recalled the figures and 
insisted they were reasonably accurate. Tested without warning after a 
period of two months he reproduced them with only minor variations, 
which are shown in Table 15 as a range. These variations do not 
materially affect the ranking order. The mills in old areas had 
considerably higher productivity, up to three times that of newer areas. 
Yen Tzu-ch'ing [1958] reported that labour productivity in Shanghai 
mills in 1956 was 16,782 yuan per head, in line with the informant's 
figures. 
Table 15 : Labour Productivity in the Cotton Textile Industry 
in Various Areas in 1958 
Location Labour productivity in yuan 




Peking 8- 9,000 
Shihchiachuang 8- 8,500 
Sian 7,500 
Sinkiang 7,000 
Inner Mongolia 6,000 
There were many reasons for the lower productivity in new areas. 
Mills in the new areas employed new workers, often peasants, who were 
unskilled, unused to factory life, and slow to learn. One report said 
that five or six new workers were not as good as one old one [ Chin Sheng, 
1955] , probably an exaggeration but indicative of attitudes. Peasants 
reportedly loafed on the job, refused apprenticeships and difficult 
tasks, had low work standards and safety records, and tended to drift 
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from job to job [ Ch'i Ko, 1959] . Recruitment of workers for new mills 
was sometimes delayed, so that the mill would commence operations with 
insufficient labour, causing the management to hire anyone regardless 
of aptitude. 
Social problems were common. Most of the new workers were young, 
and women are a high proportion of the workforce in textiles. Having 
secured an industrial post, the girls often married quickly, and within 
a year of a new mill opening there was an upsurge in requests for 
maternity leave, causing a serious replacement problem [Chang Han-ch'ing 
and Chao Hsiang-shih, 1957]. Social problems existed in areas where 
several new mills had been built, for between ten and twenty thousand 
young women workers could find no marriage partner [ Hsii Chang-ch' ing, 
1957] . Other problems were caused when experienced workers transferred 
from existing mills to new ones were unable to take their families with 
them. In addition, the old mills tended to send their poorer workers and 
troublemakers as far as possible, retaining the better ones for themselves 
[ Informant number 8] . 
Wage policy in new mills also caused complaints, since the 1956 wage 
regulations were not always imolemented in these mills, and dissatisfaction 
arose as the workers considered they were underpaid [A.H.J.P., 1959/5/9] . 
In particular, the treatment of apprentices caused problems, and new mills 
had many apprentices. The wage regulations stipulated that apprentices 
should receive lower wages than ordinary workers, during and even after 
the apprenticeship period. Some mills followed the regulations, others 
paid more than the statutory rates, which led to disputes, particularly 
if the mills were in the same city. This happened in Peking, where the 
Number Two Mill paid high wages to apprentices, and the Number Three 
Mill paid low ones [Chang Yi, 1957]. The Peking Number One Mill also had 
its wage problems: on commencement of operations in 1954 the workers 
were paid a provisional wage 23-25 per cent lower than the normal textile 
wage, and by 1956 the mill had still not raised the level [ J.M.J.P., 
1956/3/5] . 
As a consequence of these problems labour relations in the new mills 
left much to be desired. Relations were so poor in the Joint State-
Private Run Anhui Number One Dyeing and Printing Mill that the workers 
grumbled, made disparaging remarks about the leaders, and some began to 
write notes to the director saying simoly "Beware:' [A,H.J.P., 1959/5/9]. 
It is not difficult to see the reasons for low labour productivity in new 
mills. 
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The level of technology was higher in the old industrial areas. 
This was indicated in general by the movements to 'learn from Shanghai', 
and Ma Yin-ch' u [ 1957a] implied it when recommending that cadres and 
technicians for new interior factories should go to old coastal factories 
to learn, saying that Shanghai had the role of developing new goods and 
new technology. Chih Yin [ 1956] enumerated the advantages of developing 
Shanghai's industry, and included advanced technology as one point, 
while informant number eight insisted that technology in the old bases 
was superior to that of the new. The old coastal areas had an estab-
lished industrial tradition, and supplies of experienced labour were 
available, including the families of workers if necessary, since they 
often had experience. 
The new areas faced certain technical problems. Although their 
machines were new, they were merely copies of old machines and no 
advantage was taken of technical progress that had occured. Several 
informants stated this; Ch'en Ch'ung-chin [ 1957] complained that the 
new machines were crude and of an old style; and Ma Shih-shang [ 1957] 
said that they were copies of twenty year old machines. Because of 
enthusiasm to meet tight plans, the machinery was often installed too 
quickly causing losses to the state [ Lo Jih-yun, 1954] . As a result of 
over-speedy installation the machines were sometimes out of balance, 
causing them to work badly, wear rapidly and break down. The stage of 
trial running was sometimes dispensed with, and in one case, with new 
machines imported from other Communist countries, the machines only 
achieved twenty per cent of the quota set for eight hours and even 
stopped working in that time [Chin Sheng, 1955]. Breakdowns were 
repaired badly - or not at all [ Informant number eight] . When initially 
supplied some machines were incomplete, lacking essential parts, and no 
spare parts were supplied with them. 
Of the funds available to spend in new mills, not enough was 
allocated to machinery and technology,. Instead of constructing an 
efficient factory equipped with first-rate machines, much effort went 
into building showpieces, comolete with high-priced shrubs and flower 
gardens, gold fish ponds and fountains, and an excessive range of welfare 
facilities.^ 
The quality output from mills in old areas was superior on average 
to that from mills in new areas. In view of the problems already discussed 
1 
See Chapter 3,pp.57-59 for.details. 
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it is not surprising that this was the case. Informant number eight 
was emphatic about this, and said that approximately 60-65 per cent of 
all textile exports were produced in Shanghai. It was suggested that 
Shanghai should increase production in order to satisfy export as well 
as domestic markets [ Chi Yin, 1956] . Only the highest quality produce 
was exported, which suggests that Shanghai was a major source of high 
quality output. The ordinary consumers in China were said to have 
confidence in the quality of goods produced in old factories [Li Feng, 
1957]; by implication they had little confidence in goods from newer 
ones. It was announced in 1958 that Shanghai would henceforth concentrate 
on the production of high grade textiles which the inland areas were not 
able to produce [N.C.N.A., 1958a], reinforcing the view that the new 
mills in the interior were still inferior. 
Input-output ratios were more favourable in old coastal areas. 
Examining the amount of cotton used to make one bale of yarn, the average 
of all mills in China was 392 chin, of central run nills it was 389 chin, 
but in Shanghai it was only 387 chin [ Ching Wei, 1957] . In the case of 
yarn output per spindle year, in the first half of 1955, the national 
average was 0.979 bales, but it reached 1.082 in Tientsin and 1.069 in 
Tsingtao. The average for Shanghai was not given, but it was reported 
that 55.5 per cent of Shanghai mills exceeded one bale of yarn per 
spindle year [Liu Chi-wan and Lu Chi-liang, 1956]. 
Finally, the incremental capital-output ratio was lower in the old 
coastal areas than in the new bases. The Chinese did not use the term 
I.C.O.R. but they did refer to 'the principle of "less investment with 
quicker and greater results".' [ J.M.J.P., 1957/1/6] , which is a rather 
crude approach to capital-output ratios. It was pointed out in an 
editorial in the People's Daily [ J.M.J.P., 1956/7/8a] that small adjust-
ments in machinery in Shanghai factories could lead to a doubling of 
output, or even increase it several hundred per cent. The claim was 
repeated two days later, with the additional information that in the 
case of instrument factories, in order to reach a certain output, it 
would require a factory in the interior to be twice as large and would 
take four times the investment needed on the coast, even ignoring the 
three year gestation lag [ Chih Yin, 1956] . This general situation was 
true of light industry as a whole [ J.M.J.P., 1956/7/8a] and for Shanghai 
textile mills to produce a given increase in output, the needed invest-
ment was only half of that required to build a new mill [N.C.N.A., 1956c] . 
The same source revealed that one reason for the lower I.C.O.R. in 
Shanghai was that as late as 1956 firms frequently had empty buildings 
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standing idle in which machinery could easily and cheaply be installed. 
In addition, various ancilliary services, such as electricity supply and 
transport, were readily available in the old industrial areas, and co-
ordination was in general easier [Ma Yin-ch'u, 1957a]. The concentration 
of new factories in certain areas, together with the rapid rate of 
investment, led to local bottlenecks. There were often insufficient 
local building materials, such as steel, cement, bricks, tiles and fuel, 
and these had to be shipped in from other areas, placing a massive burden 
on the strained local transport system [Yang Ching-wen, 1957] . 
Pleas to make greater use of existing factories were made quite early 
[J.M.J.P., 1953/8/18] , [J.M.J.P., 1954/3/10] ; the First Five Year Plan 
repeated the message [F.F.Y.P., 1955:23,41] and a directive from the State 
Council criticised the lack of attention to capacity already existing 
[ Chou En-lai, 1955] . By 1956 it was openly argued that it was wrong to 
ignore the old coastal areas, but it was 1957 before a start was made on 
expanding the existing textile mills in Shanghai [N.C.N.A., 1956c] . It 
would appear that the new policies on developing coastal industry and 
local run industry were not rigorously applied, as Lin Wei-jen [ 1958] 
revealed that there had been no new construction for local run industries 
of any kind in Shanghai after 1956. 
It would seem that the policy of concentrating resources in the 
First Five Year Plan to build up new industrial areas was not fully 
justified. This, however, is a static allocation argument, and it could 
be held that, political and defence considerations aside, it was necessary 
to use this catalyst to promote local development. Certainly the new 
mills improved; the Peking Number Two Mill is considered in China to be 
very good and receives many overseas visitors. Nonetheless, infant 
industries in new areas suffered from many teething troubles. 
II. ALLOCATION BY OT^ S^^ ERSHIP AND CONTROL 
The problem of allocation of resources to mills under different 
forms of ownership and control was twofold: the allocation between state 
run and private mills, and between central state run and local state run 
mills. Political issues existed in both, but predominated in the former. 
Allocation to state owned and privately owned mills 
Between 1949 and 1952 there was some discrimination against privately 
owned mills, although efforts were made to restore outout to previously 
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attained levels.^ Discrimination was stepped up in 1953, and by early 
1956 virtually the entire textile industry had been socialised, much of 
it very rapidly during the 'high tide' of socialisation in late 1955 and 
early 1956. 
The ruling elite had several reasons for wanting to socialise 
industry. The pattern of development had been established by the Soviet 
Union, which had socialised private industry. Learning from Russia was 
the rule of the time. There appears to have been a genuine belief that 
such institutional change would release much untapped energy, and of 
itself would become an important engine of growth. A practical reason 
was that it was most difficult, perhaps impossible, to run a centrally 
planned economy along the lines envisaged as long as private firms 
existed, which were not susceptible to direct control by the central 
planners. Centralised disposal of resources in such a society is often 
seen as both necessary and a blessing. It is necessary for defence, is 
a way of liquidating old social, political and economic systems and of 
solving the many social and economic problems of a relatively backward 
country. It focuses energy and resources on to a few major problems 
rather than allowing the dissipation of energies unsuccessfully over a 
wider range. The shortage of good industrial cadres is believed to 
require the use of central planning, especially in view of the probable 
hostility of many of the inherited cadres [ Lange 0.,1962b:17-18] . 
The discrimination against private firms was part of a deliberate 
effort to achieve socialisation [Chen Yun, 1956:157-163] ,and took a 
variety of forms. These included planning for a lower output from 
private firms and supplying them with insufficient orders, and materials, 
making them pay more taxes (private firms paid net business income tax, 
state firms were exempt), and charging higher rates of interest on bank 
loans to private firms. In addition the trade union in private firms 
was used to make life difficult for the private owners and managers; 
a private firm with insufficient orders to run at capacity was not 
allowed to dismiss workers without oermission but had to pay the-,; funds 
for investment in private firms had to be raised privately, whereas state 
firms were naturally allocated funds form the state. 
^ In 1950, state owned mills were planned to use ninety per cent of spindle 
capacity, compared with seventy-four per cent in private mills [ J.M.J.P., 
1950/6/23]. Between 1949 and 1952, the share of private run industry in 
total output fell from forty-seven per cent to thirty-seven oer cent for 
cotton yarn but increased from forty per cent to forty-nine per cent for 
cotton cloth [S.S.B., 1956a]. 
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Certain problems existed in the process of socialising industry. 
These consisted of the various reactions of private owners and managers 
to the discrimination and eventual socialisation, and problems induced 
by the tempo and change in form at the upsurge of socialisation. Faced 
with a range of discriminatory practices, the private businessmen looked 
round for ways to survive. Some bought materials and semi-finished 
products from the state at low fixed prices and resold them at higher 
market prices without processing [T.K.P., 1954/10/16]. Some firms 
deliberately mixed inferior materials with good ones in order to save 
some of the materials supplied by the state, and as a consequence product 
quality fell [C.F.J.P., 1952/2/3], [T.K.P., 1953/4/lS] . A related 
practice was to reduce quality deliberately, so that it did not meet the 
standards set by the state; the produce would be refused by the state 
commercial system, whereupon it could be legally sold outside the state 
network at higher prices [ J.M.J.P, 1953/11/14] . The private firms 
tended to form loose associations or cartels in order to pass up inflated 
input requirements to the state, so as to secure more materials than were 
necessary [ Lu Chun-cheng and Chang Kuei-wen, 1952] . They had little 
incentive to reduce costs as their profit was set on a cost plus basis 
[ Hsiieh Mu-chiao, etc., 1960:206] . It was not unknown for a private mill 
to accept advance deposits from state mills and then not meet the order 
[E.C.A.B., 1953]. Simple stealing of yarn for sale or processing and 
sale was apparently quite common: an investigation of 156 private run 
weaving mills in Tsingtao revealed that 109 could not satisfactorily 
account for missing yarn, and some of the cases were finally taken to 
court [ T.K.P., 1954/2/24]. 
The rapid burst of socialisation in late 1955 and early 1956 
resulted in the formation of many new joint state-private run firms. 
Certain problems viere associated with these new firms. First, they placed 
a heavy additional burden on planners in local authorities When privately 
owned, the mills came under local authorities, but the mills were not much 
involved in planning, had few or no systems for handling it, and some 
appeared to have had almost no relationshin with the local authority. 
[C.K.F.C., 1956a] Once socialised, the mills were involved in planning; 
the local authority had to bring them in and try to establish proper 
detailed plans for them, and to encourage them to set UD running systems 
suitable for socialist enterprises. Most of the new joint state-
private run firms in Shanghai had no department for manning [ Kuo Chien, 
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1956] . Since the large modern mills were socialised first/ those taken 
over in late 1955 and early 1956 were almost all small, old and of low 
technical levels. These factors added to the difficulties of local 
planners. 
A supplementary factor that affected local planning was a re-
adjustment of power centres occurring in 1956 in local authorities. The 
Party and local Party committees increased their power, as that of the 
administrators was reduced. Since socialisation coincided with this 
change, it probably made the role and power of the planners less certain, 
while the new men with power may well have been less capable than the 
administrators - certainly they lacked experience of planning matters. 
It may be more than coincidental that some firms with new status, 
particularly newly created handicraft co-operatives, became submerged 
in the state apparatus; the existence of some of these firms was known to 
very few organisations, and directives, orders and materials were some-
times never sent to such firms [ Te Yii, 1957] . 
A second problem at the period of•• socialisation was that the 
attitude of the old owners was frequently obstructive. Not all ex-owners 
gave conscientious support to socialisation; some were reportedly proud, 
and disparaged the efforts of Party and government, did not undertake 
the required self-reform, and would not be bothered with the work of 
production management, once their firms were socialised. Some of the 
owners took advantage of the confusion of rapid change and misappro-
priated funds, stole what had become state property and used the proceeds 
to establish illegal underground factories [ Tsan Pei-hua, 1957] . One 
source of the materials and expertise used to establish the upsurge of 
illegal factories in 1956 is now clear. 
Those opposed to socialisation were not averse to voicing their 
opinions. 'Compared with capitalist enterprises, socialist enterprises 
are less efficient'; 'the cultural level of industrial and agricultural 
cadres is low, they do not know how to run the enterprises and the 
ability of the cadres in the present joint state-private run enter-
prises is less than those in the Kuomintang period'; and 'the quality 
of some products has fallen, some goods cannot even be bought' [Tsan 
^ lAmite L.T. [ 1972:305-306] is apparently in error when reporting that 
the first joint state-private run enterprises were set up in Shanghai 
in late 1954. This was the second round: nine textile mills were 
taken over in 1950-51 [K.S.C., 1955] . 
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Pei-hua, 1957], [Fang Hsing, 1957]. Other critical remarks were made 
along similiar lines. 
The third problem was that the exuberant atmosphere of social-
isation led to excessively rapid and radical changes, which caused 
disruption and confusion. Internally, the changes in systems were often 
excessive, and made without any investigation: in some enterprises 
every single system was altered and altered badly [ Yu Chih-min, 1956] . 
The same source revealed that in some enterprises the systems were 
repeatedly changed, so that the firm either did not produce at all or 
else reduced the variety of output. In an effort to combat this the 
State'Council issued a directive in March 1956 to the new joint state-
private enterprises not to make any changes in management, production or 
running system, types of output, and places of purchase or sale. For 
their part the trade unions, which had earlier been used to promote 
socialisation and had been active in management work, were reluctant to 
relinquish power and change their obstructive attitudes after social-
isation. 
Externally, mergers between firms were often made without rational 
basis. It was reported that up to the end of March 1957, some sixty per 
cent of new joint state-private firms taken over in 1956 had been 
amalgamated [T.K.P., 1957/3/30] , although this figure was based on 
incomplete statistics. This sounds not unrealistic, as, again based on 
incomplete statistics, in the first half of 1956 one third of joint 
state-private enterprises in Hunan were amalgamated; in Peking, Kirin, 
Heilungkiang and Kweichow it was one half; and in Anhui, Liaoning and 
Honan it reached two-thirds [Ch'ien Hua: etc., 1957:170] . Chen Yun 
criticised excessive amalgamation of firms at the Eighth Party Congress 
[ 1956:165-166] , as did Ma Yin-ch'u later [1957b] . 
Many external relationships also broke down after socialisation. 
An enterprise which had contracted with a private firm for the supply 
of items might find that after socialisation the firm had ceased to 
exist, as it had been merged with another, and the contract was worthless. 
The cotton textile industry in Shanghai was particularly affected in this 
way. The supply of spare parts and the repair of machinery were also 
adversely affected by the break in relationships, as well as by the 
closure of repair shops in some firms after socialisation [Fang Hsing, 
1957] . 
As a result of the speed of socialisation and the immediate problems 
it induced, many high level cadres in the new joint state-private mills 
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were called to an excessive number of meetings, apparently in an effort 
to sort out problems. Some meetings either overlapped in content or 
were unnecessary [N.C.N.A., 1957]. 
On the benefit side, the goal of socialisation was achieved and the 
take-over was relatively smooth. On the cost side, unused private 
capacity existed until 1956, while at the same time facilities were 
duplicated by the state, and the problem of how to plan and control 
the multitude of small new joint state-private enterprises within the 
framework of comprehensive planning could not be solved. On balance, 
leaving aside political judgements, the process of socialisation was 
quite well done but could have been better. 
Allocation to central run and local run mills 
The second problem of allocation of resources to mills under 
different forms of ownership and control was the position to be allowed 
to central run and local run industry. This would be reflected in their 
relative shares in total production and resource allocation. Proper 
co-ordination between central run and local run industry had also to 
be achieved. This general problem involved political and administrative 
decisions, because the market could not be expected to solve it to the 
satisfaction of the ruling elite. 
Local run industry has always been of considerable importance in 
C h i n a . Of the all-industry total output value in 1952, local run industry 
made up 59.6 per cent, and the target for 1957 in the First Five Year 
Plan was for only a slight fall to 56.3 per cent. [F.F.Y.P., 1955:97]. 
Figures on the breakdown between local and central run industry were not 
released for textiles. The First Five Year Plan [F.F.Y.P., 1955:103] 
indicated that food and textiles were the two major industries run by 
local authorities. About half of cotton yarn and cloth in 1954 was 
produced in private run mills, all of which came under local authorities 
I Chin Hsiieh-liang, 1954] . In 1957 it was revealed in the China Youth 
Daily [ O.K.C.N.P., 1957/4/6] that local run industry supplied fifty-fpur 
per cent of cotton cloth and sixty-eight per cent of dyed and printed 
cloth. As most central run mills were large and modern, whereas many 
local run mills were small or medium in size, the overwhelming majority 
of textile mills must have been local run. Since the First Five Year 
Plan indicated that local run industry would produce 56.3 per cent of 
all-industry total output value in 1957, and local run textile industry 
would produce 15 per cent of the total output value of local run industry. 
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It can be calculated that in 1957, the local run textile industry was 
expected to produce 8.4 per cent of all industrial total output value 
in China. 
The allocation of resources between central and local run mills in 
the period of the First Five Year Plan favoured central run mills. 
This was partly, but not entirely, the result of a deliberate policy. 
It can be seen in various provincial reports of the use of local run 
industrial capacity. In Honan the rate of utilisation of local state 
run capacity in 1953 was described as very low. In the textile sector 
it reached 82.3 per cent, which was much higher than in oils and fats, 
flour, and electric power [ N.C.N.A., 1953a] . These 'conditions are 
more or less the same in other provinces and municipalities.' In 
Anhwei only 54.42 per cent of local textile equipment was in use [J.M.J.P, 
1954/3/11] . In Kiangsu in the boom year of 1956 much of the local 
capacity was unused: of twenty-two major products only three exceeded 
eighty per cent capacity working, of which one was cotton yarn [Ming Hou-
chieh, 1957] . 
Although the distribution of output between the two sectors was 
not released, the rates of growth were published for 1952-56 (see Table 
16). It can clearly be seen that central run industry grew at a much 
more rapid rate than local, and between 1952 and 1956 the amount of yarn 
produced in central mills had almost doubled, whereas that from local 
mills had fallen absolutely. 
Table 16 : Rates of Growth in the Central and Local Run Textile 
Industry, 1952-56 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
All textiles 
Central run 100 118.7 133.4 119.2 206.8 
Local run 100 123.2 134.8 132.6 137.6 
Cotton Yarn 
Central run 100 117.0 129.0 112.0 195.2 
Local run 100 109.9 125.2 107. 3 96.3 
Cotton cloth 
Central run 100 114.3 129.2 110.3 179. 3 
Local run 100 126. 4 140.3 115.7 136.1 
Source: [S.S.B., 1958a:168]. 
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Much of the rather poor showing of local run industry is exolained 
by the general attitude of central departments, which was often to 
expand the centre, ignore or even obstruct local authorities and to 
ignore local conditions in general [Liu Shao-ch'i 1956:52,77] , [ Chou Fn-
lai, 1956c:53]. Even in a Government Administrative Council directive 
of early 1951, the position of local industry had not been great; local 
authorities were largely restricted to running small sized firms producing 
commodities to supply local needs. Capital for any development of 
this industry had to be accumulated locally [G.A.C., 1951] . 
Apart from the discrimination against private run firms discussed 
above, the major problem for local run mills was the allocation of 
cotton, investment funds and, to a smaller extent, labour. Insufficient 
rav; materials were allocated to local authorities, they were not allowed 
a large enough production task and they were restricted on investment 
allocation, and technology, by various central ministries [Tan Chen-lin, 
1956] , [ Hai Pa, 1957] . One subtle form of discrimination v/as the practice 
in cotton producing areas of retaining the best quality for the use of 
mills in the province and sending out either the worse quality or mixing 
poor cotton with good cotton. The latter practice caused technical 
difficulties for the final recipient [ Ching Wei, 1957] . All new central 
run mills were located in cotton areas, while many local run mills were 
outside them. 
Some misallocation occurred in the use of cotton stocks. There was 
no possibility of transferring part of the stocks of cotton between the 
central run and local run systems. As a consequence, if a local mill 
'stopped work to await delivery of necessary raw materials', quite a 
common occurrence, and at the same time surplus stock existed in a central 
run warehouse or mill, a simple transfer would have increased output, 
but this was impossible to arrange [ Informant number eight] . As an 
example, in 1956 Shao Pai [1956] reported that in and after the first 
quarter a good number of local run mills in Shanghai had stopped work 
to wait for materials; three days later it was reported that the stocks 
of cotton were the highest ever in Shanghai for that time in the year 
[ C.F.J.P., 1956/8/25] . 
Misallocation also occurred between central and local state run 
enterprises, and to a lesser degree between enterprises under different 
local authorities, with regard to investment. Although low capacity 
working was common in local industry, many production facilities were 
duplicated by new central run mills. The displacement of local run 
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industry by new central run factories in the same area was unfavourably 
commented upon in the People's Daily [ J.M.J.P., 1957/8/24] and criticised 
again towards the end of the same year [ Hai Pa, 1957] , especially since 
the limited supply of raw materials was insufficient for them both. Ku 
Ch'i-jui [1958] confirmed that local and central run industry frequently 
overlapped, not only on output but also on supply and marketing. 
The problem was not so much one of poor co-ordination as a complete 
lack of any co-ordination between local and central planners. The two 
plans and systems for capital construction, local and central, were 
quite separate and distinct: 
'The specialist departments of the central government are 
not concerned with the capital construction plans of local 
government agencies of the same speciality. Conversely, local 
governments have no concern whatsoever with the capital con-
struction plans of central government agencies for their areas' 
[J.M.J.P. 1957/8/24]. 
Local authorities were ignorant of central plans for new factories in 
their area, just as central authorities were not aware of local intentions, 
Misallocation of investment occurred on occasion between different 
local authorities. One local authority might build a factory which 
duplicated existing and unused capacity in an adjacent area. Shanghai 
and Tientsin faced this problem in the case of dyeing and printing works 
with unused local capacity, which was duplicated in neighbouring 
provinces by other local authorities [ Min I-fan, 1955] . 
Some discrimination also occurred in the case of labour. Skilled 
labour was deliberately transferred by the state from old areas to new 
ones. The mills benefiting were almost exclusively central run, and 
although there is no information on which mills the labour came from, 
it is possible that some came from local run mills. A more certain form 
of discrimination was the deliberate underuse of privately owned mills 
and local state mills in general. In addition, some workers preferred to 
join central run enterprises [ Hsing Yu-hong, 1957] , as they were larger, 
more modern and had much better facilities, rather than the poorer local 
ones. 
In general, poor planning, lack of co-ordination, and discrimination 
by the state in favour of central run industry, caused misallocations 
and waste of resources throughout the period of the First Five Year Plan. 
Requests to make greater use of local industry were made, particularly 
in 1956, but unfortunately 1957 was not a good year for industry as raw 
materials were in short supply, so that little could be done. The large 
87 
scale construction of new local run industry in Shanghai, for example, 
had to wait until 1958 [Lin Wei-jen, 1958], when events were overtaken 
by the Great Lean Forward. 
M - ALLOCATION BY SIZE AND TECHNOLOGY 
The size of textile mills and the use of advanced technology varied 
directly; as a general rule the biggest were the best, while the smallest 
units of all used traditional handicraft methods. For convenience the 
question is discussed in two parts: allocation to large or to medium 
and small sized mills, and allocation to modern or traditional industry. 
The definition of a large scale firm in 1955 was: 1) one with 
mechanical power and more than sixteen staff and workers; 2) one without 
mechanical power and more than thirty staff and workers; 3) all industrial 
enterprises under any central industrial ministry, irrespective of power 
or personnel; 4) all factories that generated more than fifteen kilowatts, 
irrespective of the number of employees [C.H.C.C., 1955a]. A 'large' 
firm could be quite small in size. 
Until 1957 the emphasis by planners and administrators was on building 
large scale mills. This policy was criticised between 1955 and 1957 
on the grounds that neglect of medium and small scale firms was adverse 
to development [ J.M.J.P., 1955/5/5] , [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:19,49] , 
[T.S.S.B., 1956] . The First Five Year Plan [1955:40] commented: 'The 
tendency to devote all attention to the building of big enterprises 
and ignore the importance of utilizing and building small and medium 
factories and mines is quite misguided.' Liu Shao-ch'i [1956:51] demanded 
more medium and small scale firms in the Second Five Year Plan period. 
Chou En-lai [1956c:70-71] cautiously considered that a 'backbone' of 
large enterprises was needed, but also many medium and small firms were 
necessary. 
During the Great Leap Forv/ard many medium and small scale firms 
were established and their virtues praised. This was true of most 
industries in China, including textiles, and small mills appeared on a 
wide scale. The advantages claimed were that they were quick and easy 
to build, they needed little capital, much of which was obtainable locally, 
the return on investment was raoid, and they could quickly accumulate 
capital for the state. They could use the surplus supply of local labour 
and local materials that would otherwise not be used. They could serve 
as an adjunct to large firms, by supplying spare parts, undertaking 
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repairs, and using the large firms' reject products or waste. They 
could serve as a training ground for peasant farmers to learn simple 
skills and to acquire experience of factory working. They were more 
flexible in output, since they produced short runs, and offered a wider 
variety of produce to consumers. Finally, their establishment in rural 
areas could narrow the income gap between town and country.^ 
The disadvantages of the smaller mills were that they were often 
too small to use even one large machine in linked processes [ Lin Li-
chien, 1964:109-110] , they were extremely difficult to plan and run 
centrally (not seen as a disadvantage in the Great Leap Forward when 
many small firms were built), and they were constructed widely but 
without great thought as to desirability. An additional problem with 
small firms producing inputs was that quality varied substantially and 
machines were often built on a 'one-off basis, so that spare parts 
were to prove a problem in the future. 
It is not easy to assess the relative merits of different sized 
mills, since results of comprehensive investigations of the question, if 
ever undertaken, were not published. It would seem that, properly set 
up and run, there would be positive benefits from developing medium and 
small scale industry in an underdeveloped, labour intensive economy such 
as China. 
The issue of allocation between the modern and handicraft textile 
industries is similar to the problem just discussed, but represents the 
extremes. The question was important for development and the handicraft 
industry was of some importance. In 1952 the gross output value of 
handicraft industries was thirteen per cent of the output value of 
industry and agriculture, and thirty-one per cent of gross output value 
of industry alone [ Chih Pi-jen and Wang Wei-chung, 1958] . This latter 
figure underestimates the importance of handicraft industry, as the 
figure excludes all such industry that was an agricultural side-line; in 
addition, the degree of double counting in the gross concept is less in 
handicrafts than in modern industry. By 1963 the share of handicrafts 
in industrial output value had fallen to ten per cent approximately 
[J.M.J.P., 1963/10/27] . It was reported that pure handicraft production 
The sources are plentiful; see for example [F.F.Y.P., 1955:39-40], 
[Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:19,49-50] , [Chen Yun, 1956:165-167] , [Ma Yin-ch'u, 
1957b], [C.K.F.C., 1958e] , [Chiang Kuang-nai, 1958], [C.K.F.C., 1958f] . 
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in textiles, i.e. handicraft cloth made from homespun yarn, made up 19.1 
per cent of total cotton cloth produced in 1952 [F.F.Y.P., 1^55:49-^0]. 
All handicraft cloth production must have been considerably more t:ian 
this, as the figure excludes handicraft cloth made from factory-spun 
yarn; some twenty per cent of all factory-spun yarn went to the handi-
craft industry, where in 1953 roughly 180,000 looms produced over 20 
million bolts of cloth [ J.M.J.P., 1953/12/23] . 
Up to 1957 the policy aim was to develop handicraft production in 
general light industry, but to reduce the handicraft branch of cotton 
textiles, both relatively and absolutely. The output of approximately 
26.67 million bolts of handicraft cloth in 1952 was planned to reduce 
to approximately 15 million bolts in 1957 [F.F.Y.P., 1955:50]. The 
policy of restriction was successful and the output of handicraft cloth 
in physical units fell each year between 1952 and 1956. By the latter 
year the output of handicraft cloth was a mere 22.6 per cent of the level 
in 1952, but output value had increased by 16.8 per cent from 1,409 
million yuan to 1,646 million yuan [S.S.B, 1958a:166,180]. During the 
same period, the total output value of all handicraft industries actually 
increased by some sixty per cent [ Chih Pi-jen, 1958] . In 1957 the 
cotton textile handicraft industry was again cut back because of the 
cotton shortage; the agricultural co-operatives were not selling 
sufficient cotton to the state, but developing their own handicraft 
industry or selling on the free market. 
The case presented for the handicraft industry was similar in 
many respects to that for small industry. There was a good basis, units 
were quick to build, investment needs were small, and the investment 
was quickly recouped. There was a good demand for the products by the 
peasants - between sixty and eight per cent of the industrial goods they 
purchased were produced by handicraft industry [Huang Yen-p'ei, 1951: 
646] , [ Teng Chieh, 1954] . Handicraft industry used local resources, 
including cotton and labour, and could be run by communes or hsien, 
thus assisting in the policy of promoting self-sufficient areas. The 
absorption of local unemployed labour also saved government relief 
funds., Handicraft industry could supplement modern industry, helping 
it with spare parts and repairs and supplying consumer goods to the 
towns, thereby allowing the state to concentrate on heavy industry. 
Local financing also reduced the burden of central budgets. Handicraft 
industry acted as a training ground for oeasants and developed their 
potential skills, supplied a market for agricultural output, supplied 
tools for agricultural development, and could reduce the urban-rural 
income gap.^ 
Handicraft industry was strongly promoted in the Great Leap Forward 
as part of the policy of 'walking on two legs'. Within a very short 
space of time the promotion of textile handicrafts was under attack. 
They had never been popular with the state planners: a joint directive 
from the Central Committee and the State Council in 1957 fS.C., 1957a] 
had pointed out that the handicraft branch was inefficient, since one 
chin of cotton would product a maximum of twenty square feet of hand-
woven cloth or over thirty square feet of machine-woven cloth. In 
February 1959 the use of handicraft methods, either alone or along 
with modern methods, was forbidden in the cotton textile industry 
[ T.K.P.,1959/2/19] , emphasis being given to this in the article by the 
use of heavier type. On an input-output basis, the handicraft branch 
could not be justified. It was stated that in the case of ten-count 
yarn, output per man-year was about sixty bales in modern industry and 
about one bale in handicrafts. Later figures [S.S.S.T., 19621 reduced 
the difference given in the directive of the Central Committee and the 
State Council: one chin of ginned cotton would produce 27.13 square 
feet of cloth in modern industry but only 22 square feet in pure hand-
craft industry. Output per man-day in modern industry was 302.4 square 
feet of cloth and in handicrafts 3.8 square feet, while on a financial 
basis, cloth cost fifteen cents a square foot in modern industry and 
twenty-four cents in handicrafts. 
It was also argued that handicraft produce was of inferior quality, 
and it would seem that in some cotton areas the women had forgotten 
how to spin and weave [ Hinton W., 1967:292] , so there was not really 
a good basis for development. The life of locally produced handicraft 
machines was short, not more than five months, according to Lin Li-chien 
[ 1964:60] who reports that Liu Shao-chi said this in 1959. It was also 
alleged that modern industry produced a greater variety of goods than 
handicraft industry [ S.S.S.T., 1962] . 
The input-output arguments look strong, but the figures were chosen 
to yield the desired result: on a return to capital basis, the handicraft 
The literature is quite extensive; see for example [ch'ang Yuan, 195S] , 
[Chin Men, 1958a] , [ Chih Pi-jen.and Wang Wei-chung, 1958 ]. [Chin iVen, 
1958b], [Chin Men, 1958c], and [Huing Pin, 1958]. 
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industry would look better. However, there seem to be sufficient 
economies of scale in the textile industry in most countries to ensure 
that development is in modern factories rather than in traditional 
methods. There is a better case to be made for medium and small scale 
firms than for handicraft ones and the planners cannot really be 
criticised for refusing to develop the handicraft branch. However, 
they might be considered to have cut back the textile handicraft 
industry at an excessively rapid rate during the period of the First 
Five Year Plan, when cotton textiles were not in abundant supply. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ENTERPRISE ORGANISATION AND THE INDUCEMENT 
TO FOLLOW THE PLAN 
Methods and problems of macro-planning have been considered earlier 
in Chapters 3 and 4. We now turn to a consideration of micro-plannina, 
or planning from the viewpoint of a basic level producing unit. In a 
sense this is the most important level, since it is here that the efforts 
of government and Party to promote economic development succeed or fail. 
The formal plan is handed down but ways must be found to induce enter-
prise management to try to follow the plan and to fulfill the various 
targets it contains. The formal plan is based in part on the reports on 
production conditions sent up from the enterprise. The ability or 
desire to follow the plan and the general level of efficiency also 
depends upon internal conditions. This Chapter thus considers the 
collection of statistics at this basic level, the organisation and running 
of the mills, the disproportionate growth of staff numbers, the incentives 
to follow the plan, various sanctions and the methods of supervision and 
control by the state. 
I. THE COLLECTION OF STATISTICS AT THE MILL LEVEL 
Until 1953 different accounts and methods of collecting statistics 
existed in the various regions and enterprises. In 1953 a beginning was 
made on setting up standard systems for accounts and data collection. By 
1956 the accounts and data collection methods had improved somewhat, but 
were far from perfect, and appear to have been too poor to implement 
properly a system of comprehensive planning. The problems that existed 
were numerous indeed. During 1956 the effort to achieve unified accounts 
and statistical collection methods was abandoned and some decentral-
isation occurred, with local levels making decisions on collection methods. 
This lasted until 1958, when many accounts were dropped and the statistical 
system essentially broke down. 
Just how poor the situation was is revealed by an examination of 
the numerous problems at the enterprise level in connection v;ith account 
keeping and statistics collecting. These problems included low quality 
data forwarded to higher levels, incomplete data forwarded, accounts not 
started or not in fact used, several sets of accounts in one mill, excess 
number of reports and tables together with constant changes in them. 
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and increasing demands placed upon statisticians and accountants who 
could not cope. In addition the needs for statistics of the enterprise 
and local area tended to be ignored in favour of higher level demands 
[ T.C.K.T.T.H., 1955d] and there was a notable time lag in data reaching 
the higher level authorities. 
Low Quality Data 
In this section the deliberate falsification of data, a not uncommon 
occurrence, is ignored, and is dealt with in Chapter 6. The problems 
treated here are genuine inadequacies, not simulation by workers or 
management. 
Lov? quality statistics emanated from local state run firms,"*" orivate 
firms and handicraft firms in particular [C.K.F.C,, 1956a], and also 
from new joint state private enterprises (after socialisation), and newly 
built central state run enterprises [ M . of T . , 1956a] . Labour and wage 
statistics v/ere especially poor [T.C.K.T.T.H., 1956d] , and even in 1956 
data quality was most inadequate [ Wang Wen-sheng and Tsu Yen-an, 1956] . 
There were many reasons for the low quality nature of data collected 
at the enterprise level. The people collecting the statistics were low-
level clerks, often chosen at random with no effort to determine aptitude; 
some enterprises (and even bureaus) used temporary collectors as they 
were needed rather than having permanent statistical staff [ M. of T., 
1954b]. The attitude of these clerks was not conducive to accurate data 
collection. They did not like statistical work; they did not take it 
seriously, felt it had no future, was dull, unimportant, and of little 
value.^ There was an extreme shortage of trained statistical personnel 
[Chen Wei-chi, 1954] ; in general those collecting data had had no regular 
training, lacked experience, and on occasion did not even know what the 
words meant on the forms they filled in [T.T.J.P., 1955/6/21] Genuine 
mistakes were naturally common. The turnover of accounting and 
statistical staff was, not surprisingly, high and could easily reach over 
one hundred per cent in one year [ M . of T . , 1954b] . 
1 
Tables from many local state run enterprises were habitually made in ways 
at variance with the regulations, reducing the accuracy and usefulness 
[ M . of T . , 1956e] . 
See the series of articles in T.C.K.T.T.H., [1955b] , [ 1955c] , [ 1955d] , 
[ 1955e] , [ 1955f] , [ 1955g] , [ 1955h] , and [ Ku Chi-yiin, 1955] . 
3 
The statistical records of one workshop normally contained over forty 
per cent errors. 
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Another reason for the low quality of the data was that the lower 
levels tended to solve problems in their own way without reference to 
higher echelons, thus causing different solutions to be adopted in 
different areas, with the result that the data produced were strictly 
not comparable but still had to be aggregated [Chen Wei-chi, 1954] . 
Different areas of China also used different measures, as did 
different government agencies; measures with the same name often had 
different contents in practice. [Hung Liang,1955] . This regional 
difference in statistical coverage was widened in 1955, when a meeting 
called by the Textile Ministry decided to allow each area to choose its 
own methods of data collecting, even on major items. For instance, a 
region could make its own decision on whether to measure output in 
physical quantities or in monetary terms [ M. of T., 1956c] . The intro-
duction of any new system in keeping accounts or in running methods 
tended to result in earlier systems being discreetly ignored in the mills. 
For example, the introduction of the Financial Statement Meeting caused 
some factories immediately to abandon the Cost Analysis Meeting [T.S.S.B., 
1956] . Finally, the top level factory management would not help a 
department of the factory to establish authorised accounts if management 
did not have sympathy with that innovation. The Finance Office of one 
mill was simply unable to obtain needed statistics from the other offices 
in the mill, because the management did not approve of the introduction 
of the Monthly Financial Administration Plan; as a result the Finance 
Office had to make its own estimates, since it could not obtain the 
actual figures. [N.E.A.B., 1956]. 
In view of the above situations it is not surprising that statistical 
data collected at the production units was poor. In general, the 
statistics on local state run, local joint state-private run, co-operative 
run, and handicraft enterprises were the least accurate. Cotton spinning, 
wool textiles, jute, and silk winding statistics were the best, while 
statistics on cotton weaving, dyeing and printing, silk weaving, knitting, 
and carpet making were the worst [C.K.F.C., 1956a]. 
Incomplete data for\tfarded to higher echelons of state 
The above explanations of low quality data also explain the 
phenomenon of incomplete sets of data being forwarded to higher levels 
of the bureaucracy. When a mill had eventually collected whatever 
statistics it could, it then sent them off. Labour and wage statistics 
were particularly poor; many of the required statistics were not in fact 
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collected at the mills, and what were collected were frequently incomplete, 
[ T.C.K.T.T.H., 1956d] . Examples of sections of the reports that often 
had incomplete data are: the n\imber of workers, the total wage bill, 
and the average level of wages; reportedly even less complete sections 
were labour productivity statistics, the use of available working hours, 
and information on the wage system used. 
Systems of account keeping not introduced or introduced but not used 
An effort was made to introduce economic accounting in enterprises 
quite early. This began in Manchuria, and a start to extend this to 
state owned enterprises throughout China commenced in 1950. Not until 
1952 were textile mills responsible as units for their own profit and 
loss, and by late 1955 economic accounting had not been introduced in 
many industrial enterprises. I-There it had begun, it had sometimes fallen 
into disuse [ Tseng Chih, 1955] . It was revealed that in Tientsin the 
cadres in the mills were not even trying to carry out the systems in a 
conscientious manner, and were ignoring orders concerning such systems 
[HO I, 1956] . In mills that had introduced a system and where it was 
in fact still being used, it was often the case that only a part of the 
mill had implemented it, although the mill could nresumably report that 
implementation had occurred [ Ho 1, 1955] . 
Several sets of accounts in one mill 
Several different sets of figures existed in any mill. There were 
two main sets: the 'big ledger' using fixed prices, kept by the 
statistical department, and used when dealing with the ministries in 
connection with plans; and the 'fine ledger' using current prices, kept 
by accountants, and used when dealing with banks and financial bodies. 
A third set could exist, the 'business computations'. The basis of these 
three sets was different, and reportedly it was often impossible to make 
them tally [ M . of T . , 1955a] . 
Excessive number of reports and tables and constant changes 
Because the government of China attempted to establish a system of 
comprehensive planning, there was a great demand for statistical 
information at the centre which ultimately fell upon the mill to provide. 
As the attempt was strengthened and the number of organs increased, more 
and more fell into the area that the state attempted to plan and control. 
This led to a great increase in the number of reports and tables that 
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the mill had to fill in and forward. The statisticians were unable to 
cope with this increased workload [ Wang Wen-sheng and Tsu Yen-an, 
1956] . 
The problem of too many forms in the mills was criticised in 1954 
by the Ministry of Textiles, which felt there was an excessive number, 
they were too complex, had non-unified figures in them, and generally 
resulted in a great waste of manpower. [ M. of T., 1954b] . In 1956 the 
large number of reports and tables was criticised and the point was made 
that they had little value in practise [ T.C.K.T.T.H., 1956c] . A 
further appeal to reduce the number of forms and tables in the mill was 
made in 1957 [Chang Fu-ch'iian, 1957] . 
Not only was the number of forms and tables in the mills excessive, 
but the forms themselves were constantly changed and revised; the tables 
in the annual plan were revised each year, and it seems reasonaible to 
surmise that this created problems for the understaffed, undertrained and 
under-motivated ranks of statisticians. 
Time lag in higher levels receiving data 
Reports and tables were commonly sent up late. 'Lateness' in 
the Chinese context meant after the time set by the State Statistical 
Bureau - and the Bureau usually set a rather lax limit [M. of T., 1954b]. 
Monthly reports were normally sent forty days after the end of the nranth, 
quarterly ones sixty days after, and half yearly reports ninety days 
after the end of the period. Some enterprises were much slower than this 
in forwarding their reports [T.C.K.T.T.H., 1956d]. Local state run 
enterprises were very slow in sending up data [M. of T. , 1956Q] and the 
new joint state-private enterprises were particularly at fault [C.K.F.C., 
1956a]. Some local state rvm enterprises and private mills sent in no 
reports at all, and those that did were often nine months late, which 
rendered the materials scarcely useful to the short term planners [M. of T., 
1956a]. The bureaus above the mills had to put together the individual 
reports from the mills and pass up a synthesised version. Late reports 
from the mills delayed the bureaus' work and caused the bureaus to use 
estimates for the missing reports [LO Jih-yun, 1954]. Labour, wage and 
cost reports were notoriously late being sent, even from central state 
run mills [M. of T., 1956a]. 
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II. THE ORGANISATION AND RUNNING OF THE MILLS 
There were steady changes in the internal organisation of the mills 
during the 1950s, but four broad types of departments always exist. 
These are basic production departments, such as yarn sheds and cloth 
sheds; supplementary production departments, such as repair, maintenance 
and electrical departments; welfare departments, including canteens, 
nurseries and medical units, etc; and functional departments (which help 
the top level management to lead production) such as departments of 
planning, accounting, wages and personnel [ C.K.F.C.K.H., 1957e] . 
There are obviously many ways of structuring the internal organ-
isation, covering different departments and different levels of control. 
Complete unity of organisation with all mills being identically structured 
was not pursued in view of the different sizes and natures of the mills.^ 
Some flexibility of organisation was allowed. Mills also varied in their 
speed of response to directives: reports in the literature indicated 
(given that x stands for the change ordered by higher levels), that in one 
year some mills 'did x', some 'prepared to do x', and some 'did not do x'. 
Because of the flexibility allowed and the varying response lag to orders, 
the existing structures in the mills tended to vary quite considerably. 
Immediately after Liberation the existing internal structures were 
allowed to continue, as the primary aim was to restore production. 
Commencing in 1950, a three-tiered structure was gradually implemented, 
with the director at the top, workshop foremen in the middle and small 
teams at the bottom. The main reasons for this change were that the 
state wished to alter the old systems that were seen as involving antagon-
istic relationships between managers and workers; under the existing 
systems technical and administrative leadership were often quite separate; 
and in general there was frequently much obscurity on responsibility, 
which induced mutual recriminations whenever anything went wrong. Internal 
changes included removing maintenance work from the transport department 
and establishing a maintenance department, and building up various 
functional departments, notably for planning and technical inspection. 
Between 1950 and 1953 it became clear that this three-tiered system 
(small workshop system) was unsatisfactory, and a four-tiered system began 
to be introduced. Problems connected with the three-tiered system included 
1 
Mills vary in size from a few thousand spindles to one hundred thousand 
or more. Some mills only spin, others only weave, most do both; some 
mills have dyeing and printing sections, others do not. 
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the lack of management experience of the workshop foremen; the 
proliferation of workshops of small size, especially in large mills; the 
tendency of the director to lead directly from the top, resulting in an 
absence of horizontal co-operation and contact and also placing a large 
burden on the director; and the separation of technical and administrative 
work remained. The four-tiered system involved the mill director at the 
top, followed in descending order by work area chiefs, work shop chiefs 
and small production team chiefs. 
From 1953 onward the structure became reasonably settled for the 
mid-1950s, although functional departments tended to grow rapidly in 
number, resulting in efforts to streamline in 1955 and 1957. Some small 
mills reverted to the small workshop system and dropped the work areas. 
In 1958 many staff were transferred down and the established internal 
organisational methods tended to dismantled. 
The running of the mills; 
Immediately after Liberation, army officers were stationed at many 
mills. The presence of a military representative was important to bring 
order and stability out of chaos and uncertainty, but his role in running 
the enterprises seems to have been almost entirely passive. He was not 
familiar with production and management and it was necessary to make 
alternative management arrangements [ Su Ku, 1957] . 
An early step was to achieve a democratic reform of mill management. 
This process was generally carried out under the leadership of the local 
Party committee, and the main elements consisted of establishing a 
Factory Administration Committee (FAC) and a Staff and Worker Represent-
ative Meeting (SRVJM) , [ J.M.J.P., 1950/2/6]. The system of running the 
mills was called 'collective leadership of the Party combined with 
individual responsibility', and lasted from 1950 to about 1954. 
The FAC was made up of the director, vice-directors, the general 
engineer, other responsible people in production, (such as the Party 
secretary) and representatives of the staff and workers, including the 
trade union chairman ex officio. The ideal size was considered to be 
about five to seven members. A standing committee existed, composed of 
the director, the trade union chairman, and one other man (inevitably the 
Party secretary) for making day to day decisions. The function of the 
FAC was to run the mill, that is, to discuss and decide all major problems 
of production and management, including the production plan, business 
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management, the systems for running the mill, wages, welfare, and the 
inspection and summing up of results [C.F.E.L,, 1950]. 
The SWRM was to be set up in all but the smallest mills; it came 
under the jurisdiction of the trade union and held its meetings in spare 
time. It listened to and discussed reports from the FAC and could inspect 
the way the FAC was running the mill. its power was, however, limited 
to making criticisms and suggestions direct to the FAC. 
Several problems existed with regard to this system of running the 
mills in the early 1950s. The factory management tended to go slow on 
the introduction of democratic reforms, and the different regions of 
China adopted different sets of methods of reform. The different mills 
in one town often had different approaches to the problem [ J.M.J.P., 
1950/2/6]. Once the FAC and SWRM were set up they often became a mere 
formality with no real power or function. 
An important problem was that the Party committee in the mill had 
a tendency to encroach and take over the function of management [ Li 
Hsueh-feng, 1956] causing uncertainty about who really was in charge of 
the small workshops and resulting in the managers adopting a passive 
role [Chen Keng-jen, 1954]. As a result the Party began to neglect 
political work and was unable to supervise or control the management, 
since they had taken over this function [Huang Cheng, 1955]. Additionally, 
there was a lack of well defined responsibility system in production. 
This was not very suitable for the implementation of centralised economic 
planning and hindered the setting up of necessary internal systems such as 
domestic planning [Chen Keng-jen, 1954]. 
As a result of these problems a change was made in 1953, when 
'unified leadership under a single head' (or 'one-man management') began 
to be established in industry [Li Hsueh-feng, 1956]. This began in the 
textile industry in Shanghai in the second quarter of 1954, and by 
September of that year the state run textile mills were in the process 
of changing to the new system. The power of the enterprise Party committee 
was severely curtailed and that of the director increased substantially. 
From the viewpoint of the government a new set of problems emerged 
in the period 1954 to 1956. The factory director developed 'full 
responsibility* and began to ignore resolutions concerning production 
management, passed by the enterprise Party committee [Li Hsueh-feng, 
1956]. This caused the Party to decline in authority and to adopt a 
subordinate position in the mills. In turn this 'corroded the Party 
spirit of the cadres', encouraging bureaucracy ,commandism, self-
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complacency, and arrogant behaviour among the managers. Schurmann 
sees this one-man management system as being strongly pushed in 1953, 
under oblique attack in 1954, declining during 1955, and revoked in 1956. 
He also believes that many enterprises never adopted it, particularly 
in light industry, and that 'the Chinese never became enthusiastic about 
one-man management' [ Schurmann F,, 1966:254], 
The evidence from an examination of the textile industry supports 
neither the timing, a minor point since Schurmann deals largely with 
heavy industry, nor the alleged lack of popularity. In the textile 
industry the push to establish one-man management began in late 1954, 
the system expanded in 1955, and despite being revoked in 1956, many 
enterprises were reluctant to discard it and kept it after it should 
have been abandoned [ Hsia Cheng-yen, 1956] . It would not appear to have 
been unpopular with the mill management. Only in the restricted sense 
that certain members of the ruling elite, such as Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 
and Party units at lower levels were not overly enthusiastic, is it 
possible to agree with the point about enthusiasm. 
The reason that a good number of textile mills did not implement 
one-man management was not, as Schurmann suggests, because of the 
degree of remoteness from Soviet influence [1966:253], but was because at 
that time most mills were privately owned or joint state-privately owned. 
One-man management was apparently never supposed to apply to these 
categories. In heavy industry, with which Schurmann is more familiar, 
one-man management was more prevalent, since the degree of state owner-
ship was much higher. 
In 1956 another change occurred. The one-man management system was 
terminated in favour of the policy that the director (or manager) takes 
responsibility of the enterprise under the leadership of the Party 
committee [Li Hsueh-feng, 1956]. This was officially announced at the 
Eighth Party Congress, but the order had gone out earlier to local Party 
committees and to the enterprises; it had also been announced in the 
People's Daily, [ 1956/7/8b] . 
This new system was designed to increase Party power in the mills, 
while avoiding the problems that had existed in 1950-54. Under the new 
rules, all major questions, including management problems, were to be 
discussed exhaustively by the Party committee in the mill and the decision 
1 
[schurmann, F., 1966] Chapter 4, especially pp.267, 272-278, 284-285, 
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passed on to the managers to be implemented. The managers had the power 
to do routine administrative work, technical work, and to solve urgent 
pressing problems requiring immediate solution. After an initial lag 
in adoption, the system resulted in a shift in the power centre in the 
mills from the managers to the Party committee, so that by the 1957 
anti-rightist movement the Party was firmly in control. During 1958, 
and lasting until 1961, the Party took over the management function, but 
owing to decentralisation of power within the mills and to the confusion 
that existed, the idea of mill level management virtually ceased to exist 
during 1958-60. 
In addition to the problems due to emerge in the Great Leap Forward, 
certain immediate problems came into being with the introduction of the 
new system. The desired results were initially misunderstood at the 
mill level: some felt that the Party secretary should make all important 
decisions, rather than the Party collectively; some managers decided 
that they should submit all matters, however trivial, to the Party 
committee to decide, refused to accept any responsibility for decision 
taking; and a small number of party cadres wanted everything to be 
submitted through them for decision, and encouraged the managers to 
decline to take responsibility [Hsia Cheng-yen, 1956]. It also was 
extremely difficult in practice to decide what was a technical problem as 
opposed to a policy issue. In general it proved difficult to withdraw 
authority from management while leaving them with responsibility. 
III. THE INCREASE IN MANAGEMENT STAFF IN THE MILLS 
There is little doubt that staff niombers increased rapidly in 
textile mills during the period 1949-57, and became a source of concern 
to the ruling elite. It will be recalled that labour statistics were 
among the poorest produced, so that data is hard to find. Three separate 
tables are reproduced below. 
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Table 17 : The Change in Distribution of Personnel in 
State Run Textile Mills, 1949-57 
1 2 3 
Production Workers Non-production Production Management 
as a % of All Personnel as a Personnel for every 
Personnel % of All Workers 100 Production Workers 
1949 86.4 3.0 4.5 
1956 74.3 9.3 15.0 
1957* 71.3 12.2 15.5 
Third quarter of 1957, for mills directly run from the Ministry, 
including textile machine making and new enterprises. 
Source; [Chang Po, 1957] . 
The Table indicates that production workers fell vis-a-vis non-
production personnel, and the increase in non-productive personnel and 
management cadres was quite large. The same source indicates that the 
number of production workers increased each year to 1953, then fell to 
1955, increasing slightly in 1956 to an absolute figure less than that 
recorded in 1952. This is at variance with a set of figures for the 
entire textile industry released by the State Statistical Bureau [ 1958a; 
174] . 
Table 18 : Staff and Workers in the Textile Industry, 
1952-1956 (in thou.) 
1 2 3 4 
Production Non-Production Engineers & Total 
Workers Workers Technicians 
1952 777.5 192.2 16.1 969.8 
1953 846.9 228.1 21.3 1075.0 
1954 863.0 220.6 25.7 1083.6 
1955 866.9 238.8 30.3 1105.6 
1956 942.0 277.7 37.6 1219.7 
1957 • • • • • • 1184.5 
Note: Column 2 was obtained by subtraction. The figure for 1957, 
column 4, is estimated from a statement that the increase in 
staff and workers 1950-57 was 49 per cent. 
Source: [S.S.B., 1958a:174]. 
From the above table it is possible to calculate the percentages 
by group in each year 1952-56. The percentage of production workers 
fell over the period from eighty to seventy-seven. 
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Table 19 : The Change in Distribution of Workers and 









































At a disaggregate level, the number of all textile employees in 
Shanghai mills increased more rapidly than workers: with 1949=100, 
the index for employees stood at 153.88 in 1957, as compared with 135.45 
for workers [Yen Tzu-ch'ing, 1958] . 
In the second quarter of 1956, the number of staff, including 
engineers and technicians, was in general 11-18 per cent of the niimber 
of production workers in Shanghai mills, but in six of the eighteen mills 
in Tsingtao the percentage exceeded 17; in the worst mill in Tientsin it 
reached 2 3 per cent [ Hai Hui, 1957] . The absolute number of cadres in 
various mills increased rapidly between Liberation and 1957. The Tientsin 
State Run Number One Cotton Mill had 84 cadres at Liberation and 7 34 by 
the end of 1956; the Tientsin Numbers Three and Five Mills had 178 cadres 
at Liberation and 864 at the end of 1956; the Shanghai Number Five Mill 
had 138 cadres in October 1950 and 443 at the end of 1956. The increase 
in cadres varied from three or four times at the least to five or six 
times at the most.^ 
The problem of excessive staff size was much greater in the Chinese 
textile industry than in the Soviet textile industry. The average number 
of administrators per hundred productive workers was a little over 6 in the 
U.S.S.R., compared with 14.5 per cent and 9.6 per cent in the Peking 
Numbers One and Two Mills [Chang Po, 1957] . This was reduced to 10.6 
and 6.1 per cent respectively after some streamlining, but the average 
number in many mills would seem to have been around 15 per cent; Chang 
Po felt that ten per cent was a permissible goal to aim for and that one 
third of the existing administrators could be dropped. 
^Complicating the issue is the fact that at Liberation, secretaries were 
not included as cadres, but later were included: this causes some of the 
apparent increase to be purely statistical. See Hai Hui [1957]. 
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There are many reasons to explain the increase in the numbers of 
staff relative to workers up to 1958. These reasons were: an increase 
in tasks as a result of the attempt to implement centralised comprehensive 
planning, Party and trade union bureaucracy, desires of mill managers and 
higher levels, the 'availability doctrine', welfare facilities, bonus 
regulations, efficiency indicators in the planning system, and the long 
tradition of bureaucracy in Chinese history. 
The attempt to implement a system of centralised comprehensive 
planning was a prime reason for the rapid increase in staff numbers. The 
demands for statistical information by the state led to a great increase 
in the statistical staff, so that by 1957 the statistical recording 
personnel in many mills made up over forty per cent of total staff 
numbers [ C.K.F.C.K.J., 1957b] . Each extension of the state's interest 
in running mills in accordance with centralised planning led to an 
increase in staff numbers. The safety measures and health work of 1953 
led to an increase in staff size, as did better maintenance after 1953, 
labour emulation campaigns, the introduction of economic accounting, and 
the establishment of technical inspection [ Hai Hui, 1957]. The small 
workshop system also had this effect owing to the large niombers of foremen 
required. 
Imitating the Soviet system seems to have led to a greater need 
for staff in China than in Russia. There are several possible reasons 
for this: the Chinese may have been less efficient than the Russians, 
owing to such factors as lack of experience; or the systems themselves 
may not have been copied carefully, were simply not suitable for 
Chinese conditions, or may have been misunderstood. Certain procedures 
became very complex and cumbersome, necessitating large numbers of staff 
to achieve a relatively simple result. As an example, if a maintenance 
worker in the Tientsin State Number Three Cotton Mill required one spare 
part to mend a machine, he was required to go through twenty-two separate 
procedures, including making application to the shift leader, the 
workshop level, the work area level, the materials department, and the 
accounts department [Hai Hui, 1957]. In some yarn mills the implementation 
of the domestic plan was overly enthusiastic, with targets made down to 
output in one hour, which required many more statistical personnel and 
had no particular advantages [ Chou Ch'un-tsuo, 1957] . 
One enterprise director gave a full and frank description of the 
problem he faced in his enterprise [Jen Chung-hao, 1956]. The comments 
fit what information has been obtained on the situation in textile mills. 
105 
although it is not clear what type of factory he ran. He criticised 
the excessive number of meetings and documents, which in his view 
resulted in poor management, despite large staff numbers and intensive 
work by the reasonably well educated staff. He described his eight hour 
day as made up of one hour spent on dociiments and reports from higher 
and lower levels, a minimum of four hours on internal meetings, one 
hour talking to the production manager about problems and only two 
hours left over for what he considered to be real work. Additionally, 
in one week he listened to a summary report on the progress of move-
ments within the mill, wrote a simplified account of this (half a day) 
and talked to the Russian expert (half a day). Every month he had to 
attend meetings in the town about reports (two days usually), 
accompany visitors around the factory (one day minimum),^ and evaluate 
monthly competitions (half a day). Furthermore, each year he had to 
visit the province level or Peking for a meeting (two weeks) and also 
had to study 'removed from production' (two weeks, twice a year). 
He described top management as disliking most the innumerable 
meetings they were forced to attend, while general staff disliked most 
the deluge of documents and the irrational systems. There were 66 
kinds of reports in his factory, with 792 forms that had to be sent 
to higher levels (some more than once), and he estimated that these 
would cover 20,000 square metres, weight 10 tons, and cost 45,000 yuan 
in paper, pens, ink and printing alone. 
The Party and trade union organisation in the mill also contri-
buted its share to the problem of large numbers of staff. The trade 
unions tended to be heavily staffed [Lai Jo-yu, 1955b]. The work 
methods of both organisations favoured the establishment of committees 
for considering and solving all problems. As an extreme example, one 
mill had the use of a motorcar and the trade union formed a sixteen man 
committee to manage it. This committee included the trade union chair-
man, the Communist Youth League secretary, and departmental heads; 
meeting in working hours, the committee interfered with the normal work 
of the members [J.M.J.P. , 1953/7/23]. This approach to problems caused 
extra staff to be employed to cope with the work. The minute taking, 
copying, filing and other secretarial tasks added to the staff numbers. 
The cadres themselves were often promoted from the ranks of 
workers and therefore were normally not well educated. As the leaders 
^ He felt this was not a complete waste as 'This did provide an 
opportunity to visit the workshops'. 
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did not pay attention to training them, these cadres could not always 
manage parts of their jobs. This resulted in the hiring of more staff 
and assistants to help them [ Hai Hui, 1957] . 
Nepotism was allegedly a cause of some of the overstaffing. 
Families and dependents of Party cadres were reportedly often found a 
staff job, with disregard for their abilities. The wives of cadres 
were particularly mentioned in this respect [ Hsii Chang-ch' ing, 1957] . 
By their actions, certain people at higher levels encouraged 
overstaffing of mills, as did the managemement of some mills. Many 
higher level organs wanted to establish subsidiary organs in mills, 
along vertical rule lines. Meetings at higher levels of the textile 
system often had as a consequence the establishment of special depart-
ments at mill level, which inevitably required staff rather than workers. 
For instance, an education meeting led to the setting up of education 
offices in mills; an industrial health meeting wanted a health depart-
ment in the mills; a labour protection meeting asked for the establish-
ment of a safety-technical department. Where such specialist depart-
ments were set up, frequently no one seemed to know what they should do, 
causing the staff to create a lot of work in order to look busy: this 
resulted in more staff being taken on to do the extra work - Parkinson's 
Law in a pure form [Hai Hui, 1957] . 
At the mill level, certain managers had an empire-building approach 
to their work: 
'...not a few directors' enterprises are like small kingdoms, 
wanting to control the birth, old age, sickness and death of 
the staff, workers and their dependents; the culture and 
education departments and welfare departments likewise [desire] 
completeness. They want as many primary and middle schools 
and even universities, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, canteens, 
... as is possible'. [Hai Hui, 1957]. 
In addition, the managers of many small mills wanted to have as many 
departments and sections as the large mills, causing an unnecessary 
increase in staff numbers. 
The availability doctrine was important as an explanation of 
staff build up.^ In view of the difficulties of obtaining skilled men 
when needed, the mill managers apparently had a tendency to take on men 
and train them on the job, so that future tasks could better be met. 
This was especially true of staff members, since they were liable to be 
^See also Chapter 6, pp.154-155. 
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'borrowed' by hiqher echelons, not only by the Ministry but also by the 
bureaus, the town Party organs and the area Party organs [ Hai Hui, 1957] . 
The practise of requiring cadres to ao out and work manually may well 
have encouraged the taking on of extra staff to cope with absences, as 
may the habit of trying to streamline the establishment of the mills. 
Evidence of these points is lacking and they naturally could not have 
applied until the management realised the possibility of such require-
ments, so that these two points remain tentative. 
The stress on developing welfare facilities which came from 
higher levels and from within the mills, also added to staff numbers. 
Education, health, housing and canteens are all crime examples.^ 
The bonus regulations themselves encouraged an increase in staff. 
The regulations of 1953 established a maximum for the premium fund as a 
percentage of the wage bill. Initially some mills used the wages of 
production workers alone, others used total wages and salaries. Quite 
soon a number of mills changed to the latter method in order to increase 
the permitted premium fund size. The inter-mill competitions of 1955-57 
had a similar effect by setting a limit on bonuses as a percentage of 
the wage bill [A.C.F.T.U., 1956b] . 
On their ov/n the bonus regulations provide a reason for increasing 
staff and worker numbers, but in conjunction with the efficiency 
indicators adopted by the Ministry of Textiles and the bureaus, they 
favoured an increase in staff rather than workers. In plan evaluation, 
when examining labour productivity, the Ministry and bureaus only looked 
at the productivity of production workers and ignored staff and non-
production workers. Mill management responded by keeping down the 
number of production workers but were less concerned about staff and 
non-production workers [Chang Po, 1957]. 
Strict control of personnel nimbers was lacking fChou En-Lai, 1956a] 
v,;hich allowed managers much freedom in pursuing their own interests. As 
a qeneral rule in the textile industry in 1955, the mills did not have 
a set number of personnel to be employed fChiana Kuana-nai, 1955b] . This 
permissive factor was an important element in the increase in staff' 
numbers 
T":hen, in addition to these points, the long tradition and experience 
of a large bureaucracy in China are considered, and the industrial 
^ This point is brought out bv Hai Hui [ 1957] and Chang Po [ 1957] . 
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management practise of taking collegiate rather than individual 
decisions is added, then the rapid rise in staff numbers is easily 
explained. 
Certain members of the government were uneasily aware of the 
dangers of bureaucracy, either for efficiency or for ideological 
reasons. Spasmodic efforts to oppose it were made in the early 1950s; 
for instance the Ministry of Heavy Industry began an anti-bureaucracy 
campaign in 1952 [ J.M.J.P., 1953/4/7] . A call went out in 1954 to 
streamline organs and staff [ J.M.J.P., 1954/2/24] , but it was not until 
1955 that the attempt began in the textile industry. A report by Li 
Fu-ch'un advocating economy and opposing excessive staff numbers, was 
reprinted in Chinese Textiles in that year [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955b] , and a 
directive went out to reduce the number of departments and to cut back 
on staff numbers in textile mills [ C.K.F.C.K.J., 1957e] . This effort 
to reduce staff numbers failed.^ It does not seem to have been taken 
seriously in the industry: not all mills made an attempt even on paper 
to reduce staff numbers, and where the problem was discussed and a plan 
to reduce staff numbers was made, it was not always followed. For 
example, the Shanghai State Run Number One Cotton Mill made a draft 
plan to reduce staff numbers by 105, but it was not implemented; by 
early 1957 the staff was no smaller and even seemed to have increased, 
owing to the arrival of new graduates and technicians [ Hai Hui, 1957] . 
The problem was tackled again after the Rectification movement of mid-
1957 , and internal changes in departments probably had some impact 
towards the end of 1957. The real solution had to await the arrival of 
the Great Leap Forward, when hsia fang methods were rigorously 




IV . INCENTIVES 
There are two general methods of attempting to ensure realisation 
of the state economic plan: administrative orders together with 
administrative allocation of resources, or economic means, i.e., a 
system of incentives to induce producers to follow their plan [ Lange 0., 
1962b:23] . These are not mutually exclusive methods. This section 
considers material and honorary incentives for workers and managers; 
sanctions are considered in the following section. 
Much variety existed in the use of material incentives in the 
textile industry during the period 1950-1957. There were several 
reasons for this. The bonus systems in the mills were dissimilar when 
inherited, and some reforms in the early 1950s were done locally on a 
rather ad hoc basis. Unified regulations on a national basis covering 
material awards were slow to emerge for textiles, and never appeared 
for managerial bonuses. The First Five Year Plan [1955:194] appealed 
for the introduction of a bonus system in general and the abandonment 
of existing systems where they were irrational. When regulations for 
workers' bonuses were made, they allowed the areas to adopt different 
bonus rates to meet local needs [M. of T., 1955b]. 
Different ownership was also a cause of variations. The central 
state run mills were the main target of the effort to plan centrally 
and therefore to set up an acceptable bonus system. Private and co-
operative run mills seem to have been left aside in this respect, and 
local state run mills were allowed, but not apparently forced, to adopt 
the bonus regulations for central mills if it was considered that their 
conditions were roughly the same [S.C., 1956a]. 
Even had these explanations not existed, there was one important 
causal factor of variation in the practise of material awards. The 
policy that emerged by 1956-57 was to allow the mill management to set 
the conditions for workers to receive a bonus in line with the needs of 
a particular mill. If poor quality was a problem in a mill, then a 
quality bonus was supposed to be instituted in that mill. As mills 
varied on problems, this resulted in the adoption of different bonus 
systems. 
Despite the variety of bonus systems, some generalisations are 
possible about the use of financial incentives in the textile industry. 
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Immediately after Liberation there was some awareness of the need for a 
system for rewards and punishments in the textile industry [H.H.Y.P., 
1950] , and enterprise bonus funds were established in 1952 [ Tao Sheng-yu, 
1956] . Bonuses ware common enough by 1954 for it to be worthwhile 
explaining how they should he dealt with in monthlv renorts fS.S.B., 
1^54b]. Nonetheless it was not until 1955-1957 that official attention 
focussed on the bonus system, a debate on bonuses took place in the 
journals, and managerial bonuses were considered and tried out in some 
industries. However, it had not proved possible to proceed to a unified 
system of managerial bonuses by 1957 [Chen Wen-ya, 1957a]. In general, 
heavy industry was more unified than textiles and received more 
attention. Partly as a result,bonus systems were implemented earlier 
and unified regulations often existed in heavy industry.. 
Financial incentives were less used in China than in the U.S.S.R. 
The size of bonus was lower in China and the use of a single norm for 
bonus payment was avoided. In the textile industry, top management 
bonuses were limited to 30 per cent of monthly salary, compared with 
150 oer cent in the U.S.S.R. [Chen Wen-ya, 1957a]. Piece-rate 
incentive systems were also not used really extensively. By 1957, 
fortv-two Der cent of workers in all industry were receiving some kind 
of piece rate, as compared with about fifty per cent in the textile 
industry [C.K.F.C., 1963a]. In qualitative terms, piece-rate system.s 
do not appear to have been popular. Regulations issued at the end of 
1954 recommended the establishment and improvement of bonuses with time-
rates for the textile industry in 1955 [ M. of T., 1955b] . In late 1956 
it was revealed that most textile mills had not tried out or even 
investigated the possibility of using piece-rates and a quality bonus 
[ M. of T. , 1956c] . 
Another generalisation is that managerial bonus systems were 
extremely difficult to implement property. Zielinski J.G. [1968:48] 
points out that managerial bonuses, based on profit, need three require-
ments in order to have operational value. These are decisions on the 
rules of pricing, on the methods of accounting, and on the rules for 
calculation of the bonus itself. In the textile industry the system of 
price fixing is obscure but seems to have been settled for the mills at 
higher levels; the accounting methods were not fixed in practice; and 
bonus calculation methods could not have been settled in view of the lack 
of a general unified system for bonuses. 
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It is commonly alleged that there is either no information on 
managerial bonuses or that non-productive staff did not receive a bonus. 
'There is no information on whether Chinese managers have ever received 
personal bonuses either out of retained profits or out of a special 
fund* [ Rieman K.B., 1967:209] . 'Bonuses were directly related to 
performance, and thus were not extended to non-production staff 
employees' [Hoffman C,, 1967:26]. Neither of these statements is 
justified. The managerial staff could receive bonuses as a result of 
inter-mill labour emulation competitions [ C.K.F.C.K.J., 1955b]. In 1957 
managerial bonuses were being established in the textile industry 
[Chen Wen-ya, 1957a]. Outside the textile industry there are clear 
examples of staff and managerial bonuses being paid; for example, in 
the first quarter of 1956, the director of a mine received a bonus of 
120 Yuan [ Hsieh Yen-ch'eng, 1957] . In some enterprises the internal 
transport worke rs, who were not directly related to production, could 
earn a bonus on production results [Han Pi, 1956]. Perhaps even more 
striking is the informat ion that certain ministries paid bonuses to 
their staff, above the level of the factory and production. Of the 
twenty-one ministries under the State Council, four paid such bonuses 
regularly and three more paid occasional bonueses. The Ministries of 
Railways and Agriculture paid bonuses in 1954 and 1955. It was 
recommended that all the ministries should establish a system for 
bonuses for their staff [ J.M.J.P., 1956/5/22] . Bonuses for engineers, 
technicians and leading personnel in enterprises were recommended in a 
People's Daily editorial about the same time [ J.M.J.P., 1956/5/3] . 
It appears that the bonus systems in Chinese industry weakened 
rather than strengthened between 1953 and 1955, when the Russian system 
was supposedly being implemented. Some enterprises abolished their 
existing bonus systems without establishing any new ones. Some rational 
systems were also abandoned. Some other enterprises retained a bonus 
system but made a practise of setting standards too high to be attained. 
As a result, the number of bonus recipients fell between 1953 and 1955, 
as did the amount earned in the form of bonuses [ J.M.J.P., 1956/5/3] . 
Workers' Bonuses 
There could be up to four major categories of bonuses in one mill: 
1. inventions and rational suggestions bonus; 2. external plan target 
bonus; 3. internal plan target bonus; and 4. inter-mill labour 
emulation competition bonus. 
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The inventions and rational suggestions bonus was standardised for 
all industries in 1954 [G.A.C., 1954]. For inventions, the bonus 
ranged from 2 to 30 per cent of the value saved in one year and was paid 
for three to five years. Technical improvements could be rewarded 
with 0.5 per cent to 20 per cent of the sum saved in one year, and 
rational suggestions with 0.25 per cent to 10 per cent. Bonuses in the 
last two categories were paid only once. The regulations issued for 
the textile industry had the same rates, but the application of the 
regulations was initially ignored in the industry [ M. of T., 1954d] . 
This was overcome, and in December 1957, out of nine hundred proposals 
under consideration, sixty-five were rewarded as technically successful 
suggestions. Two were paid one thousand yuan, five were paid five 
hundred yuan, nineteen were paid three hundred yuan, and thirty-nine 
were paid one hundred yuan [C.K.F.C., 1958a], It would thus seem that 
the tendency in practise was to round off the sums paid to a convenient 
figure and perhaps simply to set such a sum rather than to make 
precise calculations of the sum saved. It seems unlikely that the 
sums saved would exactly round off to the figures mentioned above. 
The bonuses for fulfilling external targets \-;ere not standardised 
in China and the areas were at liberty to choose their own bonus rate 
[ M. of T., 1955b] . The bonus rates for fulfilling internal enterprise 
targets do not seem to have been standardised; it would have been very 
difficult to do so, and general policy was for the mills to differ in 
accordance with each mill's particular needs. 
Labour emulation competitions existed rather spasmodically in the 
early 1950s. In 1954 the A.C.F.T.U., [1954] called for an intensive 
effort to promote them, recommending that material rewards be given in 
addition to honorary ones. These competitions between mills were 
introduced in the textile industry in 1955 [ C.K.F.C.K.J., 1955b] but 
began in an intensive form in 1956. Bonuses went to successful mills 
and also to individuals. The size of bonus to a mill was set by the 
Textile Ministry (or Bureau or Industrial T'ing) after 'mutual 
discussion'. For an individual, the bonus was equivalent to 15-35 per 
cent of the actual monthly earnings, averaged over three months. It 
could also be given to those whose output could not be directly measured. 
As an example, in 1955 the Tsingtao State Run Number Seven Cotton Mill 
awarded individual bonuses equal to twenty-five per cent of the wage 
[ C.K.F.C.K.J., 1955a] . The mill management was supposed to put 10-20 
per cent of the enterprise fund into a special fund each quarter to use 
for these bonuses. A limit of three per cent of the total wage bill was 
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imposed on. the amount paid out as bonuses in the inter-mill competitions 
of F., 1C)56] . The ministrv also decided that honorary awards 
should be paid, but not bonuses, for competitions between firms in the 
same branch of the industry. 
There were many problems in the working of these four different 
sets of bonuses. First, in some mills there were, at certain times, 
an excessive number of bonuses for which a worker was eligible to 
compete. Zielinski J.G., [1968:R1) feels that six to twelve different 
bonuses in one economic unit comprise a complex system (i.e. difficult 
to manage). Mills in the Chinese textile industry could have far more 
than this. For example, the Shanghai State Run Number Fifteen Cotton 
Mill had more than seventy different bonuses which were reduced by 
nineteen in March 1957. In that mill the bonus systems had to be 
totallv abolished in April of that year and a fresh start made [E.C.A.3., 
1957a] . 
A second problem was one of egalitarianism.^ This was officially 
frowned upon and criticised. Thoughts of 'everyone suffers, evervone 
should get a bonus' were to be strictly opposed [Han Pi, 1956]. The 
reasons for the development of egalitarianism appear to be rooted in the 
attitudes of manaaers, v7orkers and, probably, the trade unions and 
Party in the mill. Bonuses came to be regarded as a regular component 
of wages [Ju Lien, 1956b]. The use of collective rather than individual 
bonuses contributed to the problem.. The decision on how to divide the 
team bonus was made on the basis of discussion, which had the effect 
of equalising bonuses. For this reason, Han Pi [ 1956] urged that 
discussion was not an appropriate method of allocating the bonus 
within a team. 
Aggregate data on the number of workers covered by bonuses is not 
available, but some individual examoles exist. The Shanghai State Run 
Number One Cotton Mill paid bonuses to cover one quarter of the workers 
[C.F.J.P., 1956/4/17], and the Shanghai Number Fifteen Mill to one third 
[E.C.A.B., 1957a] . The yarn shop of the Shanahai lumber Nineteen Mill 
paid bonuses to 25.5 per cent of the workers in the first quarter of 
1956, successive quarters recording 30.2 per cent and 28.1 per cent. 
The mill planned to increase this to forty to fifty per cent [Ying, 
1957] . This compared with about twenty per cent coverage in the yarn 
shops in the Numbers Five, Twelve and Sixteen Mills, Ying suggested that 
^ Egalitarianism was not confined to bonuses. Over-issue of red flags 
as honorary awards similarly occurred [ A.C.F .T.IJ . , 1954] . 
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a little less than twenty per cent was about right. The issue of what 
percentage of the workers should receive a bonus was undecided in 1957, 
as was the basic question of whether a percentage should be fixed at 
all [C.K.F.C., 1957a], In 1962 this question was still being discussed 
[Wang Te-Chung and Huang Ch'in-hsieh, 1962b] . 
A third problem was the size and limits of bonuses. The information 
available is scattered and contradictory. Regulations on textile 
bonuses at the end of 1954 [ M. of T. , 1955b] allowed the different 
areas of China to choose their own rates of bonus, but imposed an 
overall maximum on bonuses of twenty-five per cent of a worker's standard 
wage. The regulations also established a limit for the bureaus, so 
that aggregate bonuses in the mills under a bureau could not exceed 
ten per cent of the aggregate standard wage bill of the time-rate-plus-
bonus workers in the mills. The tendency towards egalitarianism 
probably means that most bonuses were small in the period to 1958, but 
there were exceptions to this. It was possible for workers in some 
Shanghai mills to earn a monthly bonus exceeding the basic wage [ Chen 
Wen-Ya, 1957c]. It was probably more common for bonuses to be around 
ten per cent, as described by Han Pi [1956], although the labour 
emulation bonuses were in the fifteen to thirty-five per cent range. 
Tu Hsiang-kuang [ 1955] referred to an annual limit of ten per cent 
of the annual payroll on bonuses in industry in general. He pointed 
out that this meant that firms with little labour of high productivity 
had their bonuses restricted more than did firms with much labour of 
low productivity. The result was that enterprise managers were dis-
couraged from increasing the productivity of labour and reducing the 
number of workers. This meant that the wage cost share of total costs 
could not be reduced. 
Poor accounting practises and the lack of standardisation of 
accounting methods was a fourth problem. It meant that it was very 
difficult to run an efficient and fair bonus sytem for all mills. In 
1956 the Ministry of Textiles [1956c] suggested that the problem of 
establishing and 'making healthy' the poor bonus sytems was one of 
economic accounting. 
A fifth problem was that the different bonus and other systems in 
a mill were often not in line with each other. In the labour emulation 
competitions the team received an honorary award only, the individual a 
material award. This encouraged the workers to ignore the team goals 
amd to concentrate on their individual targets. The labour competition 
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targets differed from the economic accounting targets, with the result 
that the latter were ignored [Li T'ien-yu, 1957]. The North-west 
Textile Administration Bureau experimented in one mill to try to get 
these two sets of norms together, but no mention of this being extended 
has been seen, 
A sixth problem was that up to 1955 most of the bonuses were paid 
to the production team rather than to individuals, which reduced the 
incentive effect of the bonuses. Han Pi [ 1956] urged that individual 
bonuses were superior to collective ones as an incentive device. 
The payment of bonuses was also a source of trouble. Bonuses 
that had actually been earned were not always paid [Chen Wen-ya, 1957], 
or payment was greatly delayed, thus dividing effort from reward [ Ju Lien, 
1956a] . 
Additionally, the payment of bonuses was not automatic. Payment 
of a worker's bonus could be stopped by the mill director at his 
discretion if he considered there were fairly large deficiencies in the 
man's work. These could take the form of the occurrence of a serious 
accident, a notable increase in waste products, the existence of 
'disharmony' or violation of technical regulations, non-fulfillment of 
the profit target, or late completion of a major contract [ Wu Fa, 1956b] . 
Top management was eligible to receive labour emulation competition 
awards, but it was far from automatic. The manager's department had to 
be given an 'honorary name', and the masses had to agree to the payment 
of a bonus to the manager, as did the higher levels of administration 
and the trade union [C.K.F.C.K.J., 1955b]. 
In one mill only thirty per cent of the bonus fund was actuallv 
spent on bonuses, the rest being devoted to various welfare uses [ Chen 
Wen-ya, 1957b] . Chen Wen-ya also pointed out that in some mills the 
director was not in charge of the disbursement of the entire bonus fund 
at the mill. Part of it would be decentralised to lower level managers 
to hand out as bonuses. This occurred even before the Great Leap Forward. 
The bonus fund might not be used properly - some seventy-five per cent of 
the bonus fund in the Peking State Run Number One Mill has not spent at 
all [ Su K'e, 1956] . 
An eighth problem also involved the bonus fund. Only part of 
this fund was kept at the mills under the control of the mill management. 
Some thirtv per cent was deposited and centralised at the bureau above 
the mills, under the control of the bureau rather than the mill. The 
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regulation to this effect was criticised, on the grounds that it 
prohibited the development of an active spirit in the enterprises 
(that is, acted as a disincentive), by Chang Ch'eng-tsung [ l^^se] . 
The centralised thirty per cent was designed to be used for collective 
measures for the benefit of the mills which individually they could not 
ai^ford to undertake or had no interest in doing, because the measure 
would involve significant externalities. However, it was not unknown 
for a bureau to divert the money to its own use [Chang Chung-i, 1956]. 
As an example, the Honan Textile Administration Bureau was judged to 
have mis-spent sixty-five per cent of the disbursement of the money 
held for the mills in the period 1955-56. The bureau had used the money 
on such items as the purchase of trees to beautify the premises of the 
bureau, the repair of their hot water boiler, equipping their sports 
team with boots and outfits, and the purchase of 'sleeping cars' for a 
few top level cadres. 
The shortage of luxury consumer goods, the existence of rationina 
and the strong feelings against, and possible personal dangers in, 
obvious conspicuous consumption may also have acted as some disincentive 
to the pursuit of bonuses. However, the evidence suggests that bonuses 
were Dursued during the period in which they could be earned. VJhile 
these points may have reduced the desire for bonuses, they were 
obviously not strong enough to prevent such a pursuit. 
A final problem in the bonus system was the generally underlying, 
and sometimes overriding, existence of political considerations that 
were considered before a bonus could be paid. The existence of 
ideological requirements in addition to economic ones may well reduce 
the incentive effect of a bonus system. This was recognised as a danger, 
and Wu Fa [ 1956a] suggested that political requirements should not be 
excessive and that 'active study', 'unity and mutual help' and 'labour 
attitude' were sufficient 
'Managerial Bonuses 
Definitive statements on managerial bonuses in the textile industry 
proved hard to find. Some managers may have received bonuses before 
1957, as they did in some other industries, but if so it must have been 
done on a local b a s i s , since by 1957 no unified regulations existed 
for such bonuses in the textile industry [Chen Wen-ya, 1957a] . 
The source of most bonuses was the enterprise bonus fund, the money 
in which came from fulfillina the planned profit targets and earning 
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above plan profits. The first regulations on profit distribution 
appeared in April 1951, and stated that all planned profits went to the 
State, but thirty per cent of above plan profits could be retained at 
the enterprise as a bonus fund [ Ecklund G.H., 1966:80] . In January 1952 
the regulations were amended to allow the establishment of a bonus fund 
in all enterprises, including those that did not earn above plan profits. 
Industries were classified into three groups. Firms in industries such 
as ore mining, coal, petroleum, and metals, retained 5 per cent of 
planned profits and 20 per cent of above plan profits. Industries 
such as electricity, machine building, textiles, and some other light 
industries, were allowed 3.5 per cent of planned profits and 15 per cent 
of above plan profits. The third group consisted of all other light 
industries and the public utilities, and firms were allowed to retain 
2.5 per cent of planned profits and 12 per cent of above plan profits 
[ E.and F. 1952] 
By 1957 a slight change appears to have been made, since the 
reported retention of profit in the textile industry was 2.5 per cent of 
planned and 15 per cent of above plan profits [ C.K.F.C.K.J., 1957d] . It 
is possible that this statement was already a little out of date, as a 
decision had been made in 1956 to divide the above plan profits 
differently, with sixty per cent to the state and forty per cent to the 
bureau, in the case of central run mills [S.C., 1956b]. The bureau was 
allowed to pass this forty per cent on to the mill or to retain it, at 
the bureau's discretion. if retained, the money had to be used to 
assist the mills, for example if they were short of working capital or 
funds for investment. The decision on the precise division of above 
plan profit for local state run mills was to be decided at the provincial 
level and reported up. It is of course highly probable that this 
resulted in different divisions being adopted. It also appears likely 
that the bureaus would exercise their right of retention, which would 
result in a reduction in size of the bonus fund at the mill. In 
November 1957, a directive on the reform of the industrial management 
1 
Ecklund's statement [1966:81] is at variance with these regulations. 
He quotes only two groups of industries; the first roughly corresponding 
to group one above, and his second group seems to cover all the others. 
He also quotes different rates in part. For his second group he mentions 
12 per cent of planned profits and 25 per cent of above plan profits. 
His figures appear to be incorrect, not only because they contradict 
the regulations but also because it is judged unlikely that the government 
policy would be to give a higher rate to light industry than to most heavy 
industry in view of the general priority to heavy industry at that time. 
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system stated that henceforth all bonuses were to be paid out of 
retained profits. 
Payments out of the bonus fund were not restricted to bonuses. In 
addition to bonus payments, the fund was also used for collective 
welfare expenditures, the purchase of safety and health equipment, the 
relief of individual hardship (the sum spent not to exceed five per 
cent of the total devoted to bonus payments in that period), and other 
expenditures to improve production and to add to equipment. 
A debate occurred in 1956 and 1957 about bonus systems. In the 
authoritative People's Daily [ J.M.J.P., 1956/5/3] , bonuses for leading 
personnel and technicians were recommended, if the plans were filled in 
an all-round and balanced way, for total output value, main product 
varieties, labour productivity, reduction in costs, and quality. This 
insistence on a variety of norms was typical of the approach recommended. 
Wu Fa [ 1956b] reported that many industrial enterprises were 
employing a bonus system for staff and technicians, with only a slightly 
different list of norms. Typical rates are given in Table 20. 
Table 20 : Bonuses for Staff and Technicians 
Bonuses as a % 
of Standard Wage 
for Filling Set 
Norms. 
% Increase in 
Bonus for Each 
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Source: Wu Fa [ 1956b] . 
These bonuses were decided by the director, but his bonus, along 
with those of the general engineer, technical inspection chief, plan 
office chief, and finance and accounting office chief, had to be reported 
up for approval. The bonuses of technicians and staff were paid out of 
the planned wage total and were regarded as forming part of wages [ sic] . 
They could be entered as a cost of production. 
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One of the generalisations made above was that financial incentives 
wore less used in China than in the Soviet TTnion. There were several 
reasons for this. First, China was, and is, an underdeveloped country 
with a low standard of livinq. Typically there is a high marginal 
propensity to consume for goods like food and clothing. The general 
introduction of sizeable bonuses would lead to an increase in averaae 
wages. This increase in income would lead to a danger of inflation 
(areatly feared as a result of experience), could reduce export earnings 
and could upset the strategy of development by causing a diversion of 
investment from capital goods to consumer goods industries. 
zv second reason was that it was technically not easy to introduce 
and run properly a comprehensive bonus system, owing to the lack of 
good accounting practices and standardisation, at mill levels, 
difficulties of administration precluded all but fairly rudimentary 
running systems. 
Conspicuous consumption was frowned upon in the U.S.S.R, but the 
official attitude in China seems to have been stronger. Obvious 
possession and use of quality goods could lead a man to become a target 
at struggle meetings during campaigns. Less desire to spend wealth, and 
fewer goods to purchase, probably meant less pressure for financial 
incentives. 
A fourth reason for the smaller use of financial incentives appears 
in the relative factor endowments. The U.S.S.R. faced a labour shortage 
and relatively high wages, and bonuses were used to attract labour from 
agriculture to industry. China had a large supply of unskilled labour, 
and too many came from the villages to the towns as it was. High wages 
and bonuses were not necessary to secure a supply of labour. 
A fifth reason was one of ideological difference between the two 
countries. In general, the Maoist philosophy and policy is to prefer 
methods of human organisation to material incentives, which are regarded 
by some with almost moral disapproval. It is feared that the use of 
material incentives can lead to economism and, finally, to revisionism, 
which would be a betrayal of the revolution. By 1958, Maoist policies 
were in force and material incentives were basically abandoned. Even 
before this, there had been an uneasy situation of both views, loosely 
Maoist and Russian, co-existing. This probably hampered the introduction 
of material incentives, especially for managers. 
It is not possible to be dogmatic about the relative weights to be 
assigned to these factors, but it is probable that the ideological 
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explanation, together with the technical difficulties involved in 
getting an efficient and equitable bonus system incorporated in a system 
of comprehensive planning, were of major importance. 
Honorary Awards and Social Esteem 
Rewards based on social group approval were widely used in all 
industries, the textile industry being no exception. Such rewards 
were apparently more used in China that in any other country. They were 
stressed particularly strongly for workers but were not at all 
emphasised for managers. This is not to say that they were totally 
lacking, for success by a mill in achieving goals presumably brought 
credit to a manger.^ This in turn may well have improved his prospects 
for promotion. It remains the case, however, that no evidence, such as 
articles about honorary awards for managers or publicised accounts of a 
manager's achievements, has been found in the literature on the textile 
industry. 
Non-material incentives for workers were numerous and could apply 
to individuals or groups. It seems reasonable to regard the use of 
group recognition and approval of an individual as the counterpart of 
social disapproval at the struggle meetings during campaigns. 
Non-material rewards took a large variety of forms. In probably 
the simplest form, the name of a successful worker, together with his 
achievements, could be chalked on a blackboard at the mill. His 
photograph could be put on the wall or at the main entrance to the mill. 
Honorific titles, such as 'model worker', 'labour hero' and, later 'five 
good worker', could be given. Flags and pennants, always red and of 
varying sizes denoting the degree of honour, could be awarded. These 
were placed in a prominent position at the individuals workplace for 
all to see. Many of them circulated, that is were competed for period-
ically. Scrolls of honour and certificates were awarded to workers of 
merit and individuals could be praised by name at meetings within the 
mill. The workers were encouraged at meetings to pledge to achieve 
certain goals, as were groups, and the pledge was written in large letters 
1 
Informant number eight volunteered the information that overfilling a 
plan could lead to promotion, advancement to a higher wage grade, verbal 
and written praise, small presents, an increase in the enterprise fund 
(which meant better welfare facilities), and approval of requested 
investment funds. 
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and placed in a prominent position. Fulfillment of such a promise 
resulted in celebrations in the mill. This device, involving as it does 
a loss of face for failure, may have been particularly strong as an 
incentive. A really notable worker who invented a new technique could 
have the new workstyle named after him; outstanding workers could also 
be written up in the press as an example to others. Such workers 
would also be pointed out to visitors to the mill, both Chinese and 
foreign, and the worker would be allowed to meet the visiting guests. 
Perhaps more tangible rewards were improved chances of promotions and 
Party membership, and certain benefits in the form of education and 
health treatment. Election to organisations of government, such as 
local People's Congresses, or even the National People's Congres's, 
was possible, as was being sent as a delegate to meetings in the local 
town, provincial capital, or even Peking, where they might be received 
by high government officials such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. On 
rare occasions an exceptional worker could even be sent abroad for a 
visit, normally to the U.S.S.R. 
It is impossible to measure the effect on individuals or on total 
achievements of such awards. It is felt that the beneficial effects 
were probably great, as some of these methods reinforced the traditional 
group feeling among Chinese workers; the Chinese have said that various 
methods such as the red flag competitons are very effective; and 
certainly an overwhelming use was made of them. It should be recalled, 
however, that they involve a large element of ideology in the form of 
a belief in human organisation to achieve results, so that even had they 
been only moderately successful one would guess that they would not have 
been discarded. Non-material incentives are a relatively low cost way of 
achieving results, and probably work better if they reinforce, rather 
than compete with, material rewards. 
V. SANCTIONS 
Sanctions can be used to encourage compliance with state regulations 
and induce workers and managers to follow the state plan. No cogent 
and unified regulation imposing such sanctions has been found. This is 
perhaps not surprising, since China does not possess a clear legal 
system nor a codified set of laws. 
Four major reasons for this exist. First, the Chinese traditionally 
are little concerned with legal systems, which were something to be 
avoided wherever possible; many disputes which in other countries might 
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be settled in court were frequently decided by those involved or recourse 
was made to extra-legal institutions for solution. This attitude 
persisted into the Communist period, and top level factorv management 
regarded the law as existing solely for the punishment of counter-
revolutionaries: managers regarded their workers as their own people 
to be dealt with by themselves [ J.M.J.P., 1955/1/17] . Many quasi-
judicial organs, such as People's Courts and Comrades' Trial Committees, 
were established and used to try cases and impose sentences early in 
the 1950s; such organisations were given broad powers to impose sanctions 
[ Schurmann F., 1966:188] . The Party gradually and effectively replaced 
the legal system. 
A second reason was the inability to set up a good legal system in 
China ii^  the 1950s, because of the short period of existence of the new 
regime and the lack of good personnel in sufficient numbers. 
A third reason was much more important. This was the attitude 
towards law involved in the Maoist ideology. Inherent in this is the 
view that revolution is essential and change will be continuous. 
Stability and law are not important; the former is not desired, the 
latter is almost irrelevant. The stress on the masses in this ideology, 
along with the belief that the masses collectively have the ability to 
be right, also obstructed the establishment of formal laws and legal 
systems. 
A fourth reason is that many items possess, or nearly possess, the 
force of law. All people's government orders, decisions, and commands 
were regarded as law by the courts [C.P.G., 1951] , and in the absence of 
these, government policy itself V7as taken as law. Editorials in the 
People's Daily are 'near law', while articles in it, as well as most 
published recommendations, carry an influence greater than similar 
publications in the west. This situation provides flexibility to the 
state, so that a formal set of laws are not required and might indeed 
be considered superfluous. 
The sanctions available 
Sanctions are considered here as forming two groups: general 
sanctions and specific sanctions. General sanctions exist and form part 
of the general environment within which workers and managers operate. 
All such sanctions consist essentially of a preference for not offending 
the Party and state. In more detail, there is a fear that one might 
become a target of struggle meetings during a movement, when incidents of 
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infringements of rules may be used to ones detriment. A personal file 
IS kept by the state on all residents, and many people apparently 
believe that it is a voluminous record of all important events. 
Informant number eleven reported that in fact it was very thin indeed, 
but the prevalent view was deliberately not discouraged as it made 
control easier. There was also the possibility of discovery and report 
of infringements by the trade union. Communist Youth Leage, Party, or 
activists, which could result in punishment. 
The specific sanctions available to deter breaking of regulations 
and encourage the pursuit of plan norms were of two kinds, legal and 
administrative. The legal sanctions were applied by the courts, which 
considered all laws. The corruption laws in particular could apply 
to industrial malpractises such as theft, bribery, embezzlement, and 
'satisfying oneself at the expense of the public', the latter capable 
of wide interpretation [ H.H.Y.P., 1952c]. Punishments under this law 
varied from admonishment through a range of fines and terms of imprison-
ment to death. 
There were many possible administrative punishments for malpractises, 
including dismissal, admonishment, criticism, demotion in job or in 
wage grade, expulsion from the Party, the noting of one or more 'demerits' 
or 'large demerits' in the record,^ and writing and rewriting confessions. 
There was also the power to send a serious case to a court for trial, and 
directors had the power to stop a bonus payment under certain 
circumstances.^ 
The use of available sanctions 
Deliberate use of sanctions in order to ensure fulfillment of plans 
was apparently rather rare, despite the fact that the plan was considered 
to be law. Sanctions do not seem to have acted as the counterpart of 
financial incentives to encourage production and plan compliance; a high 
output earned a bonus, but low quality did not lead to punishment [ Hsu 
Chang-ch'ing, 1957]. One administrative sanction that was sometimes 
used was to reduce a workers wage as a fine if his targets were not met. 
This was encouraged in one article, in cases such as significant 
fluctuations in quality of output, in order to improve standards [ Ju Lien, 
1956a]. The practice was criticised in the textile industry as being 
1 
Three large demerits resulted in the dismissal of tax workers fM. of F., 
1950] , and the expulsion of members from the Party in the textile industry 
[ Informant number 8] . 
^ See page 115, 
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punitive [ Liu Yung -tsung, 1955], and in industry in general as being 
harsh as well as illegal [ K.J.J.P., 1956/5/18] . It was ordered that 
this sanction should not be used. 
The courts in particular played a most minor role in the application 
of sanctions in the textile industry. Few showcase trials, accompanied 
by publicity, were held in industry in general after the conclusion of 
the Wufan movement. If the courts were expected to play a role, then 
such trials might be expected to be well publicised. The occasional 
reported trial was usually for corruption or embezzlement. Factory 
managers preferred not to send workers to the courts even when they 
should have done so. Managers often dealt with it themselves by 
criticism and education, sometimes would use administrative punishments 
proper, but only exceptionally would they let it go to court [ J.M.J.P., 
1955/1/17]. 
If sanctions in general were to be used as an important device 
to ensure desired results, then it might be expected that they would be 
discussed fully. There were no discussions of sanctions as a form of 
control in either of the two textile journals up to 1959, nor were there 
any movements with the use of sanctions as an aim. Severe punishment of 
managers was in any case not desirable, since China was very short of 
experienced men with administrative ability. The wide use of punishments 
could have resulted in a diminution of the existing stock and served 
to deter potential recruits. Additionally it would contradict the view 
that human beings can be changed and re-educated, and might negate the 
policy of achieving people who were both red and expert. 
Many of the reports of flagrant breaking of rules do not recommend, 
or even mention, punishment of offenders. The case of the Honan Textile 
Bureau illegally diverting part of its holdings of enterprise funds to 
its own use is an example [Chang Chung-i, 1956]. Where punishment was 
recorded it often does not seem severe. A case of the managers of a 
mill who buried huge quantities of cotton and yarn in the grounds, 
apparently as an illegal device for concealing the amount of waste, 
resulted in two dismissals, two demotions and two reductions in grade, 
[M. of T., 1955c]. A tax scandal in Southern Kiangsu involved bribery of 
tax officials in order to avoid payments of tax. In two years the number 
of corrupt tax cadres increased from four to eighty-five,equal to thirty-
seven per cent of all the tax cadres in the town. Yet most of the 
punishments mentioned were the recording of demerits of various size and 
number [ H.H.Y.P., 1952a]. 
125 
Punishments were reportedly given tardily in the textile industry 
and were often so remote from the event that the effectiveness of 
sanctions as a deterrent was greatly reduced. In addition the punish-
ments were not at all severe [T.S.S.B., 1955b] . 
Sanctions were not popular with some sections of the Party, which 
would hinder their use. When a manager punished workers by giving 
demerits or reducing the workers grade and wage grade, some felt that 
it was commandism and punitivism on the part of the manager. This work 
style was considered poor in general and it ignored the role of the 
masses [ J.M.J.P., 1956/7/1] . This reflects reasonably clearly the 
basically different approaches to organisation and management of the 
Maoist ideology, with stress on human organisation and the masses, and 
the 'Russian' method of using experts and establishing sets of rules. 
Despite the lack of reliance on sanctions as a device for ensuring 
compliance with regulations and plans, the existence of sanctions may 
well have had some effect in this area. It is impossible to know how 
many malpractises did not occur because of the existence of sanctions nor 
how many times regulations were observed and plans fulfilled because 
of the fear of possible punishment. 
VI. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 
Supervision and control of enterprises was necessary for several 
reasons. One of these was to see what the enterprises were doing in 
terms of production and methods of running. A second reason was to 
discover what problems existed at the level of production in order to 
help in their solution. These first two reasons can be regarded as 
information gathering. A third reason was to prevent, reduce or stop, 
undesirable behaviour, such as theft or the use of illegal methods or 
sharp practises, on the part of managers and workers. This was a 
definite control function. The economic element of supervision and 
control was to try to ensure that the state economic plans were followed, 
as well as to improve the accuracy of planning. 
Methods of supervision can be classified in several ways: such as 
administrative or political, internal or external to the textile industry, 
and internal or external to the mill. The last system of classification 
is adopted for convenience of exposition. Supervision and control of 
financial affairs is treated separately. 
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Internal Supervision of Mills 
Several different ways of achieving internal supervision were 
attempted before the period of the Great Leap Forward. A Security 
Committee was to be established in organisations such as factories, 
schools, government organs, streets, and villages [N.C.N.A., 1952]. 
Nothing was found on the activities of these committees in the textile 
industry, and it may be doubted if their role was ever more than purely 
political. 
The Communist Youth League, Party and trade union in the mills had 
some supervisory functions. Neither the League nor the union ever 
achieved a general full time supervisory role, but both were used for 
short periods during movements to reveal problems. There were many 
problems in developing the trade unions as a supervisory organisation. 
In the early 1950s the role of the unions was not seen as supervisory: 
the trade union constitution does not mention it as a function and it was 
barely implied by Lai Jo-yu [ 1953] in an odd sentence. By 1955 the 
unions were to become an agent of supervision [Lai Jo-yu, 1955b] , but 
under the leadership of the Party, not independently. The administration 
in state run enterprises was generally unwilling to deal with the question 
of trade union supervision in the factory, and believed it was only 
necessary in private run firms, although this was not the government's 
intention [ J.M.J.P., 1955/8/31] . In private run firms, the capitalists 
were reportedly skilled at placing their men in leading positions in the 
union or at winning over existing union officials. In one training class 
in Canton for existing union cadres, of the 202 cadres, which included 
52 trade union chairmen, 179 had previously assisted capitalists to 
deceive the state by actively abetting or concealing offences [K.J.J.P., 
1955/3/11] . The local unions in each mill were fairly independent, 
and, even early in 1956, the textile industry trade union had not managed 
to achieve regular and systematic leadership over the plant unions 
[A.C.F.T.U., 1956a]. It is therefore unlikely that mill unions were 
generally playing a unified role in supervision work. 
The Party organisation in the mills was not very effective in 
supervision work for quite a different reason. The Party was well 
organised and functioned reasonably well. A problem in many mills was 
that the Party had a strong position in running the mill until 1954, and 
a commanding one from about 1956 onwards. To request the Party to 
supervise management of the mills was, under these circumstances, to 
ask it to supervise itself. Party Supervision Committees existed in 
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factories in 1956 [C.F.J.P., 1956/9/1], but it seems unlikely that they 
could have functioned well as a device for economic control. Ho I [ 1955] 
pointed out critically that cadres saw or heard of dishonest actions 
in textile mills but felt that everyone was dishonest and therefore did 
not bother to report it. Some cadres did it in order 'to fulfill the 
plan', others simply did not know enough about business matters to 
recognise the situation for what it was. 
The planning office of a mill had an investigation and reporting 
task in plan compilation and in the methods and outcome of plan 
fulfillment. However, generally speaking, the planning offices did 
not undertake investigations of plan implementation as the offices 
were short staffed and inexperienced. Occasional criticisms of this 
deficiency were made. Further, the planning office was not only part 
of the web of mutual involvement in a mill, but also came under the 
factory director, which could severely limit its independence in 
supervisory work. Chen P'u [1956] complained that planning offices 
asked no questions when inferior goods were put in the storeroom and 
counted towards plan fulfillment, and in general 'adopted an attitude 
of secret agreement.' 
Another body working within factories had an investigatory role: 
this was the Economic Activity Inspection Committee, charged with 
looking into and supervising many matters, including plan fulfillment 
and the running of the enterprise [ J.M.J.P., 1955/11/6] . It would not 
appear to have had much impact, since it was infrequently mentioned, 
and membership was apparently restricted to the enterprise administration. 
The director, vice directors and departmental heads were on this 
committee, and the director was chairman ex officio. 
Control correspondents formed part of the apparatus of supervision. 
A provisional set of rules was issued in July, 1951, and in 1953 these 
regulations became formal. Control correspondents were recruited from 
the workers; their duties included the investigation of illegal 
derelictions of duty, behaviour damaging to the interests of the state, 
major problems in work, and to gather opinions and to report. Being on 
the spot it might be expected that these correspondents could be 
effective in their work. This was not the case however. The correspond-
ents were rarely mentioned in the literature on textiles and some 
'important departments' of the textile industry had established none at 
all by 1955 [T.S.S.B., 1955a]. Where they had been set up they were 
apparently not working well, since the same article called for a 
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reorganisation, the replacement of poor correspondents, and the 
'readjustment' (i.e. replacement) of those holding down two jobs and 
who were too busy to undertake control work. It was also recommended 
that those doing well should be rewarded, a practise that had been laid 
down in the regulations some years earlier, but which, this suggests, 
had not in fact been done. In view of this, it may be doubted that in 
actual practice 'The incentives offered to the control correspondents 
were attractive' [ Schurmann, F., 1965:317]. 
Letters of complaint and accusation against anyone working in an 
organ of state could be sent by any citizen to the organs of state 
[Constitution, 1954:92] . Such letters also went to newspapers and 
journals. It has been reported that all letters to newspapers are read 
and answered [Schurmann, F., 1966:317] . By about May 1955, the Supervision 
Office of the Ministry of Textiles had managed to deal with eighty-five 
per cent of the 4,356 letters it had received in the previous year, 
which seems reasonable, However, not all letters seemed to be concerned 
with supervision work, since 'a large proportion' of them were concerned 
with individual welfare, and punishment was irrelevant [T.S.S.B., 1955b]. 
One problem in making effective the letters of accusation to the 
offices of supervision was that the supervisory cadres receiving them 
did not take them seriously, and some simply could not be bothered with 
them. 
Internal controls in general have advantages and disadvantages. 
On the positive side the investigators are familiar with the industry and 
with the particular mill, which makes the task of locating problems, 
breaches of regulations etc. easier. On the negative side, the 
investigators are involved with the people in the mill and may have reason 
to conceal irregularities, such as fear of the response of management 
or loss of bonus or face, if terminating them would result in non-
fulfillment of plans. Of the several internal controls attempted, 
none appear to have been particularly effective and they were not enough 
to prevent the occurrence of undesirable behaviour of the kind considered 
in Chapter 6. By 1956 the Party was beginning to play the most 
significant role in managing the mills and this probably weakened 
supervision in practice. In 1957 the masses were being urged to take 
part in supervision work [ C.F.J.P., 1957/3/22] , foreshadowing the internal 
decentralisation of power in the Great Leap Forward. From 1958 to 1961 
supervision work ceased to exist in practical terms, as it was regarded 
as a conservative fetter on the masses, on initiative, and on the 
potential increase in output. 
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External Supervision of Mills 
External agencies with some power over mills can usefully be 
divided into two groups: those within the textile industry and those 
outside it. 
Within the industry there were two main supervision methods. The 
first involved individuals or teams being sent to the mills from the 
Ministry of Textile Industry, or one of its bureaus, to investigate 
and report back. There is little evidence on the importance of this 
method. One report [ Chu Fang-shih, 1956] mentioned that several 
different teams would arrive at the same time to investigate the plants. 
Four or five such teams might come from the Planning Committee, 
Industrial T'ing, the Supervision T'ing, the Communist Youth League 
Committee or the trade union, and successively interview the same people, 
each team wanting the same information. They were not popular with the 
lower level cadres as this 'caused a lot of trouble'. One problem with 
such teams was that they usually only looked for successes, turned a 
blind eye on problems, and had as their main aim the desire to increase 
output. Judging by this report, they were therefore not functioning 
as a supervisory device. 
The other agency internal to the industry was the Offices of 
Supervision, established at local levels by the Ministry of Textiles. 
Regulations issued in December 1952 ordered that Offices of Supervision 
be set up at provincial (or municipal) level and above, in economic 
and financial departments, and in enterprises [G.A.C., 1952] . The 
Supervision Office of the Ministry of Textiles was apparently set up 
about 1954. Supervision work was given some impetus by the Third 
National Supervision Work Conference in April 1954, and departments were 
established at lower levels down to and including the mills. This 
supervisory system was internal to the textile industry, coming under 
the Minister of Textiles. Barnet A.D., [1967:62] reports that the Bureau 
of Supervision in Ministry M was itself linked to the Ministry of 
Supervision, but he provides no details. Supervision work by these 
offices was beginning to operate by 1955, and in May of that year it 
could be announced that a start had been made to reverse the previous 
existing situation of not bothering about supervisory work [T.S.S.B., 
1955b]. Even some central run joint state-private mills had managed to 
set up a supervision office [T.S.S.B., 1955a]. 
Despite the success in establishing these offices, these two reports 
by the Supervision Office of the Ministry of Textiles revealed that many 
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problems remained to be overcome. Inspection was superficial, the 
supervision cadres were proud, wanted special privileges, and were in 
very short supply. Moreover, they were of low ability and lacked 
experience of the work of supervision, production and finance. Thirty-
five per cent had received no training in the work of supervision. Some 
supervision cadres were unsure of the limits of their work and fell 
into step with what the ordinary business departments were doing, 
thereby ceasing to have any role in supervision. Some supervision 
cadres were haughty to cadres in other departments and did not respect 
them. They also adopted an attitude of 'live and let live' to the 
leaders of the mill. Other supervisory cadres thought about the 
individual gains and losses from pursuing their work and did not follow 
their principles. Instances exist of supervision units revealing 
deficiencies and, after receiving reproaches from the leadership of the 
mill, being afraid to continue, and quietly dropping the case. 
An inspection by the Offices of Supervision of the Ministry of 
Textiles in the first eight months of 1956 revealed that false 
reporting was a widespread problem and corruption was rife. Incomplete 
statistics covering the East China Textile Administration Bureau 
alone showed that instances of corruption occurred in 40 units, 
involving 118 people. It was declared that the other bureaus and the 
mills in Peking also suffered from corruption activities. Although there 
were less corruption after the Sanfan movement, it was easy for corrupt 
elements to operate, owing to lack of attention and vigilance on the 
part of the authorities, together with lax systems and investigations 
[Ts'ao Ch'un-keng, 1956] . 
It can be concluded that at this time efficient and independent 
supervision had not been achieved by this agency. There was one more 
reason why this was unlikely, given the way the Offices were supposed 
to operate. The ordinary departments in the mills were supposed to 
help in the supervision work, and supervision units that attempted to 
be independent and conduct proper supervision were actually criticised. 
It is not immediately apparent that a department helping to investigate 
itself will automatically improve the work of supervision. 
Rather more agencies with some power over textile mills existed 
outside the industry. The public security organisation and the police 
could have exercised supervision, but it appears that they did not do 
so. The courts reportedly began to develop an investigatory and 
adjudicatory role within industrial enterprises and mines in 1954, actually 
131 
going into the factories to do this [ J.M.J.P., 1954/9/4] . No reference 
to this occurring in a textile mill was found. 
The Procuracy had established organs at various levels in Shanghai 
by September of 1955. The work of informants was strengthened at 
the same time by the development of correspondents in enterprises, organs 
and co-operatives. These correspondents reported violations of the law 
to the office [ Wang Fan, 1956] , 
Various functional departments might send a team to investigate 
problems, or might work in conjunction with a team from another unit. 
For example, the Labour Bureau of Tientsin and the Textile Supervision 
Office in Tientsin jointly investigated the problem of excessive overtime 
in a state run textile firm in 1956 [C.K.F.C., 1956b]. 
The Ministry of State Control was formally established in 1954 
and soon set up its own regional offices, which were active by 1956. 
In that year the Shanghai State Control Organs carried out thirty-three 
inspections, covering 203 units, received more than 2,200 letters and 
accusations and more than 1600 enquiries [ C.F.J.P., 1957/3/28] . It is 
not clear if the existence of the industrial control office prevented 
the general one from dealing with the industry or whether both could 
operate in the same industry. 
The local Party organisation provided a final possiblity of control. 
Until 1956 the town Party organisation was supposed to exercise some 
control [Li Fu-ch'un, 1955a:128]. In 1956 a decentralisation occurred 
and the district (ch'ii) level Party organisation increased in power, 
becoming responsible for watching over and helping all firms in its area. 
The organisation could inspect enterprise and workshop achievements 
in fulfilling the plans, could see if plans were set too low, and look 
for the use of illegal methods of filling the plans [C.F.J.P., 1956/11/15] , 
Schurman, F., [1966:346-353] describes the period from about mid-1955 
onward as moving towards political and internal controls, culminating 
in the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, after which ' basic controls 
would be exercised by the Party internally within the unit'. There is 
much in this, but there was a strengthening of political control both 
within the mills and outside at the district level. It appears that the 
factory Party organisation was reluctant to have the local district 
Party organisation check on the factory. The internal Party seems to 
have resented the increase in power of the district Party, and complained 
that the district Party kept calling long meetings after working hours 
and that this was intolerable. For its part, the district Party blamed 
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the necessity for meetings on the poor nature of the reports sent up from 
the factory and the fact that district Party members visiting the 
factories were treated as outsiders and were criticised. Since the 
mill Party managed to take over the management functions in factories 
in 1958, it would appear that the internal Party organisation was the 
more successful in the long run. Schurmann believed that Shanghai was 
simply untypical of the rest of China, and that economic controls, as 
opposed to political, were continued in Shanghai of necessity. 
External controls in general, like internal, have their advantages 
and disadvantages. On the positive side, external people are not 
involved in the set of relationships existing in a mill, and they are 
better able to reveal faults, since the top managers are much less able 
to prevent disclosure. The major disadvantage of external controls is 
that outsiders do not know the mill and it is very difficult to discover 
problems. Outsiders must rely to a great extent on the accounts and 
statistics provided, and these were of low quality. Opinions can be 
sought from the masses, but there may be a problem of lack of co-
operation with outsiders, even from the Party. It is clear that the 
ch'u Party organisation did not know enough about textile production, 
administration, and finances to be effective at discovering many problems 
[ C.F.J.P., 1956/11/15], and where problems were discovered, or the 
visitors were told about them, the ch'ii Party organisation was unable 
to solve them. The shortage of staff and the increase in work caused 
by the socialisation of private enterprises were also factors involved.^ 
In summary, external economic controls appear weak until 1956, when 
some improvement occurred, but external controls were abandoned in the 
first half of 1958, even before the Great Leap Forward really gained 
impetus. 
1 
Some of the new joint state-private enterprises sought help from the 
ch'ii Party, but apparently without success, as is indicated by the 
remark "It is no use throwing us some bones and asking us to gnaw them, 
give us some concrete help!" [C.F.J.P., 1956/11/15]. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE GOALS OF THE STATE AND THE RESPONSE OF THE MANAGERS 
The general environment in which managers operate was covered 
in Chapter 5. This Chapter deals with the goals of the state and the 
response of the managers to the planning system as it impinged upon 
them. Specifically this Chapter discusses the communication of prefer-
ences by the state, what these preferences were, the phenomenon of storm-
ing, and the use in China of semi-legal or illegal methods of management, 
revealed by others ^ for the Soviet Union and other centrally planned 
economies. 
1. THE GOALS OF THE STATE 
The incentives and sanctions discussed in Chapter 5 encouraged 
effort in general. The question remains as to how the state tried to 
communicate its wishes to top management; of the many targets in the 
different plans, it was essential to indicate to managers which targets 
were to be considered more important. A mill could not normally fulfill 
all the targets simultaneously, and a choice might have to be made between 
them. The targets were not even independent, so that efforts to achieve 
one, such as physical output, could adversely effect the achievement of 
another, such as quality. 
Several possible methods of communicating preferences 
The methods of indicating the preferences of the state can be divided 
into two broad groups: financial incentives, and non-financial incen-
tives. There were three kinds of financial incentives; bonuses to man-
agers, bonuses to workers, and altering the size of the bonus (or other) 
fund. Managerial bonuses could be linked to the achievement of what-
ever norms were preferred by the state planners. This method was little 
used in China as compared with the Soviet Union, and could not be very 
effective where managerial bonuses were paid, owing to the small bonus 
size and the use of multi-norms. Worker bonuses were set by the 
^ The main source is Berliner J.S. [1957]; see also Granick D. [1954], 
Kornai J., [1959], and Bergson A. [1968]. 
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mill director and he could link them to the targets favoured by the state. 
This required, first, that he was certain what targets the state preferred, 
and second, that the director wished to achieve the same targets. Neither 
of these conditions was automatically guaranteed. A further problem was 
that by his actions, a production worker could affect output, quality and 
so forth, but could not directly affect such targets as factory profit-
ability or the mix of goods chosen for production. Non-production workers 
could do even less. 
The third possibility was to link changes in the size of the enter-
prise or bonus fund to achievement of the state-preferred targets. Even 
without managerial bonuses, an increase in the size of such funds resulted 
in more freedom of manoeuvre for management, and allowed more money to be 
devoted to worker bonuses, the provision of welfare facilities and so on. 
The difficulty with this method of inducement to follow the preferences 
was again the adoption of multi-norm success indicators. 
Non-financial inducements consisted of the plans, directives, and 
the use of organisations in the mills. The plans themselves were too 
broad to indicate preferences, which indeed was the problem. Changes in 
the quarterly plans could indicate to managers what items the state curr-
ently regarded as important. The bureaus called meetings of mill directors 
to announce and explain the new quarter's plan, at which preferences could 
be made clear. 
Directives from higher levels were much used and seem to have been 
the main method of communicating preferences. The directives were re-
inforced by speeches of high officials, often published, and articles in 
newspapers and in the industrial journals. These indicated to an alert 
manager what specific items were regarded as important at that time. 
Of the organisations in the mills, the Party was most important, 
receiving directives from higher echelons containing general targets and 
much detail on how to achieve what was desired [Informant number 8]. 
The trade union and Communist Youth League were also used, first being 
instructed on policy, then in turn passing it on to their members and 
the workers. If a particular goal was important enough, the mass or-
ganisations were used to start a movement to achieve the goal. For 
example, the labour emulation drives in Shanghai in 1955 adopted 'im-
prove quality and economise' as a goal [T'ang Kuei-fen, 1955]. However, 
in such movements some mills set goals, and even linked bonuses to them, 
that the state did not want. In the labour emulations, some mills only 
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set increases in output as a goal, adversely affecting quality. This 
occurred despite a strong, well-publicised economising movement in the 
latter half of 1955. Of the several possible methods of trying to in-
dicate the preferences of the state planners at any point in time, it 
can be concluded that financial incentives were not very important, and 
use of directives and the Party organisation seem to have been the main 
method. It does not seem that the planners were conspicuously successful 
at indicating their preferences, and in particular a precise and sophis-
ticated system did not emerge. General preference indication, such 
as economising, was achieved, but apparently not much more. 
What were the preferences 
State preferences and managers' preferences co-existed. They were 
not always identical, and the evidence suggests that they frequently 
differed, once the period of rehabilitation (1945-52) was over. Even 
where the two sets were the same, over-reaction by mills could have re-
sults that the state did not intend. For example, the state planners 
induced an economy drive in 1955, but over-reaction caused a noticeable 
deterioration in the quality of output. 
The preferences of the state varied quite considerably from time 
to time. From 1949 to 1952 the over-riding goal was to restore output 
to the highest levels existing in the past. In 1955 economy of materials 
was stressed, and in 1956 the quality of produce was emphasised. 
For the mill management, output was always the important target and 
at most times over-rode all other goals in the period 1949 to 1961. As 
early as 1950, the Shanghai State Run Number Nine Cotton Mill pursued 
the goal of output, while neglecting maintenance and quality [C.F.J.P., 
1950/7/24]. In 1953, the Ministry of Textiles concluded that various 
bureaux and mills only paid attention to output norms and not to cost, 
labour, quality or supply norms [T.K.P., 1953/6/10]. In the first 
quarter of 1954, textile mills pursued output, neglecting quality and 
the economy of materials [Chiang Kuang-nai, 1954]. In 1955, the mills in 
Tientsin lacked a balanced view of fulfilling the plan, concentrated 
on output but not on quality or the supply of materials, and had no 
real idea of how to compile or implement a labour plan [Ho I, 1955]. 
In 1956, some areas and mills one-sidedly strove for output and output 
value [M of T, 1956b], while local state run and joint state-private run 
mills in Wuhan blindly pursued output, causing quality to fall and the 
breakage rate to rise. Maintenance was ignored in Shanghai up to 1956, 
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as the mills concentrated on the short run goal of output [Shao Pai, 
1956]. 
Chou En-lai [1956b] indicated the universality of the problem by-
including in his Political Report to the Second National Committee of 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference the comment 
that enterprises often tried to meet the physical output and total value 
output norms, but ignored quality, variety and costs. Safety was also 
traded off for output gains [C.K.F.C., 1957c]. Other examples could 
be produced, but it is clear that only output targets were of prime 
importance to managers throughout the period. 
The two main norms for output were physical output and total out-
put value. These were closely related but could diverge under certain 
circumstances. In particular, a manager could increase total output 
value without changing total output measured in physical units, by 
altering the mix of goods chosen in favour of more goods of high value. 
By 1956 total value of output was very important. In the first quarter 
1956, all major industrial enterprises in Shanghai over-filled the total 
output value targets, but fewer managed to fill the physical output 
targets [C.F.J.P., 1956/4/19]. Informant number eight testified that 
between 1956 and 1960 the plan for total output value was the most 
important in the eyes of mill management, while the plan for physical 
output was in second place. Hsli'eh Mu-chiao [1957] reported that the 
total value of output norm had become the most important standard of 
checking on the activities of enterprises. 
It is thus the case that the preferences of planners varied over 
time, but that those of managers were very consistent, with output pre-
dominating over all other possible goals. The opinion of Schurman F. 
[1964:71] that 'Having fewer investment resources to rely on than their 
colleagues in heavy industry, they (managers of light industry] had to 
struggle constantly to keep output up while at the same time keep costs 
down to the barest minimum in order to meet the financial targets of the 
plan' is not supported in the case of the textile industry. Financial 
targets were not of prime importance and cost plans could frequently 
be ignored or true costs concealed. 
A point worth making is that so far the tacit assumption has been 
made that the planners' preferences were consistent at a point in time. 
1 See below, p.160 and Chapter 3, pp.62-65. 
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In practice this was not always the case. Different parts of the 
Ministry of Textiles placed conflicting demands on mill management. 
For instance, the Finance Office wanted a quarterly labour plan at the 
mills, but the Planning Office wanted a monthly plan and monthly anal-
ysis, and said that the quarterly plan reports should be left until 
later [Li Ch'i-wan, 1957]. This may be regarded as merely inconvenient 
for mill managers and might not fundamentally affect their actions. 
However, Li Ch'i-wan thought it was a serious problem. Of more sig-
nificance is the fact that in 1957 a directive from one office in the 
Ministry asked the mills not to increase stock levels in that year and 
a directive from a different office required the mills to increase their 
stock levels. Obviously clear cut and consistent preferences were not 
always communicated to the mills. 
II. THE PHENOMENON OF STORMING 
Storming is a temporal rhythm in production, characterised by 
inertia after the commencement of a plan period and great exertion 
towards the end of a period. Storming is common in all centrally 
planned economies and existed in China once planning was introduced. 
A similar rhythm, but with different timing, was evident for all stat-
istical workers in the mills. Such workers were intensively employed 
early in a plan period assessing the achievements of the previous per-
iod and compiling reports, and were slackly employed towards the end 
of a plan period [Chang Tzu-an, 1955], 
The relevant time periods in China were months, quarters and years. 
The phenomenon was well described by Ch'i Wu [1953:41-42] : 
'There are some enterprises and units where the workers "work 
harder at the end of the month to earn their wages, while at the 
beginning of the month they take it easy, wandering about absent-
mindedly", as if they were carrying out the old rules. The work 
of leading production is frequently slack at first and tight 
later, in the first half of the month work is stopped to wait 
for materials, in the latter half of the month, life is spent on 
overtime.' 
Many reports of storming were found. ' the vast majority of 
factories and mines only fulfilled their production targets by shock 
operations' [J.M.J.P., 1953/7/13]. A lot of textile mills used an 
138 
increase in labour intensity, working overtime, speeding up machines 
or early opening and late closing to make up the plan figures [T.K.P., 
1953/4/18]. In some factories and mines ' — . each year at the year 
end there is this law, namely: on the one hand the conditions of ful-
filling the production plan take a turn for the better, and along with 
this there are serious conditions of using blitz methods and ignoring 
safety. Looking at Liaoning Province there is still no improvement in 
the "old law"' [J.M.J.P., 1955/11/27]. Informants number seven, eight, 
and ten revealed that working overtime was a common way of fulfilling 
the plans in the textile industry, always towards the end of a plan 
period. Mill directors insisted on it; as one remarked to his workers 
'The production task is given from above, if you can think of ways of 
fulfilling the task, then you need not work overtime' [C.K.F.C., 1957c]. 
As a result of excessive overtime working and the use of blitz methods 
in 1956, there was a sharp increase in the number of accidents in the 
textile machine making industry. 
Two reports gave some indication of the degree of storming. In 
industry in general in the North-east, over fifty per cent of the 
factories and mines could not fill their plans in the first month of 
a quarter. If the total value output produced in the first month was 
taken as 100, the corresponding figure for the last month of a quarter 
averaged 117, and could be as high as 125 in some quarters [Huang Ch'i, 
1953]. In the textile industry in general, there was about seventy to 
eighty per cent achievement of the plan in the first third of a month, 
about eighty to ninety percent in the second third, and intensive work-
ing and overtime began in the final third, in order to make up the 
deficiency [C.K.F.C., 1954]. 
The occurrence of storming was facilitated by slack labour rules. 
Anyone could issue an order to extend the working day, without securing 
the approval of the factory management or the consent of the trade 
union. There was no limit to the extension of hours to be worked, and 
some workers recorded seventy-two consecutive working hours, owing to 
additional shifts and prolongation of the working day [Lai Jo-yu, 1955a] 
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III. MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOUR 
Joseph Berliner [1957] in his study of management behaviour in 
Soviet enterprises described the following as typical. Managers would 
usually be faced with a tight plan, that is, one with unreasonably high 
targets and difficult to meet, in conjunction with difficulties and 
uncertainties on the supply side, for example irregular delivery, or 
short or non-delivery of essential materials. In such cases, managers, 
strongly motivated by financial rewards in the form of high bonuses, 
engaged in a certain type of behaviour. This he called simulation, the 
seeking of safety factors and the use of influence, or blat. Sim-
ulation consisted of any way of appearing to meet the plan without 
actually doing so. Safety factors were various kinds of reserves upon 
which the enterprise could draw. Stocks held (often illegally) for 
future use or for exchange with other units for needed items, and ob-
taining low plan targets, were important types of safety factors. Blat 
was a term used to describe all methods of manipulation and influence 
used by anyone, but especially by tolkachi, (purchasing agents, 'fixers', 
'arrangers' or 'supply expediters'), such as gifts, the provision of 
entertainment, and indeed anything that could result in the establishment 
of a good relationship in the places where influence would help. Such 
influence might be used to acquire scarce and needed raw materials, 
obtain a low plan, or persuade a bank cadre to overlook the use of enter-
prise funds in an unplanned manner. 
Management behaviour in China 
Relatively little is known about the behaviour of managers in China 
compared with our knowledge of the Soviet Union. 'However, detailed 
analyses of the planning mechanism, as well of enterprise management, 
remain to be done. One would like to see for Communist China studies 
similar to those done by Berliner and Granick for the Soviet Union' 
[Galenson W., 1967:12]. The work of Perkins D.H. [1966], Schurman F. 
[1966] and Richman B.M. [1969] have added to our knowledge but this still 
cannot be described as extensive. 
In order to widen understanding, the hypothesis was tested that 
the behaviour described by Berliner for the U.S.S.R. also occurred in 
the Chinese textile industry. It was anticipated that a possible 
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outcome would be less use in China of both simulation and the seeking 
of safety factors, because the system of planning was new, was not well 
established, and suffered constant changes. A greater use of blat 
seemed possible, since methods of interpersonal linkage were traditional 
in China. They [the conservative business groups in pre-Communist 
China] built up their organisations on the basis of the only principles 
they knew, namely the network of personal linkage' [Schurman F., 1966: 
230]. China was also less developed than the Soviet Union during the 
period studied by Berliner, and interpersonal relationships are common-
ly stronger in a less-developed environment. The motivation of managers 
was tentatively expected to be financial, the over-riding driving force 
described by Berliner. 
The hypothesis was tested by means of refugee interviews in Hong 
Kong and Macao, and by sifting books, newspapers and journals for relevant 
materials. Reports on simulation and safety margins began early in the 
1950's, before anything even approaching a viable and permanent planning 
system had been established. A number of examples of each type of be-
haviour are presented for several reasons. One is a matter of method-
ology: it is not difficult to find an occasional example of many things 
in a complex world, but the need here is to establish a pattern of be-
haviour. A second reason is that almost all of the examples are drawn 
from Chinese sources and not accessible to most Occidentals. Further, 
many of the printed sources and all of the refugees, are not readily 
available in the west, even to the reader and speaker of Chinese. 
Finally, the actual examples are of interest, adding as they do to our 
knowledge of management behaviour in China. The three types of behav-
iour, simulation, safety factor seeking, and blat, are considered sep-
arately, the findings discussed, then various factors that allowed, or 
encouraged, hoarding to flourish are considered. 
Simulation 
Managerial behaviour akin to simulation was known in pre-Communist 
China, in the general form of the concealment of reality. It is re-
puted that two sets of books were sometimes kept, one accurate, the 
other for the tax officials, understating output and profit. Certain 
limits exist on the possible amount of simulation. The last report sent 
by the mill acts as a bench-mark, and in normal times the new report 
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must be feasible when compared with the previous one. Large overful-
fillment (or underfulfillment) could lead to investigation. Informant 
number one reported that plus or minus ten percent from the planned out-
put was enough to start an investigation. Another limit is that claims 
for large output in the current period will lead to future higher plans, 
which would be more difficult to meet. 
The types of simulation practised were many and varied. Straight-
forward falsification of figures was the most obvious form. Falsification 
of reports occurred in local run industry, and leading cadres were often 
arrogant, resisted criticism and concealed errors. When exposed, they 
tried to place the blame on higher leadership and even asked for trans-
fer to new work. Some went to the extent of taking revenge on those 
criticising them [J.M.J.P., 1953/3/3a]. False reporting and concealing 
errors was reported in Tientsin in the same year, and the newspapers 
came under criticism for not actively criticising and exposing such 
behaviour [J.M.J.P., 1953/4/12]. 
A detailed report on an example of simulation appeared early in 
1953. At the third sub-factory of the Tientsin Dyeing and Weaving 
Plant, the plan for blue cloth output in August and September 1952 was 
not met, and what was produced was of poor quality. In October, the pre-
viously existing problem of poor water supply was solved and daily cloth 
output increased from 600 bolts to 800-900 bolts. With a little effort, 
the plan for the month of 27,000 bolts could have been met. The branch 
Party secretary had been criticised in the past when the plan had not 
been met and he was eager to gain the honour of meeting the plan in Oct-
ober. However, instead of mobilising the masses and meeting the plan 
legitimately, he resorted to trickery, and simply ordered the statis-
tician to falsify the accounts. The output on October 27th 195 2 was 
900 bales but was put down as 4,540, while stocks were 873 bolts but 
were entered as 3,598. This latter is obviously an attempt at simulation, 
not a safety factor, since a safety factor requires the ujider-reporting 
of stocks. As a result of this, the plan was filled four days early. 
The plant leaders accepted the claim from the sub-factory, after sending 
four cadres to inspect. The trophy in a monthly competition was then 
given to that sub-factory. The true state of affairs was discovered 
and revealed by the Local Run Industry Bureau of Tientsin [J.M.J.P., 
1953/3/3b]. 
A survey of eight mills in Tsingtao and some of the mills in 
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.se East and North China in the first half of 1954, revealed that fal; 
filling in of reports was widespread. 'it emerged that in the case of 
output a little is reported as a lot....in the case of low quality and 
waste products, a lot is reported as a little to make the bad very 
good- [T.S.S.B., 1955b]. The original primitive records were even being 
crossed out and altered, in order to keep them consistent with the final 
claims. 
In 1955, of the workers selected for awards in Shansi, thirty-three 
•good deeders- were chosen for examination. On investigation, fifteen 
of these workers had received the award as a result of false boasts, or 
the matter was greatly confused and the truth difficult to locate [Sun 
Shao-tseng, 1955]. It was reported that about this time there was an 
increase in the amount of falsifications occurring [Ho I, 1955], pre-
sumably owing to the increase in plan targets and the poor harvest of 
1954, which resulted in a reduced output in the textile industry in 1955. 
Falsifications were common in 1956, judging by the number of re-
ports. Dyeing and weaving mills were falsifying the accounts in order 
to conceal a general attitude of ignoring product quality [T.T.J.P., 
1956/4/9]. The People's Daily listed a set of current problems [J.M.J.P., 
1956/2/26] which included false reports, the concealment of mistakes, and 
fictitious reporting of success. The Shanghai State Run Number Nine Mill 
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provided a clear example of obvious simulation. Many workers were falsi-
fying their recorded output in order to demonstrate plan fulfillment. 
The leadership knew that false claims were being made, but believed that 
it was not serious, as only a few individual workers were involved. Upon 
investigation the situation was revealed as more serious than that. Of 
the sixty-nine work areas in one workshop, sixty-six had made false re-
ports. The motive of the workers was ascribed to a desire to avoid 
criticism for not meeting the plans, after the management had increased 
the plan targets [K.J.J.P., 1956/11/29]. One girl who had been nominated 
as an Advanced Worker was criticised for making false reports. She 
replied 'Everyone makes false reports, it cannot be stopped'. The re-
port pointed out that this was not an isolated event in one mill, but 
was widespread throughout the textile mills in Shanghai. 
Even clearer examples of simulation by falsification occurred in 
the Shenyang Local State Run Canvas Cloth Products Mill. The several 
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attempts failed, but only because of the vigilance and obstinacy of one 
statistician who refused to countenance such illegitimate practices. In 
the annual report of 1955, semi-finished products were counted as finished 
products in order to exaggerate production. In the winter of 1955-56, 
the town statistical bureau asked that figures for output value be 
supplied, broken down by products. The fig\ires sent up were quite diff-
erent from the original figures at the mill. The statistician reported 
the irregularity to a vice-director in the mill, but he took no action. 
The chief statistician in the mill gave in to the leaders' requests 
and fraudulently added 320,000 yuan to the actual value of output, which 
changed the previous figure for plan fulfillment from 90.6 per cent to 
106.4 per cent. He presumably felt that a falsification of such mag-
nitude was feasible, an indication of the scope for such behaviour. The 
plan for January 1956 was filled by a mere 63.2 per cent and this had 
to be concealed. To achieve this aim, the chief statistician artfully 
included goods to the value of 170,000 yuan which had been produced by 
workers not paid by that mill. The activist-statistician managed to 
get these annulled by reporting direct to a town-level office. 
In February 1956, the mill leaders, who 'had still not learned 
their lesson', adopted different tactics and secretly hired extra work-
ers, who did not appear on the books and were concealed from the activist-
statistician. She managed to find out about them, however, by going 
around the workshops. The February plan was actually filled by 46.7 per 
cent and to improve the record the chief statistician gave the activist, 
perhaps ill-advisedly, a list of goods valued at 50,000 yuan to include 
towards plan fulfillment. A (different) vice-director then commented 
that this was not enough and that a minimum of 100,000 yuan should be 
falsely added to output. The activist managed to prevent these attempts 
from succeeding. 
Towards the end of the first quarter of 1956 it was clear that the 
plan would not be met. The management had still not stopped trying and 
the activist was sent to the director's office for 'peaceful advice', 
an apparent effort to win her round by kindness or veiled threats. The 
leaders then intended to count about 400,000 yuan of semi-finished pro-
ducts as final output in order to meet the plan. This final attempt 
was foiled and the case exposed in the journal Statistical Work [T.C.K.T., 
1957] almost one year later. 
The Peking State Run Number Three Mill also suffered from false 
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reporting, as well as the concealment of inferior cloth and waste pro-
duce. While attempting to rectify this situation, it was discovered 
that over thirty cases of irregularity had occurred and thirty-nine diff-
erent methods of false reporting were current in the preparatory work-
shops alone [C.K.F.C.K.J., 1958a]. 
Informant number ten disclosed that false reports were one way of 
meeting an otherwise unfulfillable plan, as did informant number eight. 
The latter mentioned that the bureaus above the mills would also inflate 
the figures occasionally, in order to show the plan for their area had 
been met. 
It is clear that these were deliberate falsifications and not 
accidental, although in 1954 it had been alleged that of the false re-
porting, very little was deliberate, some was caused by unscientific 
methods, poor running practices, and lack of machines and tools, but 
most of it was produced by poor statistical personnel [Lo Jih-^^un, 
1954]. 
More subtle methods of simulation existed than mere falsification 
of figures. In particular, choosing a certain mix of output was pop-
ular, in order to achieve such targets as the managers felt most import-
ant. Chia To-fu [1953] pointed out that some industrial factories which 
were unable to meet the plan for certain main products, made it up by 
overfulfilling plans of secondary products. Two months later the People's 
Daily [J.M.J.P., 1953/7/13] indicated that 'In order to fill the target 
of total production value, some units, instead of producing according to 
state plans, turn out secondary products to make up for key products . . . . ' 
In 1955 the People's Daily [1953/3/30] asserted that some enterprises did 
not produce the kinds of articles specified by the state, but t'orned out 
products of high value and little labour content, often unwanted by 
society. 
Some dyeing and printing mills were in the habit of changing the 
types of product without authority. One of them ignored the East China 
Textile Bureau's new design for cloth, as the mill was afraid that its 
adoption could mean the plan would not be filled and it might result in 
inferior cloth production [T.K.P., 1955/12/21]. Chen Yun [1956:174] 
referred to the problem at the Eighth Party Congress when he said '. . . . 
factories manufacturing articles of daily use often concentrate only on 
the fulfillment of targets relating to value of production and profits, 
while giving insufficient attention to whether their products meet the 
needs of consumers'. In 1958 it was alleged that in the textile industry. 
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mills produced output with low labour content and much material content 
for preference [S.S.B., 1958b]. 
Informant number eight reported that mills often changed the mix 
of output in order to fulfill the total output value target, either by 
producing high priced goods or by producing new goods and receiving a 
high price for them. Informant number ten said that mills could pro-
duce new goods, which were not in the plan, and he felt this was simply 
to conceal the fact that the planned mix of output would not have been 
produced anyway. 
Various methods of simulation were used in regard to quality and 
waste products. Passing inferior goods off as good quality produce was 
quite common. The Tientsin State Run Number Two Mill was passing off 
inferior produce as up to standard by means of technical tricks in pro-
cessing [J.M.J.P., 1953/3/3b]. A wool textile mill mixed in second 
grade products with first grade goods and passed them off as first grade 
[T.T.J.P., 1953/4/15]. A People's Daily editorial pointed out that some 
enterprises substituted poor quality output for good produce. The Shang-
hai state run textile mills were especially notorious for having used 
various means of deception to sell inferior quality cloth over a long 
period of time [J.M.J.P., 1955/3/30]. A year later the People's Daily 
[1956/2/26] said that firms were still counting inferior produce as good 
quality, counting waste as finished products, falsifying, and deceiving 
their customers. Eleven months later the Shanghai State Run Number 
Fifteen Cotton Mill was revealed to have mixed low grade cloth with 
high grade, and counted it all as high grade. It was pointed out that 
some could inadvertently be exported, with adverse effects in inter-
national markets [C.F.J.P., 1957/1/12]. 
In some mills the production departments passed inferior goods 
as being up to standard and put them in the storeroom^. Where this 
happened, the planning departments of the enterprises did not ask ques-
tions about it and indeed had the general attitude of being in secret 
agreement with the practice [Chen P'u, 1956]. 
^ Only output placed in the storeroom could be counted as finished pro-
ducts, be included in production figures, and count towards plan ful-
fillment. 
146 
Not all attempts at simulating quality were successful. The dir-
ector and 'a fellow official' of the Chung-I Cloth Mill in 1956 wanted 
to count a small quantity of poor cloth as standard and sent it out. 
This was opposed and stopped by the inspection personnel and product con-
trollers [C.C.J.P., 1956/4/12]. 
If the goods were of such low quality that there was no chance of 
passing them off, then they were waste products. Such waste products 
were sometimes hidden and disposed of quietly. Waste yarn in the Tientsin 
State Run Number Two Mill was kept out of the records by floating it 
around the mill. Towards the end of the month waste yarn was sent into 
the weaving sheds, where it was an input not an output and was there-
fore not counted. After the end of the month, the yarn would reappear 
in the spinning workshops [J.M.J.P., 1953/3/3b]. Ho I [1955] pointed out 
that in some mills, inferior cloth was deliberately not put into the 
storeroom at the end of the month, in order to fill the plan for quality. 
When waste materials had acc\amulated in quantity in the Chia-mu-ssu 
mill they were buried or taken out and thrown away on orders of the cost 
department. Included in the waste were cotton, tools, water pipes, and 
cloth. Although the mill was trying to conceal the existence of waste, 
(it had received a directive on how to handle waste and ignored it), the 
materials were of value: when the loaded carts went out they were foll-
owed by local residents and the families of workers and, when dumped, 
scuffles and tussles for the materials ensued [J.M.J.P., 1955/8/3]. 
Substandard cloth in the Shanghai Number Nine Mill was torn up by 
workers and hidden, thrown down the lavatories, or disposed of elsewhere 
[C.F.J.P., 1956/11/18]. Five or six kinds of waste disposal methods were 
reported by workers in the weaving shed. Such methods seem common; the 
disposal of unwanted waste materials by flushing down the lavatories was 
also mentioned in one of a series of general articles on planning in 
the textile industry [C.K.F.C.K.J., 1957b]. This article also criticised 
falsifications by the masses, attitudes of preferring work with bonuses 
attached, and a general reduction in moral standards, particularly among 
new teenage workers, who stole things and did not maintain the customary 
male-female relationships. 
Rather than reporting waste materials, some workers resorted to 
destroying them by fire. Two men in the Shanghai Number Two State 
Run Cotton Mill burned waste cotton valued at 15,000 yuan in order to 
147 
obtain the title of 'advanced workshop' for the group [T.S.S.B., 1955b]. 
Attempted concealment of inferior quality cloth occurred in the 
Tientsin State Run Number One Mill. The plan for quality in February 
1955 had not been filled and it was clear that in March the result would 
be similar. A workshop foreman and a workstage head tried to conceal 
the quantity of poor cloth in order to fulfill the plan, by not placing 
it in the storeroom. The plan was therefore fulfilled, despite reports 
from a different workstage head and comments by some workers. The affair 
was somewhat ineptly handled, as nine bales of cloth were left in the 
shed for the first shift in April to find [Tung Wan-hsiang, 1955]. In 
the Peking State Run Number Three Mill, inferior cloth was put aside and 
taken home by a work area head and some workers, thereby concealing the 
true output of low grade cloth. The motive was fraudently to obtain the 
title of 'Advanced Work Area' [C.K.F.C.K.J., 1958a]. 
The quality of output fell during the Great Leap Forward for reasons 
akin to, but not identical with, the simulation process described by 
Berliner J.S. [1957] for the Soviet Union. In the latter it was managers, 
attempting to obtain bonuses, who reduced the quality of output. During 
the Great Leap Forward in China it was Party cadres, motivated by ideol-
ogy and striving to achieve prodigious increases in output, who reduced 
the quality. 
Various technical tricks were resorted to in order to simulate the 
fulfillment of plans. The Shanghai State Run Number Thirteen Mill used 
unsuitable technical methods of drying cotton, which apparently would 
have long-term effects on quality [C.F.J.P., 1955/10/20]. Where lengths 
of cloth were found to be too short, they might be stretched to meet 
the order. In one example, eighty and a half yards were stretched to 
eighty-two yards, but naturally the width was reduced. The mill was 
quite satisfied, at least until the cloth was later returned as un-
acceptable [Li Yung-yao, 1955]. Some mills made a regular practice of 
stretching cloth lengths to fill the plan [T.S.S.B., 1955b]. 
Regulators on machines were intentionally mis-set, and in effect 
were rendered inoperative, so that they would pass yarn which should 
have been taken out owing to its low quality [Chang Fang-tso, 1955] . 
Ho I [1955] referred to the practice of inserting lax control figures 
in production systems and the use of incorrect solutions to technical 
problems. 
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The workers could use simple methods of simulation, such as placing 
empty wooden bobbins, spindles and other items into the bag of yarn in 
order to increase the weight. This was done to gain honour or to receive 
better wages if on piecework. The practice was examined in one mill 
where some control cadres knew it went on but did nothing to prevent it. 
A snap inspection revealed that of twenty yarn bags examined, each held 
an average of 10.5 empty bobbins [T.C.K.T.T.J., 1954]. The weighing 
process exaggerated output even without these extraneous materials. 
Scales were not accurate and overweighed the output. Additionally, in 
order to ascertain the weight of yarn produced, the bag plus yarn was 
weighed and the weight of a bag subtracted to get the net content. How-
ever, the bags became heavier with use owing to the water content and 
mud, but the weight of a clean, dry bag was always subtracted. Poor 
sampling of water content of the produce also reportedly inflated the 
output figure each month. This weighing process resulted in the over-
reporting of 5,500-7,500 kilograms of output per month. It was not un-
common for the inflated output figures to give an 'efficiency rate' of 
over one hundred per cent, an impossible result. In February 1954, in 
the mill examined, the 'efficiency rate' for twenty-one count yarn ex-
ceeded one hundred per cent for seventeen days [T.C.K.T.T.H., 1954]. 
Technical questions such as the impurity of cotton, or water content, 
were habitually decided in favour of the mills [Ho I, 1955]. 
Simulation also appeared in cost calculations. Excessive production 
or other costs in one category could be disguised by entering part of the 
costs under a wrong head [informant number 5]. Planned cost reductions 
were also achieved by putting costs down under another item [informant 
number 8]. This solution was common in 1956, when many mills reported 
that costs were kept below planned levels. In reality, actual costs 
were high but were entered in part as 'supplementary expenditure', not 
as production costs. 'For a long period' the use of cotton, materials 
and electricity was above planned levels but was concealed in this way 
[C.K.F.C.K.J., 1957c]. 
One unusual and legal type of behaviour of a simulation nature 
concerned the treatment of workers in a factory who were sent there as 
part of the labour reform programme or who were working under surveill-
ance. The output of such people was naturally recorded but they were all 
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excluded from such calculations as average worker numbers, labour product-
ivity and the total wage bill [S.S.B., 1954c]. 
If a mill felt it could not fill a plan without more materials 
then a sister-mill might help. The sister-mill would give the materials 
and enter them on its books as being a processing order, but the first 
mill would not show the materials on the books as being for processing 
[informant number 8]. This form of simulation could apparently result 
in double counting, if both mills recorded the output and the first mill 
could conceal the disposal of the product. The informant reported this 
as a likely outcome. 
On occasion, the investment plan could not be filled even though 
the money was available, as the mill could not purchase what it needed. 
In this situation, a factory might invest in ways not needed, or not 
urgent, in order to show that the investment plan was fulfilled [T.C.K. 
T.T.H., 1956a], 
Another method of simulation was to reduce the cleaning of machines 
or their maintenance in order to meet the output targets of the plans. 
This caused losses later but these were overlooked [T.K.P., 1954/9/13]. 
A form of quasi-simulation was to increase the intensity of labour in 
order to fulfill the plan. This method, unlike the others, does result 
in a real increase in output, but was regarded as incorrect [Tu Hsiang-
kuang, 1955]. Taking on temporary workers was common; if the output 
looked like falling short of the target, local residents and the fam-
ilies of staff and workers were hired [informant number 8]. Under-
stating the true working hours was a frequent deliberate device used to 
meet the plan without showing the extra labour intensity [informant 
number 5] . If the workers were not paid, then it was immediately con-
cealed. If the workers were paid, a more likely event, then the extra 
wages had to be hidden in the costs of the mill: this would not be 
difficult to do in view of the low regard for financial work and poor 
financial control. 
Simulation also took the form of changing the plan. If a factory 
was not meeting the plan during the course of a year, it might ask the 
authorities to reduce the plan in order to do better. If the author-
ities refused the request, the factory could then ask for the plan to be 
'readjusted', which meant that part of the planned output would be 
assigned to another factory to produce [Lu Hao, 1955]. Reductions in 
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the plan were even asked for after the year end in order to demonstrate 
that the plan was filled. The Ministry of Textiles received requests 
up to February 1954 to reduce the plans for 1953 [Chiang Kuang-nai, 
1954]. Tu Hsiang-kuang [1955] also mentioned that enterprise directors 
requested a revised plan, in order to demonstrate success in meeting it. 
The final form of simulation discovered in the textile industry 
was the 'borrowing' of output from the forthcoming period and entering 
it as current period production. As an example, the Tientsin State Run 
Number Two Mill in April 1952 was not able to wrap and place in the 
storeroom enough output to fill the plan, although sufficient had actu-
ally been produced. On 1 May (a major national holiday) the workers 
came in and worked overtime, put the goods in store, and counted them 
as April's production, although they should have been entered as out-
put in May. During May, the same mill could not fill the yarn plan and 
so put down all of the output of twenty count yarn of 1 June as pro-
duced in May [J.M.J.P., 1953/3/3b]. The general case of counting semi-
finished products as finished products is also essentially borrowing 
on future output. 
Safety Factors 
Safety factors fall into two broad groups. The first type con-
sisted of obtaining low targets in the plans to make them easier to fill, 
or securing satisfactory techno-economic norms for safety, such as high 
allowances for costs. The other main form of safety factor was hoarding, 
chiefly of materials and equipment, in order to draw upon the stocks in 
the future. 
The effort to obtain satisfactory plan targets was pointed out by 
a bureau chief at a meeting of textile mill directors in 1954, when he 
commented that the leading personnel in some mills always thought of 
drawing up their plan with low targets [C.K.F.C., 1954]. Planners who 
did this had the motive of saving face and increasing the size of the 
director's fund, as a result of the easily obtained success[Lo Jih-
yun, 1954]. The administration bureaus also desired low targets for 
the plans of the mills under them, and passed up suggestions to the 
Ministry of Textiles which were lower than the figures coming down from 
the Ministry [E.C.A.B., 1954]. This report pointed out that nonetheless 
the mill level was a greater offender in this respect. The Shanghai 
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Number Two Cotton Mill proposed targets for 1954 that were below the 
level of 1953, the Number Ten Mill set very high cost norms, and the 
Number Seventeen Mill was reported to have said 'We prefer norms fixed 
rather low as they are easier to meet'. The same report indicated that 
up to that time there had been a practice of mills setting plan targets 
lower than achievements that they had already made. 
Mill managements had already been criticised in 1953 for setting 
low plans [K.J.J.P., 1953/3/28], and were criticised again in 1955 
[T'ang Kuei-fen, 1955], with the comment that leading workers were say-
ing 'this is a sleeping norm, it can be filled without any effort'. 
The State Statistical Bureau also criticised the practice of setting low 
production norms in that year [S.S.B., 1955]. A widespread existence 
of low plan setting is indicated by the fact that Chou En-lai [1956b] 
mentioned it critically in an important Political Report. 
Techno-economic norms were often set to favour easy plan fulfill-
ment. Planned loom speeds might be set at low rates as a safety margin. 
The Chin-chou Textile Mill set its planned loom speed at 190 revolutions 
but was in fact already running the looms at 211 revolutions [K.J.J.P., 
1953/3/28]. Raw material consumption norms were set above actual con-
sumption of previous years, and cost figures were set high [Ch'u Tao-
hsien, 1955]. Financial targets were also deliberately set at unrealistic 
levels in draft plans of industrial enterprises in order 'to set an 
ambush and leave an escape route', so that it was easier for management 
to haggle with higher level organs or control departments [Diao. R. 
1966:40-41] . 
The second major safety margin was to engage in the practice of 
hoarding. Efforts to build up excess inventories of materials, equipment, 
tools and almost anything, were common. The general attitude to large 
stocks was indicated by the use of such phrases as 'when one is pre-
pared there are no problems', 'it is better it have too much than too 
little', 'liberally order and conservatively use', and 'stocks of be-
loved materials or tools are very comforting when seen daily 
^ There are many references to these attitudes: see for example [K'ung 
Sang, 1954], [Li Chu-p'ing, 1955], [C.K.K.Y., 1954] and [C.K.F.C.K.J., 
1958b] . 
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Examples of hoarding appeared as early as 1951 [Liu Tsai-sheng, 
1951]. The Tientsin State Run Number One Mill had various loom parts 
stored away, sufficient for three years' normal use, and the parts did 
not appear on the books at all. The Number Two Mill had in store 240 
motors, an electric generator, which was about to be stripped for parts, 
and a large quantity of wood, some of which was rotting away. The 
Tientsin Dyeing and Printing Mill had 400 motors in stock, as well as 
large quantities of chemicals, which had already begun to deteriorate. 
The Tientsin Machine Making Factory had enough wire in stock to last 
one hundred years, and large quantities of machine parts. Generally 
speaking, all the mills under the regional bureau were holding stocks 
valued at two to three times the permitted limit. 
The Tientsin Number One State Run Mill had managed to under-report 
small pieces of cloth and lengths of good cloth which had been produced. 
These were kept back as a safety margin to draw upon in future months when 
the plan could not be met. The first quarter plan in 1952 was met by 
drawing on these stocks [T.C.J.P., 1952/7/14]. 
The Tientsin Number Two Mill held a safety margin in cloth in 1952, 
which came in useful in July of that year. In July the yarn and cloth 
output plan could not be met, so the managers cut into the accumulation 
of cloth in order to meet the cloth plan. This allowed forces to be con-
centrated on producing and packing yarn by day and night. The mill man-
agers were not ashamed of doing this and publicly honoured and rewarded 
the workers who had worked overtime [J.M.J.P., 1953/3/3b]. 
The Hsin-feng mill had a grave problem of hoarding in 1953, in 
conjunction with poor storage practices. Over one hundred looms could 
not be safely used because of missing parts. Most of the parts were 
actually in stock and were simply piled up outside the storerooms or 
were on the roadway. Many of these had been there for over a year and 
were rusting away, or deteriorating in other ways. Included in the value 
of hoarded goods (five hundred million yuan) were ten tons of water 
pipes [C'ang Fu-hsing etc., 1953]. 
A Textile Ministry report in 1955 on control work [T.S.S.B., 1955b] 
discussed, among other things, the problem of mills ignoring costs, buy-
ing feverishly, and increasing the size of their stocks. It described 
the process of planning material purchases in the following way. The 
workshops proposed a plan for the use of materials, the supply offices 
did not examine this, the finance office did not control or inspect it, 
and purchases of materials could be out of line with the plans. No one 
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ever enquired about the stocks held already, so that purchases were 
excessive, and the planned consumption of materials was above actual 
consumption. As an example, the Tsingtao State Run Number Three Mill had 
4,000 kilograms of a zinc compound in store, which was sufficient for 
three quarterly periods usage, yet a further 4,900 kilograms were blindly 
purchased. 
The Tientsin Local State Run Dyeing and Printing Mill was consid-
ered to be a typical medium sized establishment, 'the sort that can be 
found in any city', and had hoarded so many materials that its total 
capital was enough for two mills of the same size [Li Yun-hung, 1955]. 
The Kiangsi Textile Mill had large stocks of machine parts which were 
revealed in the Kiangsi Daily. On this occasion, part of the stocks were 
sold to others, six salesmen going round North and East China to sell 
what they could [C.H.J.P., 1955/6/28]. 
An article in the People's Daily [K'ung Sang, 1955] referred to 
several examples of hoarding in different areas and mills, and admitted 
that hoarding was a serious problem in the textile industry. One mill 
in the North-west had fourteen different raw materials in stock, suffic-
ient for between one and twelve years normal use. One mill in East 
China had enough wire materials for forty-four years use. Of the 1,086 
materials in store at the Shanghai State Run Number Two Mill, holdings of 
572 were excessively large. Some mills had managed to build up stock 
levels in excess of ten times the norms. 
Fuel was another commodity that was hoarded whenever possible. By 
1955 the new Peking State Run Number Three Mill had stored up thirty-
nine tons of coal [Wang Chan-min, 1955]. The article enquired 'How did 
it become a coal mine?' This was asked because part of the surplus 
coal had been used for filling in ditches in the mill grounds, a useful 
way of temporarily disposing of valuable fuel that was bulky to store. 
Hoarding was described as serious in the 103 state, joint state-
private and private nun mills, as well as in dyeing and printing mills, 
under the East China Textile Administration Bureau in 1955 [T'ang Kuei-
fen, 1955]. Materials in store were commonly at least twice the per-
mitted amount. 
Deliberate hoarding would occur concealed by false reports. The 
Tsingtao State Run Numbers Six and Seven Mills falsely reported the size 
of their grain stock levels, and the number of personnel, in order to 
build up a grain reserve [T.S.S.B., 1955b]. In four months they managed 
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to accumulate over 181,000 chin of grain in this way. 
A large scale investigation of this problem by the State Economic 
Commission, the Procuracy, and the State Statistical Bureau, involving some 
9,000 cadres who inspected more than 600 enterprises, revealed that units 
:«;ept false accounts, the systematic under-reporting of stocks was wide-
spread, and the amounts involved were large. The stocks were dispersed 
about the unit in order conceal them [C.F.C.P., 1957/3/4]. The dis-
persal of stocks at different levels of a mill seems to have been common. 
The Peking State Run Number Three Mill had built up so many materials 
at the workshop level by 1958 that a movement was held to return them to 
the storeroom at the mill level. The weaving workshops alone eventually 
returned 1,223 tools and 4,618 spare parts [C.K.F.C.K.J., 1958b]. 
Informant number five stated that in his mill stocks were deliber-
ately under-reported 'so that they would be available for future use', 
one way of building up stocks being to over-report the amount of wastage. 
Informant number eight reported that large stocks were not really con-
sidered to be illegal in any case, as long as the director or Party sec-
retary knew about them. After a little thought he added that it was 
really 'semi-legal, semi-illegal' to keep such stocks, but the Party in 
the mill was not against hoarding because it also wanted to fulfill the 
plans. 
Hoarded goods fell into two broad groups: things that could be used 
by the mill to meet future plans, and things that in themselves were of 
no use to the mill. The latter were intended for future barter with other 
units, for items that the mill might require. Falling into the latter 
group were three thousand petrol cans stored by a Hang-chou mill in 1961 
which could not be used by the mill [Informant number 5]. 
Labour was also hoarded where possible, in case of future needs as 
the mill developed, or to use more labour-intensive methods to improve 
quality, or simply to have workers available for any task that might at 
some stage be regarded as necessary [C.K.F.C., 1962a]. Local run firms 
in Shanghai had an added inducement to hoard labour. If the 
total production task set at the local level was insufficient to run all 
the firms at full capacity, as it frequently was, the total production 
figure was divided up between firms in proportion to the number of staff 
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and workers. Hoarding labour thus resulted in a larger quota and 
bigger allocation of materials [Shih Ying, 1956]. 
Tolkachi and blat 
Blat proved the most difficult to trace of the Berliner 'symptoms'. 
It is not to be expected that the capitalist or bourgeois managers would 
complain of it nor draw attention to it. It would perhaps seem desir-
able in order to fulfill the plans and they might accept it as being 
normal business practice. If complaints were to be voiced it should be 
the Communist managers or Party that were heard, as the practice serious-
ly offends the Communist ethic, especially Maoism with its emphasis on 
proper human organisation. Yet after a detailed search of the literature, 
not a single reference was found to blat in the textile industry, and 
there were no movements to supress such behaviour once the early Wufan 
movement was finished. 
The absence of published references to blat suggests certain poss-
ibilities. One is that blat did not occur, or if it occurred it was 
only infrequently in the textile industry. A second possibility is that 
blat occurred but that the authorities were not aware of it. This 
seems unlikely, as the authorities quickly knew of irregularities such 
as simulation and safety factor seeking, and with the poor opinion of 
Shanghai business practices in pre-liberation China, it seems probable 
that they would be looked for closely. A third possibility is that blat 
occurred, the authorities knew of it, but gave it no publicity. Perhaps 
they were unconcerned because they realised that blat greased the wheels 
of industry: but on the whole it seems very doubtful that the Maoists 
would have been unconcerned. The evidence presented in Chapter 7 in-
dicates that lubrication of the system was insufficient, and in 1958 
the entire Soviet approach to planning economic development was aband-
oned. It is possible that some part of the inability to pursue central-
ised planning successfully was caused by a lack of sufficient tolkachi 
and blat. Perhaps the authorities were concerned but worked to stop 
blat without publicity. This seems unlikely, as without publicity it 
could hardly be stopped, at least in the 1950's, and the press was used 
as a purveyor of government and Party policies at that time. Of these 
possibilities the first, that blat occurred rarely, seems to be the most 
acceptable. 
156 
A little information on blat exists in secondary sources. Donni-
thorne A. [1967:290-291] pointed out that the shortages of materials, 
especially during the Great Leap Forward, meant that 'Factory staff had 
to spend much time and effort on trying to procure raw materials and, in 
doing so, had to go outside the official channels of commerce or of the 
planning system'. Purchasing agents were employed by enterprises and 
other bodies, and performed a necessary function, as did the tolkachi 
in the Soviet Union. These agents were granted grudging recognition; 
in 1957 certain provinces and cities were allowed to establish purchasing 
offices at industrial centres, and it was hoped that the purchasing 
agents could be so controlled. Purchasing agents were to register with 
the appropriate local departments where they operated, and were not 
allowed to buy goods subject to planned or unified purchase, nor comm-
odities being processed under contract with state commercial bodies. 
Such independent brokers as existed were also not allowed to deal in 
these goods. 
Ecklund G.N. [1966:34-35] said that tax agents and tax bureaus 
acted in the role which in the U.S.S.R. is filled by tolkachi, 
although he did not use that word. 
Richman B.M. [1969:389] indicated that purchasing expediters, or 
tolkachi, were commonly employed by supply departments of industrial 
enterprises, their use being very pervasive during the Great Leap Forward. 
He believed that their use was less widespread in China than in the 
Soviet Union. 
The information obtained about blat and tolkachi in the textile 
industry during the period under review is inconclusive. It is all 
refugee information because, as indicated earlier, no published refer-
ences have been found. 
Informant number one was a top level manager in a joint state-
private run mill in Shanghai. The mill was modern, well equipped, and 
was supplied with sufficient materials to keep operating. He saw no 
real need to send buyers out to scour the country and he felt his mill 
received a very high priority for materials because it was large and very 
efficient. He had not heard of the behaviour of the kind implied by 
blat in his or other mills. 
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Informant number six was also a mill manager, in charge of the 
internal running of the whole mill. He reported that barter occurred; 
in his mill usually wood, tin and spare parts were bartered for whatever 
was needed from other mills. He had surplus cotton stored up but pre-
ferred to keep it as a safety device for the future and would not barter 
it. He insisted that barter was only spasmodic before 1958, when it ex-
panded rapidly, as until the Great Leap Forward the shortages had not 
been really serious. He also said that barter deals were supposed to be 
registered with the administrative bureau and that most of them were so 
registered. Purchasing agents were sent out to buy what was required 
but he did not hear anything about how they operated. It was judged on 
the whole that he did not feel that they were crucially important to the 
operation of his mill, but were merely necessary. 
Informant number fo\ir was the ex-owner of a small handicraft mill 
which employed twenty-two workers. Occasional stocks of small amounts 
of raw materials would be built up, and woven into cloth. This was taken 
out by a worker and sold in the market for what it would fetch - usually 
about twenty to thirty per cent above the official price. The money 
was then distributed equally among the workers, including the Party cadre 
who ran the mill. They had no dealings with other firms, only with the 
bureau. 
Informant number seven was a vice-forman in the Shanghai Number Six 
Mill, which had two buyers. He said that they rarely went out to 
purchase but ordered mainly by telephone and confirmed by letter. This 
suggests that the emergence of blat was perhaps unlikely, if his descrip-
tion was correct, as personal meetings would be reduced. 
Informant number eight was a Party man in Tientsin industrial cir-
cles. He reported that a typical mill would have five or six men for 
purchasing and selling, some of whom travelled; others were stationed in 
the cotton producing areas to purchase materials. Barter and black 
markets existed in the textile industry, and 'exchanging goods for mutual 
help' was not really regarded as illegal if the leaders agreed to it. 
The mill Party organisation was frequently able to decide on barter 
requests. He also knew that materials could often be obtained if a 
buyer offered a price slightly higher than the official price, which was 
considered illegal by the bureau if done in their area, but the bureau 
would ignore it if payment went to another bureau's area. He pointed to 
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all the necessary ingredients for blat - stocks suitable for trade, 
travelling and stationary purchasing agents, barter trade, and tight 
plans which rarely could all be filled at the same time - but he had not 
actually heard of blat. 
Informant number five was a purchasing agent for a small mill of 
about six hundred employees, which purchased cotton waste, ends of cloth, 
waste sliver pieces and so on, from other larger mills and knitting fac-
tories. These materials were processed by his mill into items such as 
working gloves, vests, and underwear for children. He made long trips, 
lasting about a month, when he visited Wuhan, Shanghai, Hangchou and 
various hsien in Kwangtung, and short trips of about three to five days. 
At the mills visited he dealt with one of their salesmen, or their dir-
ector, Party secretary or storeman. Barter was common in the textile 
industry: in his opinion almost all the mills and factories did it. He 
indicated that 'because the plans are too tight, we must get materials 
in any way we can' and the top Party representative in the mill 'knows 
it goes on but he needs the raw materials and turns a blind eye'. 
When engaged in purchasing he was as friendly as possible and after 
the conclusion of business those involved almost always went for drinks 
or a meal. He practised blat on a small scale, giving small but very 
acceptable presents, such as eggs, cigarettes and wine to managers he 
dealt with. 'Any "help" you give him is appreciated and he is easier 
to do business with; he will then supply more and it is easier to get 
in the first place'. Close questioning revealed a systematic pattern on 
behaviour. The agent visited the mills to purchase the needed materials 
and while there gave, or sold very cheaply if he thought the recipient 
might feel the goods were stolen, such things as chicken, ducks and geese, 
as well as the articles mentioned above. The materials went to his mill 
and were processed into gloves, etc., which in turn he sold to the supply 
and marketing co-operatives in rural areas. While in the rural areas he 
obtained the village produce which he needed to supply to the city men 
with whom he did business. 
This was the only clear example of blat found in the textile industry 
and in manner the informant seemed to be a natural tolkachi. In the few 
short weeks since leaving China, despite having no relatives or friends 
locally, he had set up a business, was equipped with rolled umbrella 
and business cards, and appeared to be prospering. There are however, 
three problems with his evidence. One was that his dealings occurred in 
the early 1960's onward; he reported that he had heard that there had been 
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almost no behaviour of this kind in the 1950's and he believed that it 
began only after the Great Leap Forward. Second, he only needed to 
purchase a few waste textile materials and did not search for other 
things for his unit. Third, his behaviour was the kind being looked for, 
but it was on a small scale and rather personal, never seeming to reach 
the intensity of the reported behaviour of purchasing agents in the 
Soviet Union. 
Certain conclusions can be drawn from the evidence on simulation, 
safety margins and blat. The original tentative hypothesis was that 
there might be less use of simulation and seeking of safety factors, but 
more use of blat, all motivated by financial reward. The results of the 
test refuted the hypothesis and were almost exactly opposite. Simul-
ation and safety factor seeking occurred widely and commonly in the tex-
tile industry. The Chinese managers were no less ingenious than their 
Soviet counterparts at discovering possible methods. Blat and tolkachi 
were difficult to pin down and the probability is that they did not 
extensively exist before the Great Leap Forward. Even afterwards they 
probably did not reach the levels attained in the Soviet Union. It is 
possible that the textile industry was a special case and that blat and 
tolkachi were widely used outside textiles but not within. State mon-
opoly trading of cotton, yarn and cotton cloth may have severely restric-
ted the purchasing agents: they were forbidden to buy these commodities. 
It therefore required an act of blatant illegality to operate as a true 
tolkachi in the textile industry. Buying and transporting prohibited 
materials had clearly been laid down as corruption, punishable by sen-
tences up to and including death, as early as 1952 [Peng Chen, 1952], 
which may have acted as a deterrent. Informant number five, the pur-
chasing agent, stated that he could never obtain raw cotton or even good 
cotton yarn, as it was impossible for him to get. 
It is also possible that the lower priority accorded to the textile 
industry during the 1950's made for a little less pressure on managers 
in this industry to perform and on tolkachi to emerge. This may be 
doubted however, since the textile industry was the largest inherited 
industry, the products were in great demand by peasants, were income 
elastic in demand, and earned substantial amounts of foreign exchange. 
It is equally possible that as a general rule the output-orientated 
simulation and safety factor seeking will emerge in a centrally planned 
economy, but that the input-orientated tolkachi and blat may, but need 
not necessarily, occur. 
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The motivation discovered was generally not financial, and managers 
in textiles did not receive general and sizeable bonuses. Simulation and 
safety factor seeking occurred because of tight plans and uncertainties 
in supply. However, the general motivations such as honour, prestige, 
self-respect, a desire to do the job well, enhanced promotion possibil-
ities, and the traditionally strong feelings about 'face' were themselves 
sufficient to induce this behaviour. The oveirwhelming stress on financial 
incentives laid by Berliner was untrue of the Chinese textile industry. 
Oscar Lange [1962a] also put the blame for the habit of fixing low plans 
and attempting to overfill plans by only a small amount on managerial pre-
miums. These practices occurred in China in the absence of managerial 
bonuses. 
Since these findings are at variance with those of Berliner, the 
question arises of whether the two countries are simply different, or 
whether Berliner gave financial motivation an emphasis that it did not 
deserve. There are four reasons for thinking that the emphasis supplied 
by Berliner was misplaced. First, an informant cannot be expected to 
analyse his own motivation accurately; at best he can truthfully say 
what he believed it to be, but it is very easy to rationalise and reach 
a wrong conclusion. Second, Berliner's informants had recently exper-
ienced the ' . . . . rather desperate physical and moral conditions of life 
in displaced persons' camps ' [Berliner, 1957:5]. It is possible that 
this led them to consider income as a most important desideratum, as 
their present desperate conditions could have been alleviated or ended 
with a reasonable income. Duesenberry's hypothesis [1949], that people 
tend to resist reductions in their standard of living and would rather go 
into debt, may have as a corollary that enforced reductions lead to an 
over-emphasis on income, as they wish to return to the highest standard 
of living previously attained. Third, Berliner's informants all came 
from an era of great and well-publicised stress of the use of the price 
mechanism, bonuses, and payment by results. Labour was allocated and 
transferred by use of wage policies, not by means of fiat. The Stakhan-
ovite movement began in the mid 1930's and the linking of reward and effort 
was widely emphasised and publicised^. Coming from that alone, it would 
^ See Granick D., [1954:85-86], Dobb M., [1966:463-487] and Raugh G.V., 
[1957:224-228] . 
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be vsry ireasonable for the infonnants to believe that financial induce-
ments were potent motivators. Fourth and finally, most of Berliner's 
informants came from heavy industry, and this might have been significant, 
because wages and material rewards in heavy industry were better than 
average. Perhaps the view of Gregory Ryapolov [1966] should be accepted. 
'A plant manager..., is dedicated to production and loves it. He loves 
it for its own sake, not for the material rewards'. He worked in Russian 
industry si nee 1936, and after World War Two he served as chief engineer 
or director in various firms, all in heavy industry. 
As blat was not found to have a widespread existence in the textile 
industry in China, but was common in the Soviet Union, then the differ-
ence is likely to be found in differences between the two countries. A 
major difference was the degree of political security. The Soviet Union 
was well established by 1938-41, the period covered by Berliner, and 
there was no real danger of a counter-revolution. The Chinese govern-
ment, on the other hand, had only just been established, and there might 
have been a possibility of counter-revolution or invasion. It was dan-
gerous to be mistaken for a saboteur, or for a Kuomintang agent or 
sympathiser, and use of blat could perhaps lead to such a charge, with 
long imprisonment or death to follow. The ex-capitalists and bourgeois 
managers had the most experience of using interpersonal linkage in 
business dealings, but were the group in the worst position to make use 
of the method, because they were not fully trusted and were always open 
to suspicion. The Communist managers or the Party could condone simul-
ation and safety factor seeking, but might well regard blat as 'sugar 
coated bullets', corruption, and a betrayal of the cause. 
In an era of political insecurity there is one important difference 
between simulation and safety factor seeking on the one hand and blat on 
the other. The former is restricted to a group of 'insiders', who can 
usually be relied upon to keep quiet; the latter involves 'outsiders' 
and if any one of them proves unreliable the result could be disastrous. 
It might even be the case that insecurity discourages blat but encourages 
simulation and the seeking of safety margins, because the desire to 
succeed is constrained to only two of the three channels. 
A second important difference between China and the Soviet Union in 
and after the 1930's is that the latter had trained and installed a new 
breed of manager, both red and expert, while the former still essentially 
had a choice of either red or expert managers. A red and expert Soviet 
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manager may have been willing to undertake risks and indulge in blat, 
which a bourgeois expert in China might shun. 
A third major difference between the two countries was that the 
Soviet Union made extensive use of managerial bonuses, and China did not. 
It is possible that the extra risks involved in the use of blat and 
tolkachi would have been accepted if sizeable managerial bonuses could 
have been earned. If this is so, then the lack of widespread managerial 
bonuses in the textile industry would have little effect on either sim-
ulation or the seeking of safety factors but would depress the use of 
blat. 
The incidence of simulations and safety factor seeking appears to 
have been great in the textile industry. In view of this, together with 
the lack of efficient sanctions, the opinion of P.J.D. Wiles [1952:137] 
may need some modification. 'Thus in China, persuasion and terror have 
reached such heights that there is probably less crime, even including 
economic crime, than in the advanced countries of Western Europe. In 
U.S.S.R. in the first FYP, when the system was new and the control mech-
anisms undiscovered, there was far more'. Richman B.M. [1967] dismissed 
the whole range of simulations, safety factor seeking and blat as 
'....apparently much less extensive and intensive in China....' It is 
doubtful if this is justified in the case of simulation and safety factor 
seeking in the textile industry. 
The reasons for hoarding 
Hoarding was easy because of certain permissive factors which allowed 
the practice, and some stimulatory factors which encouraged it. This is 
dealt with here, rather than in the section on safety factor seeking, in 
order to avoid interrupting the earlier flow of evidence and arguement. 
Many factories inherited stocks of materials from the Kuomintang 
period. The hyperinflation after 1937 had encouraged the hoarding of 
goods generally. In the Communist period, over-ordering and setting high 
norms for consumption of inputs added to these stocks. Much hoarding 
occurred in newly built mills owing to slack control during the construc-
tion and early running periods. Excess quantities of materials were 
ordered, some of which were not in fact usable in the mill, and later 
these became hoarded inventories [C.K.F.C.K.J., 1958b]. The purchase 
plan in new mills was sometimes drawn up before the design plan, so that 
goods were ordered with no real concept of needs [Ch'ien Chih-kuang, 
1955]. For example, the State Run Number Five Mill in Shensi purchased 
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a large quantity of machinery and equipment before the design plan for 
construction was finalised, and the equipment was uselessly hoarded 
[J.M.J.P., 1953/8/20]. 
The planning methods themselves encouraged hoarding. Factories 
applied for materials first, then drew up the production plan [M. of F. , 
1955] . When the plan for use of materials was drawn up, the materials 
specified were immediately ordered, no one checked the plan and no one 
looked to see if the needed materials were already in store. A change in 
the plans could lead to hoarding because reductions in the plan for out-
put were not accompanied by reductions in the supply of materials [Ch'ien 
Chih-kuang, 1955].^ The common practice of handing down incomplete plans 
was also reported to lead to hoarding [J.M.J.P., 1954/2/19]. 
Hoarding could occur because mill managers might duplicate their 
order for equipment that was difficult to obtain, asking for supply to 
be made from within China, and also separately requesting the equipment 
to be imported. If this request was granted, then an extra set of equip-
ment would eventually arrive [Ch'ien Chih-kuang, 1955]. Obtaining state 
approval for the allocation of materials for a special use, without using 
them, also resulted in the build up of stocks [M. of F. , 1955] . Ineffic-
iency on the part of state commercial organisations could also lead to 
stocks being held at the mills. An export company ordered a quantity of 
cotton cloth, but left almost a quarter of a million metres at the mill 
which produced it. After more than three years, the mill management 
asked the company to remove it, and found that the material had been struck 
off the books of the company, which regarded the matter as closed [N.F.J.P., 
1966/1/5]. 
Factories producing goods subject to unified allocation, such as 
the cotton textile industry, sometimes found they were left with a sur-
plus, as the state commercial organs could not rapidly balance and make 
adjustments for extra output [M. of F., 1955]. Some mills worked exclus-
ively for supplying the army with cloth and received very large quan-
tities of materials as a result, which were built up into large stocks. 
Not only did such mills have these stocks, but if they ceased to be an 
army supplier, the stocks were not handed back to the state or army 
^ See also a report by the Ministry of Finance [1955] and an article 
in Chinese Industry fC.K.K.Y., 1955]. 
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[Li Yun-Hung, 1955]. 
Poor storeroom procedures and control were a strong permissive 
factor in hoarding. A constant change of storekeepers in some factories 
led to "losses in work' and disorder [Ho Tseng-jen, 1956]. Within mills, 
no efficient system existed for returning to the storeroom excess mater-
ials or tools drawn earlier, and it was easier to keep them at lower 
levels. There also seems to have been no systematic way for mills to 
return to the state their excess materials. The storekeeping was so 
poor in many factories that there was a general problem that parts shown 
on the books did not exist in practice and parts that did exist did not 
appear on the books [Chiang Ming, 1954]. 
The lack of good external inspection of storerooms, and the ease 
with which visiting inspectors could be deceived, did nothing to 
discourage hoarding. One state run mill in the South-west illegally 
retained surplus raw materials after processing on contract for a depart-
ment store, and used them to weave over one thousand feet of cloth. The 
store sent inspectors to look for any materials left over, but they were 
easily misled by the 'deceitful tricks' of the managers, who showed 
empty storerooms to the inspectors and ordered the cadres to keep quiet 
about the true situation [Liu Chih, 1955]. 
Once the desire existed to build up stocks as a safety margin, it 
was clearly not difficult to do. Conversely, it was not easy to prevent 
unauthorised increases in the size of stocks, and recourse had to be made 
to an occasional cleaning-out of storerooms. This was done at the insis-
tence of the state in an effort to put some of the materials into use. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 
The Great Leap Forward involved great changes in China, some temp-
orary, others rather more permanent. With the Great Leap Forward, China 
entered into a new period. It was a complex time and the economic, 
social and political elements cannot be entirely separated. This Chapter 
examines the reasons for its occurrence, the efforts prior to the Great 
Leap Forward to deal with the existing problems, the effects of the Great 
Leap Forward on the textile industry, and the attempt to restore order. 
I. THE REASONS FOR THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 
The reasons for the Great Leap Forward can be classified as pol-
itical, military and economic. The former are beyond the scope of this 
study, but include the effects of a guerilla heritage, a desire to offer 
an alternative to Soviet leadership of the Communist world, a wish to 
proceed to a higher stage of Communist progress, and a desire for rel-
atively self-sufficient areas in case of war. 
There were several strong economic explanations for the Great Leap 
Forward. The first was that by 1956 major bottlenecks had emerged as 
reserves and capacities had often been exhausted. The shortage of cap-
ital began to preclude a continuation of the Soviet method of industrial-
isation, with its stress on heavy industrial development, and so the need 
emerged for a careful re-evaluation of strategies. Output had to be in-
creased, and by 1956 some attempt was made to economise on the use of 
capital by means of reducing non-productive expenditures, cutting down on 
staff numbers, making greater use of coastal industry, and suggesting 
that medium and small enterprises were superior to large ones. 
The second economic reason for the emergence of the Great Leap 
Forward was the lagging agricultural sector, which was not keeping pace 
with the demands placed on it. The supply of agricultural produce was 
insufficient for the needs of industry, and the standard of living in rural 
areas was not increasing at a rate that could be regarded as satisfactory. 
Institutional change was the main method chosen as the solution to the 
problem. 
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A further reason was the existence of an abundant supply of labour 
together with underemployed rural labour, which could be better used for 
development by use of mass mobilisation and by greater use of medium 
and small scale firms, which were more labour intensive than the large 
ones previously preferred. 
A foiarth reason was that under centralised planning it had not 
proved possible for the centre to deal effectively with local run indus-
try, nor had the central government departments really been interested 
in this. As a consequence, local industry was contributing less than its 
potential to development, and some local sources of labour and materials 
were underused. Decentralisation was required in order to exploit this 
potential fully. 
A fifth reason for the Great Leap Forward was that the courageous 
attempt at comprehensive planning had led to overcentralisation and 
rigidities, and had placed great burdens on both central and local plan-
ners, as well as on the ministries and the mills. In addition the use of 
target planning, where each mill and sector attempts not merely to reach 
the target, but to exceed it, meant that overfulfillment in one mill, 
area or industry could cause underfulfillment elsewhere, owing to the 
limited supply of materials. 
Perkins D.H. [1963] has suggested that the Great Leap Forward was 
' . . . . not dictated so much by underlying economic conditions as it was 
by the impatience of the leadership with the pace of development....' 
There is truth in this, but this statement does not of course imply that 
the economic causes were slight. They were in fact strong. The focus 
of attention in this Chapter is on the fifth explanation, that the effort 
at comprehensive planning induced severe rigidities and could not be 
sustained. This is not to deny the importance of the other explanations. 
The endeavour to plan comprehensively imposed large burdens on the admin-
istrators and planners. These burdens are examined; then the reasons why 
the burdens could not be met are considered. 
The increasing burdens on the administration 
The increase over time in the number and complexity of plans, forms 
and tables placed an increasing burden on administrators at all levels 
down to and including the mills. As early as 1952 the Special Adminis-
trative Area Government received over 47,000 documents, letters, tele-
grams, directives and notices from the Shantung Provincial People's 
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Government within a period of ten months [J.M.J.P., 1953/2/20]. The 
total output value part of the national annual economic plan had more 
than two hmdred figures in it [He Wen-t'ao, 1958]. A similar increase 
in the number and complexity of systems in and over the mills added to the 
problem. 
By 1956 three top level planning organs existed: the State Economic 
Commission, the State Planning Commission and the State Construction 
Commission. Each of these sent directives to one planning body at lower 
levels, such as the province or city, which was unable to cope adequately; 
'.... these three streams run into one ditch, the flooding waters over-
spill, and how can one narrow ditch drain them off?' [Mao Chun-I, 1957]. 
When the provinces responded by increasing the number of departments this 
led to 'the body gets fatter while the strength gets weaker'. This also 
occurred at the hsien level as well as in local Party committees. Since 
Mao ChUn-I reported that the norms, forms, methods and procedures diff-
ered, depending on the source of the directive, the problem was clearly 
not small. Financial directives were too numerous and tried to apply 
strict limits. The directives were not clearly understood by mill man-
agers or even by finance workers, while much time was wasted in meetings, 
answering telephone calls and dealing with excessive numbers of documents 
[Yang Chih-hsueh, 1958]. 
The demands by the state for information led to arduous tasks. The 
state widened its coverage of the economy and needed more detailed in-
formation. Different organs of state would ask for overlapping materials 
and had different definitions of some items. The ministry had a perennial 
problem of having little hard information on local run firms. As demands 
for information were passed down, successively lower levels might add to 
the requests. As an example, with regard to output, labour, costs and 
finances, the state issued twenty-two pages of reports and tables, the 
Ministry increased this to thirty-four, but fifty-six pages of requests 
reached the enterprises [Chen Ta-Lun, 1958]. It was not unknown for enter-
prises to be asked for information that was almost impossible to supply, 
such as figures for the future cost of building materials [Mao Chiin-I, 
1957]. 
The socialisation of industry and commerce added to the work of 
planners. Before 1956 many small enterprises were not in the direct state 
plan, but were in local plans, with fewer demands on the enterprise or the 
planners. Socialisation meant more work for the central planners [C.H.C.C., 
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1956a], even if the norms and tables had been left unaltered. In fact 
some were changed at socialisation [S.S.B., 1956b]. By the end of 1957 
some 50,000 staterun and joint state-private run enterprises were 
included in the state plan [Chen Ta-lun, 1958]. 
Overcentralisation was a factor in the overburdened system. Many 
central organs felt that strong centralisation was essential for planning, 
and some had an empire-building complex, trying to increase power and 
spheres of operations which stifled the mills [Hai Pa, 1957], [Kao Yu-
Jen, 1958]. Yang Ying-chieh, [1958b] indicated that the idea that state 
planning had to be as centralised as possible was strong before 1957, 
and also included the view that local authorities should not have any 
flexible authority. Mao Chuh-I [1957] also felt that higher level plan-
ning bodies arranged too many plans and tasks as well as controlled norms 
too rigidly. Chen Ta-lun [1958] agreed that enterprise personnel had 
too little power over the running of their enterprise and were stifled 
as a consequence. This rigid hierarchy of control existed at all levels: 
the ministry was too tightly controlled by higher levels of the state 
administration [He Wen-t'ao, 1958], and towns were too tightly controlled 
by the provinces [Huang Yun-hsiang, 1957]. 
In a penetrating discussion of planning problems, Liao Chi-li 
[1958] pointed to such matters as poor arrangements for local run enter-
prises, little awareness of the complex interactions in the economy, lack 
of attention to plan implementation, and overcentralisation. In his dis-
cussion of these problems he revealed some unusual facts, such as some 
schools, farms, hospitals and even bean-curd shops were put into the plan 
for industrial production. 
Factories in Shanghai in 1956 were, in principle, very tightly con-
trolled. In state run firms the director had the power to spend up to a 
limit of 200-500 yuan only; in state-private run firms the power of the 
director was even more circumscribed, and in some such firms he possessed 
none at all. As was pointed out, it was ridiculous that a factory direc-
tor should have to ask permission of higher authorities if he wished to 
purchase one bar of soap [Chang Shih-hung, 1956]. 
The problems and burdens were particularly great for local planners. 
^ See Chapter 3, pp.66-67 for details 
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When a local government department could not deal with a matter, the de-
partment frequently passed it on to the local planning committee. This 
matter could be directly concerned with planning or not [Mao Chun-I, 1957]. 
Mao Chun-I also described part of the problem as too many plans coming 
down in the first place, as well as some committees attempting to expand 
their sphere of influence by taking on extra work. 
He also pointed out that the provincial committees were unable to 
handle the sets of norms sent down by the ministry, and so simply passed 
them down as received to the town and hsien levels. It seems improbable 
that these lower levels would be better equipped than the province level 
to deal with the figures. It is obvious that the town level did not 
function well. The town planning committee had the tasks of compiling and 
inspecting plans, inspecting plan fulfillment, suggesting ways of meeting 
plans, and investigating important economic problems [Yang Fang-tung, 1957] 
However, the committees were so ineffective at inspecting plan fulfill-
ment and suggesting ways of meeting plans that Kao Hsiang-chang [1957] 
suggested that these tasks should cease to be regarded as an important 
part of their work. A major weakness pointed out by Kao Hsiang-chang was 
that a committee had no power to solve problems in plan implementation 
that it might discover; for instance the Tientsin Planning Committee could 
not adjust a target for 800 tons which had been given to a factory of 
5,000 ton capacity. In the case of other types of problems, the division 
of responsibility between the local town planning committee and the local 
people's council was never clear, so that both might ignore a problem for 
a long period yet both might try independently to tackle the same problem. 
Ironically, an additional burden was placed on planners and admin-
istrators by the succession of changes instituted between 1956 and 1958, 
which were designed to alleviate the problems. The changes were too 
rapid or too great to be handled by the administration. 
It was pointed out by Chen Hao-jan [1957] that changes in systems 
for running industry, and in financial or planning methods, caused extra 
work for the planners. Planners were extremely busy, worked overtime 
regularly, were tired and exhausted, but the work could still not be 
done. 
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The reasons that the increased burden could not be handled ^ 
There were many contributory factors to the inability to solve the 
problems of increasing rigidities. Good planners and statisticians were 
in short supply, and men of ability at lower levels were often transferred 
to the ministries, denuding the lower levels of talent. At the top these 
men were often underused, while non-Party men were often underused at all 
levels. The size of China and variations in age, size and technology of 
mills was a perennial problem. The attitude towards planning was not 
strong and plans were frequently poorly drawn up. 
The most significant factor was that the Soviet system of planning 
was not suitable for Chinese conditions. China rigidly applied the ex-
periences of other planned economies, mainly of the Soviet Union, in its 
planning system, regardless of Chinese conditions and without thought 
[He Wen-T'ao, 1958]. The same criticism was made of financial planning 
by Kao Yu-jen [1958]. While these statements, emanating as they do from 
the period of the early Great Leap Forward, may be questioned, basically 
they are sound. The Soviet Union practised comprehensive planning, and 
China was too underdeveloped to undertake successfully such an ambitious 
attempt. This was the real reason for the many problems and lack of 
success in planning up to the Great Leap Forward. The rejection of Soviet-
style planning by the Maoists was founded on good economic sense, irres-
pective of political considerations. It is tempting to reach the con-
clusion that China was simply overcentralised, and this had been said in 
China, but this was merely a symptom of the real problem, that China was 
not ready for comprehensive planning. 
It is not enough to simply argue that there are fewer goods and less 
complex economic relationships in underdeveloped countries, which facil-
itates central planning and renders it appropriate. In such countries 
there are normally few resources to administer such a system, little 
experience of what is involved, and probably a cultural barrier to over-
come. The disadvantages can easily overshadow the advantages. 
Wilber C.K. [1969] presented an apparently persuasive case for the 
relevance of the Soviet model to the problems of underdeveloped countries. 
^ See Chapter 3, pp.53-68 for details 
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He excluded small, resource-poor countries, but felt that Soviet-style 
planning could prove very useful for larger ones with natural resources, 
such as India or Indonesia. He admitted that a major overhaul of the 
basic Soviet model might be necessary in order to adapt it to local con-
ditions [1969:13-13]. However, despite valiant efforts in China to 
adjust and improve the Soviet model, it proved unworkable and had to be 
abandoned. 
Many Soviet economists have now admitted that rigid and stereo-
typed Soviet planning is not suitable for underdeveloped countries and 
are now prepared to allow a role for foreign trade, and do not insist on 
starting with a heavy industry drive, while some even advocate the use 
of private foreign capital in such economies [Jeffries I, 1968]. 
In view of the fact that more developed centrally planned economies, 
such as the Soviet Union itself, are finding it difficult to pursue the 
rigid comprehensive planning of the past, it is possible that this form 
of economic organisation is perhaps more suitable for 'middle' economies, 
but not at all suitable for really underdeveloped or developed ones. 
II. THE EFFORTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS, 1956-57 
By 1955 the attempt to introduce comprehensive planning had resulted 
in problems that urgently needed solution. Between 1956 and 1958 many 
suggestions and trial changes were made, aimed at increasing flexibility 
within the system of planning. This period of re-evaluation culminated 
in the Great Leap Forward of 1958. A leap forward was called for at the 
National People's Congress in February 1958, with stress being laid on 
steel production. In March of that year the Central Committee and Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung called a meeting of ministries and provincial and 
municipal leaders, which resulted in the adoption of the policy of 
speeding up the industrialisation prograirane by means of simultaneous dev-
elopment of central and local run industry, large, medium and small 
scale firms, as well as of agriculture and industry. 
The year 1956 was one of discussion of problems. In April, Chair-
man Mao produced an important article on the ten sets of relationships 
[Chen Jerome, 1969:65-85], which among other things stressed the need 
for local authorities to be allowed a greater role. A series of meetings 
to discuss excessive centralisation was held between May and August, 
which resulted in decisions to increase the power of local authorities 
in planning, and to allow local authorities as far as possible to run all 
enterprises, with the exception of key firms, vital to the national 
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economy [Chou En-lai, 1956c:88]. It was also decided that there should 
be freer markets, that the State Council would give local authority 
targets directly to the authority, by-passing central departments, and 
that medium and small scale enterprises were desirable. The seeds of the 
policies of the Great Leap Forward had thus been sown. 
The Eighth Party Congress turned its attention to these and other 
matters. While Li Fu-chun was open about the problems in planning and 
administration, Chen Yun made the most radical proposals for improvements. 
These included a more flexible price policy and greater use of the price 
mechanism, for instance to encourage better quality, and a proposal that 
plan targets should be for reference only. Factories producing articles 
of daily use should make their own plan and not be tied to state plans, 
while profit should be decided at the end of the year on an ex post 
basis, rather than be planned and subtracted from the enterprise bank 
account. Chen Yun's suggestions laid great stress on flexibility, market 
demands and market response, but apparently still within the frame-
work of loose state planning. It was later reported that the view that 
it was desirable to make great use of the price mechanism was prevalent 
in 1956 [Yang Ying-chieh, 1958b]. 
Other changes in 1956 were the separation of long term and annual 
planning, the State Economic Commission being established to deal with 
the latter, and the encouragement of non-unification and local differ-
entiation in policies. This marked the beginning of the end of compre-
hensive planning, as local statistical bureaus were allowed to make 
their own decisions on issues, without recourse to the State Statistical 
Bureau. They were supposed to act in accordance with general statistical 
principles, but in their absence could reach an independent solution 
[S.S.B., 1956c]. In planning, a few of the targets set by the state 
could not be altered. In the case of the plan for industry the unalter-
able norms were total output value, the national balancing of products, 
and the seasonal division of output of major products. All other parts 
of the plan for industry could be altered by the provinces, autonomous 
areas and direct run cities, to suit local conditions [C.H.C.C., 1956a]. 
This was clearly defined as 'the start of the reform of the system of 
planning work in our country'. Industry was of course subject to plans 
other than the industry plan, for instance the labour and wage plan. 
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These other plans were also relaxed, with more power going to local 
authorities over portions of them. 
In 1957 the efforts to solve problems continued and strengthened, 
culminating in large-scale decentralisation of power to local author-
ities in November. The Hundred Flowers Movement, which began in 1956 
but emerged strongly only in 1957, can be regarded in part as an attempt 
to reveal the problems and to obtain help in their solution. Many 
critics of the planning system were heard at this time. Yang Ying-chieh 
[1958a] reported various criticisms including 'in the last few years' 
planning work, the mistakes are the major thing, the successes are very 
minor'; 'planning work has caused our country's progress to be like 
broken threads; of the five years there were four years of mistakes, two 
years conservatism and two years reckless advance!'; 'very many of the 
plan figures are dreamed up!'; and 'plan work is totally confused, plan-
ning organs are a crematorium for men'. 
Planning in the textile industry was simplified in 1957, with a 
simplification of tables and in the process of compilation; the Min-
istry only set main aggregate targets and sent them to the bureaus or 
companies, leaving aside all supplementary tables, calculations and 
norms. The enterprise received control figures from the bureau and these 
were used as the plan, the enterprise not being compelled to draw up its 
own plan at all. In effect, the annual plan at the Ministry in 1957 was 
a simpler outline than in the past, which was expected to give the Min-
istry more time to work on quarterly plans [Shou Han-ching, 1957]. 
In an attempt to increase flexibility within the central run textile 
industry, the Ministry was urged by Chiang Kuang-nai at a meeting of 
bureau chiefs [C.K.F.C., 1957b] to enlarge the power of enterprises and 
make their management more democratic. He also announced that the Min-
istry should follow the recommendations of bureaus when making decisions 
on enterprise running or on plans. Building the greater detailed know-
ledge available at lower levels into decision taking at higher levels 
was clearly an effort to reduce some of the problems of overcentralis-
ation. 
During 1957 the power of the local authorities grew rapidly, pre-
dating the well-known official decentralisation in November. Local 
authorities invested without seeking prior government approval and their 
investment in basic construction was frequently in excess of the limits 
allowed by the government. Some authorities engaged in barter activities 
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and also, whenever possible, diverted resources to their own area, and 
detained goods in transit through their area, in order to achieve the 
desired level of investment [Yang Ying-Chieh, 1958]. It is clear that 
the November measures formally applied the decisions taken in 1956, 
and followed upon, and carried further, a situation that had already 
begun to develop. 
The decentralisation measures, which included the handing over of 
all textile mills to province or other lower level control, resulted in 
a widening of the geographical distribution of income gap between local 
authorities. Since profit retention by local authorities increased, 
and most mills were in the old coastal provinces, these areas gained 
substantially more revenue than interior areas with little industry. 
In 1958 the twelve norms of a command natiare controlled by the 
State Council were reduced to four: the output of major products, total 
staff and worker numbers, the total wage bill, and profit. The remaining 
eight norms lost their command nature and could be revised at lower lev-
els [S.C., 1957b]. The ministries, provinces, autonomous areas and 
direct-run cities could add to the four norms with a command nature, 
depending on what they felt was necessary for particular enterprises. 
Plan compilation was simplified again, with the state only setting 
an annual plan, leaving the quarterly and monthly plans to be set by 
ministries, bureaus or other lower level bodies. These latter could 
include the enterprises themselves if the controlling bodies saw fit. 
The process of 'two up and two down' in plan fonnation was changed to 
'two down and one up', cutting out the stage of the enterprises suggest-
ing a plan [Chen Ta-lun, 1958]. It was even suggested that 'one up and 
one down' was more suitable [Ch'u T'ung-hsing, 1958]. It was also stated 
that under normal conditions the plan sent down would no longer be sub-
ject to abrupt changes from above. 
Ill, THE CHANGE IN STRATEGY 
During the re-evaluation period 1956-57, two broad schools of 
thought emerged: the Soviet centralist and the Maoist decentralist. The 
former was generally in favour of a centrally planned economy modelled 
on the Soviet pattern. This school preferred priority to heavy industry, 
capital intensive methods, larger units of production and modern tech-
nology, although these elements probably tended to weaken, in the sense 
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that they were no longer exclusively preferred, at that time. The school 
also favoured material incentives, the seeking of enterprise profits, 
and full use of expertise and skilled personnel. The second school was 
associated with a quite different set of policies of a more radical 
nature. This school favoured decentralised planning with locally self-
sufficient areas, more use of the masses in production by means of mob-
ilisation, local rather than central finance of investment, and use of 
ideological incentives. The concept of balance in development was lack-
ing, superseded by one of change and imbalance. Although the concept of 
'two lines' or two schools is often accepted by observers outside China 
and is emphasised within China, this neatness in categorisation cannot 
be so clearly observed in practice. Many people had conflicting inter-
ests and did not subscribe to one line in its entirety, or subscribed in 
varying degrees to parts of both lines. Nonetheless, it seems useful 
to discuss complex issues in a precise manner, as long as a degree of sim-
plification is recognised. 
Broadly speaking, 1956 was a year of discussion, 1957 one of attempts 
to i^ '-^ s^a.se flexibility roughly within the existing system of central 
planning, and 1958 was the year when the second school predominated, 
ushering in the Great Leap Forward. Exceptions to this, as to all gen-
eralisations, can be found; in particular the power of local authorities 
increased rather earlier than is commonly believed, but on the whole the 
generalisation appears to be justified. 
The changes in strategy in the Great Leap Forward signalled the end 
of an era - albeit short - as China diverged from the path beaten by the 
Soviet Union and attempted to find its own solution to the development 
problem. Comprehensive planning had proved to be unworkable in this 
large and complex underdeveloped country. In a sense the development in 
China after 1949 had occurred despite, rather than because of, compre-
hensive planning. There had been notable successes. National goals had 
been set and well-publicised, the people had been organised and mobilised, 
excitement had been generated and passivity attacked, rates of investment 
had been increased and were maintained at high levels, and the inherited 
problems were rapidly dealt with. It is likely that all of this could 
have been achieved if the attempt to introduce the system of comprehensive 
planning had never taken place. It is significant that after the Great 
Leap Forward failed, no effort was made to return to a centralised system 
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of comprehensive planning, but recourse was made to a more market 
orientated economy with freer markets. China has never again tried to 
revert to the system of pre-1958, both for political reasons and because 
of recognition that this system had not proved entirely suitable. 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD ON THE 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
The effects of the Great Leap Forward on the textile industry can 
conveniently be discussed in two groups: external and internal to the 
industry. The external effects were indirect, the changes in other 
sectors in turn affecting the textile industry. Of the many indirect 
changes that affected the industry, those in control and planning, fin-
ancial control and in the statistical system were the most important. 
Commencing about the end of 1957, enterprises were steadily decen-
tralised and came under the control of provinces, autonomous areas and 
direct-run cities. From the end of 1957 to 15 June 1958, nine ministries 
had handed over more than 880 enterprises to local authorities [H.K.T. 
K.P., 1958/6/26], and some eighty per cent of all central run enter-
prises had thus been decentralized [Lin Wei-jen, 1958]. Although a 
rather cautious statement had earlier been made that at first only a 
few textile mills were to be handed over to local authorities to run 
[S.C., 1957b], by mid-1958 control of all mills had in fact been passed 
to local levels [T.K.P., 1958/6/25]. 
A striking change occurred in the planning system. Previous to 
1958, two separate systems existed; one covered all central run mills 
which came under the Ministry, the other covered all local run mills. 
The result had been a total lack of communication between mills under 
different systems.^ The new method, to commence in 1959, was dubbed the 
•twin track system', in which the Ministry still compiled its own plan 
for any enterprise still retained, but the same enterprise was also 
included in the plan of the local area in which it was located [Wang 
Kuei-wu, 1958]. Since all textile mills and almost all light industrial 
enterprises had in fact been decentralised, they only went into the local 
plans. Other industries followed the new system. 
^ See Chapter 3 , pp.41-42 and 59-62 for details. 
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External supervision by special agencies fell into disuse during • 
the Great Leap Forward and ceased to operate. This was apparently a 
deliberate policy measure in order to liberate lower level initiative, 
and the Ministry of Supervision was formally abolished in 1959. 
It seems improbable that the range of problems induced by the 
attempt to introduce comprehensive planning could be solved by simple 
decentralisation of a few powers. A great decentralisation of power 
would in effect result in non-comprehensive planning. The increase in 
functions at local levels added to the work of local planners, and in 
the absence of a great increase in the numbers of skilled planners, a 
deterioration in planning was perhaps inevitable. The poor situation in 
local planning previous to 1958 was discussed earlier. Yang Fang-tung 
[ 1957] described it quite well: 
'Recently some comrades say that the local planning 
committee compiles the draft plan too many times, the 
working personnel regularly work overtime and many 
departments come to the planning committee for a 
solution to concrete problems, they feel the work is 
excessive for the number of personnel, the work is 
chaotic and passive, there is not time to penetrate 
the basic levels to understand conditions, nor to 
investigate problems. It should be pointed out that 
these problems exist to a greater or lesser extent in 
the work of planning organs of all areas and, in addition, 
if they are not solved, they will continue to affect the 
raising of plan quality and the development of the 
functions of plan organs'. 
With the extra work nominally placed on local planners it is not 
surprising that the local Party committees could increase their power, 
both within and above the level of the mill. 
Financial control, never strong, slackened during the Great Leap 
Forward. Unlike most of the economic system, the banking system was 
not decentralised at this time, but rendered less effective as a 
control device by the rise in power of Party committees and the pre-
vailing attitude of stress on increasing output, together with the 
abandonment of all fetters that might hinder this. Some, like Chou I-
Mao [ 1958] , protested that some supervision by banks was necessary, but 
this went against the tide of opinion at the time. The tendency in 1958 
was for the banks to consider how best they could supply sufficient funds 
to meet the demands of enterprises and to play down the control and 
planned allocation of such funds. This was attacked in the early effort 
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in 1959 to reimpose control [C.F.L.R., 1959], but it appears that this 
effort succumbed to the radical line in August of that year. In 1961 
the supply of planned working capital which, with the exception of 
self-financed capital, had been given entirely to the banking system 
in February 1959, was altered. Henceforth eighty per cent would be from 
budget appropriations and only twenty per cent would be supplied through 
the People's Bank [M of F, 1961]. This change was initiated because of 
slack control of finances, and was part of the attempt to restore order 
to the system. 
The breakdown in the statistical system has been well described by 
Li Choh-ming [1962] . As early as 1956 ordinary business departments in 
some enterprises began to collect statistics, which previously had been 
the function of specialist departments [Wang Wen-sheng and Tsu Yen-an, 
1956]. Undoubtedly this partly accounted for the deterioration in 
statistical quality that occurred in 1958 and later. This deterior-
ation seriously impared the standard of information available to the 
centre, which could not observe actual events quickly or easily. As 
late as 1962, the quality of information available to the authorities 
was poor; mills were using different definitions of norms, and unity of 
statistical definitions had not been imposed [Yang Kuang-shih, etc., 
1962]. 
The direct effects of the Great Leap Forward on the textile indus-
try were numerous. These are considered below as the effect on labour, 
internal organisation, plans and attitudes, financial work, non-textile 
output, enforced mergers, product quality, maintenance, and output. 
The effects on staff and labour 
The four major effects on staff and labour were that cadres were 
transferred to lower levels, workers moved into the work of management, 
expertise was downgraded, and the number of workers increased substant-
ially. As part of the process of hsia fang, the Ministry of Textiles 
transferred 631 cadres at the beginning of 1958. Of these cadres, 290 
went to the villages, 180 to lower levels of administration, and 161 to 
mills [C.K.F.C., 1958c]. The mills followed the lead of the Ministry 
and began to reduce the nximber of administrative cadres. The Dairen 
Textile Mill originally had thirty-four cadres and reduced these to six-
teen [Wang Shao-P'ing, 1958]. The Chengchou State Run Number Three Mill 
felt that they could reduce the administrative cadres by 125, from 6.24 
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per cent of personnel to 3.9 per cent [T'ien Yii-ming, 1958]. The Shang-
hai State Run Number Seven Mill reduced the number of cadres by over 
200, thereby reducing the percentage of cadres to production workers 
from twelve to four approximately [Han Hsli-ch'in, 1958]. Further ex-
amples sxist for other mills. Planning workers in general were singled 
out for attention and were told to 'get off the horse and see the 
flowers', and to go out into the workshops [Chu T'ung-hsing, 1958]. 
Workers began to assume part of the functional role of management 
early in 1958, In the Northwest Number Three Mill this commenced in 
March, when economic accounting was passed down to the small teams to 
run [C.K.F.C., 1959c]. The policy of workers participating in manage-
ment was promoted in the Shanghai State Run Number Seven Mill after 
April 1958, when the Party secretary had attended a city Party Meeting 
and heard about experiences in Heilungkiang with the 'two take part, one 
change' system (liang-ts'an I-kai) [Han Hsu-ch'in, 1958]. This system 
was one of workers participating in management, cadres participating in 
production, while unreasonable regulations and systems had to change. 
The power of the workers increased. In the Chengchou State Run 
Number Three Mill the small team took over many of the functions of 
management; for example, the team had the power to transfer personnel 
on a temporary basis, to adjust the norms for use of material within 
certain limits, and to grant a holiday of up to one day, while the team 
leader gained the power to propose bonuses [T'ien Yii-ming, 1958]. In 
the Tientsin Number Two Dyeing and Printing Mill, power over finances, 
plans, and the allocation of personnel was given completely to the small 
teams, the members of which were responsible for production arrangements, 
taking care of statistics on tools and materials, technical inspection, 
safety, and public health [Liu Erh-t'un, 1958]. 
The results of bringing management to the workers were that the 
concept of factory level management greatly relaxed and, for a time, 
appears to have ceased; division of responsibility was unclear, causing 
disharmony and some confusion; and the burden on the workers increased. 
The Hangchou State Run Number Three Mill provides a clear example. In 
this mill much work was passed down to the workers, including the control 
of the plan for output. After each shift the workers had to spend one 
or two hours calculating output; meetings were missed, and sleep was lost. 
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Workers in charge of wage calculation and payment were removed from 
production work before pay-day. Eventually powers had to be handed 
back up to specialist personnel, and the workers were reported to be 
thankful [T'ien Yu-ming, 1959]. 
The number of workers employed increased rapidly during the Great 
Leap Forward, and hoarding of labour became prevalent later. An in-
crease in the labour force was necessary, owing to the building of new 
large, medium and small scale factories, and to the increase in output 
from established mills. Existing mills in some areas sent workers to 
the new ones to help them start production; this system was known as 
'the hen lays eggs'. In other areas peasants were taken on to staff 
the new mills [Wang P'o, 1958]. In 1958 the total staff and workers 
in the textile industry numbered 1.8 million [Fang Chih, 1959], and by 
1960 they numbered over 2 million [Chiang Kuang-nai, I960]. Although no 
production figures were issued after 1959, it is believed that textile 
output fell sharply in 1960 and again in 1961. Despite the reduced need 
for labour, the mills were generally unwilling to lay off workers, and 
labour hoarding developed [Ling Tse-chih, 1963]. This happened in many 
industries, and in 1962 Chou En—lai called for a reduction in the size 
of the urban population. The textile industry was asked to respond and 
to end the problem of labour hoarding and the associated low level of 
productivity of labour [C.K.F.C., 1962a]. Some industrial enterprises 
did not have a plan for the use of labour in the early 1960's, owing to 
the breakdown in planning concept during the Great Leap Forward, so that 
the hoarding of labour presented little difficulty [Chao Wan-yu, 1962], 
[M. of L. , 1964] . 
The hsia fang of cadres reduced the numbers of administrative staff 
in the early Great Leap Forward, but before long staff numbers began to 
increase again. In the mills under the Peking Textile Bureau, the ratio 
of not-directly-productive staff to productive personnel increased from 
thirteen per cent in 1958 to approximately eighteen per cent in 1962, and 
in some of the mills it reached over twenty per cent. These figures were 
based on reported statistics, but the true situation was worse than this, 
since after 1960 some mills designated some of their staff as 'workers' 
in order to keep the percentages more favourable [Ling Tse-chih, 1963]. 
In Peking, despite the proximity to central power, the number of textile 
cadres doubled between 1958 and the end of 1962 [Liu Wen-P'u and Wang 
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Kiiang-hui, 1963]. 
The downgrading of experts and the lack of attention paid to exper-
tise dioring the Great Leap Forward is well known. Factory managers, 
statisticians, engineers and accountants all suffered a dimunition of 
power, and were frequently transferred to other work. The general man-
agers began to regain power about 1961, but the other specialists had 
to wait longer. As late as 1962 some mills had no chief accountant 
[C.K.F.C., 1962b], and tentative regulations governing the powers and 
duties of accounting workers were not issued until November 1962 [S.C., 
1962]. 
The effects on internal organisation 
Internal reorganisation of mills was of two broad kinds: the stream-
lining of departments and the dismantling of systems of running. The 
former consisted of establishing a simpler organisational structure as a 
result of dropping or merging departments, which reduced the niombers of 
staff. The results were not satisfactory. Oversimplifications in 
structure occurred, leading to an excessive reduction in the numbers of 
managerial workers, which appeared to place a big burden on those left 
and was not favourable to efficient running [Tien Yu-ming, 1959], [C.K. 
F.C., 1959g]. Departments which had been 'irrationally adjusted' were 
later split up again, as for example in the Wuhan State Run Number One 
Mill [Wang Tso-I, 1961]. 
Some of the systems of running, slowly built up since the early 
1950's, were dismantled as they were believed to be fettering an increase 
in production levels [C.F.J.P., 1958/4/28], [Han Hsu-ch'in, 1958]. While 
some systems were needlessly restrictive and needed adjustment, in general 
the reform was overdone. In some cases nothing was set up to replace the 
discarded systems, leaving an administrative vacuum [T.K.P., 1959/7/29], 
or where systems were retained in principle, they were often ignored in 
practice by the workers and no one was responsible for seeing that the 
systems were followed. As was reported in one mill: 
' the chaos in production management was not entirely due 
to unreasonable or unhealthy systems, but was mainly due to 
having systems but no one responsible, and when men pleased 
themselves and did not follow the systems, no one supervised; 
when men violated the system there was no one to check up.' 
[C.K.F.C., 1959f]. 
The Shanghai Dyeing and Printing Company reported on the factories 
under it: 
'Since the Great Leap Forward last year, not a few regulations 
and systems were smashed, which had a great function in liberating 
thought and improving management, this is important and basic. 
However, among the systems that were smashed some good systems were 
eliminated, that is to say some areas excessively smashed systems... 
a bigger deficiency was to break the old without replacing it by 
anything new...' 
[C.K.F.C,, 1959e]. That this was a common occurrence is clear from a 
statement by an official of the Ministry of Textiles: 
'In 1958 the staff, workers and masses smashed the un-
reasonable regulation systems But in the reform of last year, 
owing to the lack of experience and short time, the regulation 
systems in most enterprises were excessively smashed and little 
was set up; some enterprises smashed but set up nothing, and this 
was unfavourable to raising production and improving the running.' 
[M. of T., 1959b]. 
The effects on plans and attitudes to planning 
Power over plans was often given to the small teams. The plans, 
reports and tables themselves were greatly simplified in 1958, in an 
attempt to reduce workloads and create initiative. The number of forms 
in the national economic plan of 1958 was the least in any year since 
1952, the number being reduced by fourty-nine, or by one third when com-
pared with 1957. This works out to be approximately 150 forms in 1957 
and 100 in 1958 [S.E.C., 1957]. The State Statistical Bureau also re-
duced the number of reports an enterprise had to forward in 1958 [T.C.K.T. 
1958]. In Shanghai textile mills the existing fifty-five financial re-
ports were reduced to ten, and their annual plan became a simple frame-
work [Kao Yu-Jen, 1958]. 
Economic accoiinting was considerably weakened during the Great Leap 
Forward. Many textile mills did not persist with it [C.K.F.C., 1959h], 
and this slackening led to cost increases [Chu I-chao, 1963]. In this 
period of slackness, norm observation and control suffered and the con-
cept of norms and targets weakened: in Peking the bureau only began to 
fix norms again about the end of 1961, and that only on a trial basis in 
three mills [Yang Kuang-shih etc, 1962]. 
The concept of planning was also considerably weakened in the Great 
Leap Forward, as decentralisation occurred, control relaxed, and polit-
ical enthusiasm was substituted for expertise. During this period it is 
not too extreme to say that planning in any meaningful sense did not 
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exist. In the early 1960's the state began to reimpose order, and 
articles appeared using phrases such as 'putting enterprises on the 
road of state planning', which had been commonly used in the early 
1950's during the effort to establish a planned economy, but rarely 
after that. It is significant that books on enterprise planning and 
management began to be published in the early 1960's. It was admitted 
that the idea of planning was weak in Honan and that plan following was 
not at all strict in the mills [C.K.F.C., 1961b]. Faults uncovered dur-
ing the clean-out of storerooms in the early 1960's were ascribed in part 
to lack of financial understanding, weak attitudes to economic account-
ing, and a weak planning standpoint [Yang Hsiieh-li, 1962]. By 1962 not 
all industrial enterprises even had targets in production work, and 
those without such targets were asked to fix them if they were able 
[Wen Chin, 1962]. 
Possession of a planning system is not the same as achieving planning 
effectiveness. A country may have a plan with no real attempt at plan-
ning or may even have planning without a paper plan [Waterston A., 1965: 
167]. Until 1957 China had a planning apparatus of sorts, but overall 
was not very effective at planning. In 1958 both the planning mechanism 
and central planning itself began to break down, although paper plans 
continued to be made at the centre. Strong regional planning was unable 
to develop during the Great Leap Forward, as it was not possible to 
achieve closed control over the mills at that time. 
Financial work in the mills 
Financial work in the mills slackened noticeably in the Great Leap 
Forward, partly because of external financial slackness and partly because 
of the hsia fang of power within the mills and rise of the Party. Some 
cadres and workers in one mill felt that it was sufficient to compute 
output alone, and it was too much trouble to bother to add up sums of 
money [C.K.F.C., 1959c]. Financial work often went to the small team to 
do, which sometimes caused difficulties, as in one mill that had over 
130 such teams, and the whole mill was on team level accounting [Ch'uan-
Ch'ang-t'ien, 1959]. It was admitted in 1963 that financial work had 
slackened or been neglected in some textile mills during the period of 
the Great Leap Forward [C.K.F.C., 1963b]. Cost accounting regulations, 
issued by the Ministry of Textiles until 1957, ceased in 1958, and only 
commenced again about 1964 [M. of T., 1964]. Circulating capital was 
used for basic construction purposes without control; this was even true 
of controlling departments, which borrowed circulating capital belong-
ing to enterprises under them [M. of F., 1959]. Some enterprises also 
borrowed from the People's Bank and used the credit for investment pur-
poses. Elements that should not have been included were put into produc-
tion costs, and some firms, using their own output for expansion purposes, 
priced the inputs at cost and not at the (higher) state purchase prices, 
so that more physical investment could be achieved for the same financial 
expenditure. Judging by a comprehensive list of forbidden actions issued 
in the textile industry in 1962, the expenditure plan had been ignored, 
money had been transferred freely to any use, and taxes and profits had 
not been handed up as they should have been [C.K.F.C., 1962b]. 
Methods of worker remiineration changed in 1958. Previously, many 
workers were paid on some form of piece work or piece work plus time rate 
system. Before 1958, about fifty per cent of textile workers were on 
a piece work system [C.K.F.C., 1963a]. The large increase in output, 
part of which was imaginary but much still real, would have led to bonus 
earnings too large to be acceptable to the ruling elite. Piece work 
earnings did increase, reportedly to thirty, forty or even one hundred 
per cent in excess of basic wages [N.C.N.A., 1958b]. As a result, the 
system changed to some form of comprehensive bonus, which began in 1958, 
or to time rates. The comprehensive bonus system was not unified, and 
details varied considerably in different areas and enterprises. As a 
general rule, the coverage of workers was wider, mass discussion and 
evaluation were a feature, political considerations should have been and 
were taken into account, and large bonuses were avoided. It was not long 
before problems with the new bonus method arose. In many enterprises 
the masses reportedly used their power in discussion to reduce the pol-
itical requirements, such as taking part in social movements and active 
study of political theory, and put the stress on output, economy and 
safety [Wang Te-chung and Huang Ch'in-hsieh, 1962a]. Wang Te-chung and 
Huang Ch'in-hsieh sympathised with these workers, and felt that the 
bonuses should not be used as a substitute for proper ideological work. 
Other problems that emerged were that the coverage was too wide, egal-
itarianism was common, bonuses were paid irrespective of output levels, 
and in some units the bonus was regarded as a welfare measure for looking 
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after the livelihood of staff and workers [Li Wei-I, 1964]. These 
latter criticimsm are reminiscent of those levelled at the bonus system 
existing prior to the Great Leap Forward. 
Textile mill production of non-textile output 
The production of non-textile output by textile mills looked im-
portant in 1958. Textile mills, like the rest of China were encouraged 
to produce iron and steel, and some did so. The Wuhan Number Six Tex-
tile Mill produced 1,322 tons of steel up to 22nd October 1958 and hoped 
to reach 3,000 tons by the end of the year. Electricity generation was 
also asked for early in 1959, as demand was expected to exceed supply 
by approximately twenty per cent in that year [M. of T., 1958]. The 
repair workshops in some mills began to make agricultural implements in 
1958 [Wu Lu, 1958]. The results were not as good as anticipated: work-
ers became fatigued and the iron and steel produced was of very low 
quality. Early in 1959 requests for and publicity about the production 
of iron, steel and electricity ceased. This campaign to produce non-
textile output in textile mills was short lived and had a relatively 
minor effect on the industry. 
Enforced mergers 
During the Great Leap Forward some mergers were made that were 
really part of the rather fanatical behaviour common at the time. The 
Peking Numbers One, Two and Three Mills were all merged into one gi-
gantic unit, although they were physically separate [J.M.J.P., 1958/3/ 
29] . They were later split up again, presumably on the grounds of in-
efficiency. At least one textile mill became a commune, taking in towns-
people, commercial workers, and peasants. The mill changed from being an 
industrial enterprise with 6,500 workers, to being a commune with a pop-
ulation of 12,623, and about ten factories in different trades, comm-
ercial undertakings, including a bank, and agricultural units [Li Wen-
wu, 1958]. As in the case of non-textile output, the lasting effects of 
such events on the textile industry seem to have been minimal. 
The effects on product quality 
The quality of output fell during the Great Leap Forward for sev-
eral reasons. The supply of raw materials became difficult [Hsu Hsin-
hsueh, 1959], and factories had to cope with both short supplies and low 
grade inputs. Quality also reduced as mills focused their attention on 
output alone [C.K.F.C., 1959g], striving to meet the inflated output 
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targets of the Great Leap Forward. The excessive increase of machine 
speed in order to meet output goals also contributed to the lowering 
of quality standards [Liu Ch'ing-chou, 1964], New products, rushed 
into production without undergoing any trial manufacture, were often of 
low quality [Hsu Hsin-Hsueh, 1959], and many of the large army of ne'.s-
workers were not versed in industrial technology. 
A major reason for the lowering of quality was that control and 
inspection within the mills deteriorated sharply. Control and inspec-
tion of the raw materials purchased slackened [C.K.F.C., 1959b], while 
inspection of yarn, cloth and finished products either weakened or 
ceased in some mills [C.K.F.C., 1959d]. This article also alleged that 
some mills retained the inspection systems but drastically reduced 
the numbers of personnel, while other mills abolished specialist per-
sonnel for this work and gave it to anyone to do, including to new 
workers with no experience of cloth standards. The machines used in 
cloth inspection were run too fast in some mills and could not be oper-
ated properly; standards were deliberately reduced in other mills and 
poor cloth was passed as up to standard, in order to meet the output 
quotas. 
The effect on maintenance and machinery 
Maintenance work was reduced and the depreciation of machinery 
accelerated during the Great Leap Forward. The increase in machine 
speed in an effort to meet high production targets would have resulted 
in increased depreciation of machinery if only normal maintenance had 
been done. In practice, customary maintenance work was not done and it 
was simply neglected from the start of the Great Leap Forward [C.K.F.C., 
1959g]. Many technicians and maintenance workers in existing mills 
were transferred to work directly in production in their mill or to work 
in new mills. As a consequence, a shortage of maintenance workers dev-
eloped [C.K.F.C., 1961a]. The increased speed caused breakdowns to be 
more frequent owing to breakages in parts, yet machinery and spare parts 
were in very short supply and were often not available [C.K.F.C., 1961a]. 
In 1961, attention was again drawn to the problem and the mills began to 
tackle it, as output levels fell and the pressure to produce was reduced. 
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The effect on output 
The effect on output is not difficult to see in general terms, but 
the precise output figures are, and are likely to remain, unknown. 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung gave a speech when inspecting villages in 1958, 
in which he said 'Since food can be eaten without money, in future 
clothing will also be obtained without money' [Chang Ch'eng-tsung, 
1958]. It was anticipated that the extension of free supply to the pro-
ducts of the textile industry would lead to an increase in demand by the 
masses; given the low consumption level in China and the entry of more 
women into the monetised sector, which meant that families increasingly 
bought shoes and clothing rather than made them [J.M.J.P., 1959/3/14], 
the demand side posed no problem to increasing output. It was on the 
supply side that the effects of the Great Leap Forward were to appear. 
On the supply side, the major influence was the cotton harvest, 
followed by the construction of new mills, mostly medium and small scale, 
the increased use of local run and coastal industry, and possibly a 
slight improvement in resource allocation as rigidities were reduced. 
The latter is not capable of measurement and, if it occurred, is unlikely 
to have offset the problems induced by political extremism. Unfortun-
ately the size of the cotton harvest is in some doubt, owing to the 
statistical breakdown and exaggerated claims. The harvest of 1958 was 
undoubtedly very good, although the claimed output of 2.1 million metric 
tons may be a little high. Lin Li-chien [1964:66] gives estimates for 
cotton output of 1.4 million metric tons for 1959, 1.3 million metric tons 
for 1960 and 1.22 million metric tons for 1961. This direction of change 
fits the reported serious natural calamities in 1959 and 1960, which in 
the latter year were described as the worst for a century. 
Under the influence of the call 'let the textile industry bloom 
everywhere', many provinces and towns built new mills; in 1958, some 
nineteen provinces and towns were expected to build medium and small 
scale mills [T.K.P., 1958/5/8]. A survey of sixty communes revealed 
that of commune-run industry at April 1959, textiles made up eleven per 
cent [Ku Tso-hsin, 1959], presumably by value of output although this was 
not made clear. After a flood of reports of new mills in many provinces, 
it was announced that the number of medium and small scale mills that 
went into operation in 1959 made up over ninety-four per cent of all 
the mills in China [N.C.N.A., 1959]. These must have added to the cap-
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acity to produce yarn and cloth, although considerably less than the 
numbers indicate, since the other six per cent were much larger and more 
modern mills. In the Shanghai textile industry in 1956, the 4 per cent 
of the mills which employed over 500 workers were responsible for 59 per 
cent of textile employment and 65 per cent of output [Yen Tzu-ch'ing, 
1958]. In addition to the small mills, thirty-five above-norm mills 
started operating in 1959; in that year the total number of cotton 
spindles increased by one million [Chiang Kuang-nai, I960]. 
Lin Li-chien has estimated the yarn and cloth output for 1959-61, 
and these estimates are given in Table 21, together with estimates for 
cloth output made by Field R.M. [1967:294]. 
Table 21 : Estimated Yarn and Cloth Output, 1958-61 
Year Yarn Cloth 
Mill, bales Mill. Metres 
(1) (2) (3) 
1958* 6.10 5,700 5,700 
1959 5.26 5,712 7,500 
1960 4.77 5,190 6,000 
1961 4.39 4,770 3,000 
(1), (2) Lin Li-Chien [1964:116] 
(3) Field R.M. [1967:294] 
* official statistics [S.S.B., 1960:99] 
Yarn output in 1959 was officially claimed to be 8.25 million bales 
and cloth output to be 7,500 million metres. Since the 1958 harvest 
figures were probably inflated, these claims may be too high, but since 
the harvest was very good it seems improbable that yarn and cloth output 
would drop in 1959. In view of the diversion of cotton land to grain 
production after the poor harvest of 1959, it is reasonable that both 
estimates for 1960 and 1961 show a decline in output, but there is at 
present no acceptable way of choosing between them. An effort to est-
imate cloth output for 1958 to 1961 by means of linear regression analy-
sis, using cloth output and exports 1951-57 as a base, resulted in est-
imates for the period of the Great Leap Forward which exceeded the 
exaggerated claims. The sharp discontinuity at this period precluded the 
use of the technique. 
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What can be concluded is that the Great Leap Forward, in con-
junction with bad weather, adversely affected textile production by 
reducing the supply of cotton available to the industry. This was con-
siderably more important than the direct effects of the kind described 
above. In the long run, the newly built large mills, and the best of 
the medium and small mills, remained to be used in the development of 
the industry. The worst of the small establishments were apparently 
closed down, as being grossly inefficient in their use of cotton and 
yarn. 
V. THE EFFORT TO RESTORE ORDER 
The possibility of disruptions and the potential for chaos was 
foreseen by some before the Great Leap Forward got under way, but was 
discounted. Chen Ta-lun [1958] mentioned that some people worried about 
the extension in enterprise power in planning for this reason, but he 
argued that this view was wrong. T'ien Yli-ming [1958] revealed that 
cadres in the Chengchou State Run Number Three Mill felt that giving 
management tasks to workers would cause confusion, and adversely affect 
production, owing to the low cultural level of workers and their lack 
of experience. The workers too had their doubts, with beliefs described 
as 'three fears', 'two withouts', 'one lack of understanding', and 'one 
grumble'. They feared the trouble, the fact that they did not expect to 
run things well, and they might be regarded as culprits; the 'withouts' 
were lack of time and culture; the lack of understanding was of affairs 
in general; and the 'grumble' fear was that big character posters might 
blame them if things went wrong. 
The first attempt to curb the excesses of the period began early 
in 1959. From early spring until August, a drive was held to set up 
systems to impose order and efficient running in the mills. The 
attempt began with a directive from the Ministry of Textiles [M. of T. , 
1959^], issued on 17 February, which asked inter alia that management 
systems be set up and made healthy. In the same journal, an article 
called for good control of financial capital, and although mainly radical 
in tone, stressing as it did reliance on the Party, the masses, and the 
passing down of power, it also asked for strict control of norms. An 
editorial in China Textiles [C.K.F.C., 1959a] insisted that new systems 
must be established to replace those abolished earlier in the Great Leap 
Forward. In July, the magazine returned to this theme with a series of 
articles on establishing running systems, quality and cost control, 
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revealing that a meeting to discuss improved cost control had been 
jointly convened in May 1959 by the State Planning Commission, the State 
Economic Commission, and the Ministry of Finance [M. of T., 1959b]. The 
high tide of the attempt to restore order occurred in July, when many 
articles appeared emphasising control in textile enterprises. The end 
came quickly. At the famous Eighth meeting of the Eighth Party Central 
Committee, 2-16 August 1959, at Lushan, the more conservative elements 
were defeated, and this was reflected in the articles appearing on the 
textile industry. The articles calling for order and control in textile 
mills ceased abruptly, and were replaced by articles reminiscent of 
those appearing in the more extreme days of 1958, with emphasis on high 
tides, the masses, and leaps. An anti-rightist campaign began in August 
as a result of the power adjustment in the Party, and this formally 
affixed the seal of disapproval on all critics of the radical line. The 
Great Leap Forward was to continue unrestrained, and solution to the 
problems was deferred, until the next major policy change, announced 
formally in early 1961. 
Kang Chao [1968:566] has referred to signs in 1959 that the Party 
leaders began to recentralise the system. It is true that some Party 
leaders made an attempt to bring back order and end excesses. However, 
by no means all Party leaders wanted this; those that did were defeated 
at Lushan; and the effort to restore order does not necessarily imply a 
desire to recentralise. With the continued decentralised system of the 
1960's, the interpretation of Kao Chang must be treated with a degree of 
caution. 
In conclusion, the instinct of the left to change from following 
^ Although not as abruptly as some might have wished. The Ministry of 
Textiles convened a large scale meeting of 439 people from 20-31 July 
1959, at which methods of strengthening enterprise running and improving 
quality were discussed. Speeches at the rather conservative meeting 
were not published until 13 August, during the anti-rightist campaign, 
which began on 6 August, with an editorial in the People's Daily. 
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the Soviet model of comprehensive planning was sound, as the 
model had proved to be most unsuitable for Chinese conditions. Some 
elements of the Great Leap Forward appear sensible; in particular the 
mass mobilisation of labour with a sense of purpose, the use of more 
medium and small scale enterprises with higher labour-capital ratios, 
the decentralisation of some power over decision making to lower levels 
of government, and the sought-for increase in flexibility. Despite 
this, the attempt to find a different path to development failed at that 
time. The poor weather and lack of Soviet assistance were part of the 
matrix, but the lack of experience, and above all the role played by 
cadres and local Party committees, trying too much too fast and possess-
ing a blind faith in their efforts, were responsible for this failure. 
It is impossible to answer accurately questions of the 'what would have 
happened if type, but it is possible that if the Great Leap Forward 
had been more cautiously and sensibly managed, then failure on the 
grand scale could have been avoided. The experience of the late 1960's, 
when many of the policies resembled those of 1958-60, but economic 
extremism was avoided, suggests that the policies themselves were not 
at fault: it was the administration of them that was extremely poor. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE ESTIMATES OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, 1950-61 
The problem was to determine the amount of capital accumulated 
in the textile industry each year. It is known that light industry as 
a whole was an important source of capital accumulation for the state 
during the period of the First Five Year Plan. Few figures were 
released for capital accumulation by the textile industry, except for 
the total profits forwarded to the state by central run mills, 1953-57, 
reported by Chiang Kuang-nai [1957a] to be 2,900 million yuan, an index 
for capital accumulation by the textile industry, with 1952=100, 
1953=120.34 and 1954=140.61, also reported by Chiang Kuang-nai [1955c], 
and total accumulation by the textile industry 1953-57, which was 
10,000 million yuan [ Yeh Fang-t'ien, 1961] . 
With such a paucity of figures the only feasible method of 
estimation involved the use of a surrogate, i.e. something which is 
known and which is believed to be related to what is sought. The method 
is not very sophisticated, but no real alternative presented itself. 
The lack of sophistication was not felt to be a barrier. Chinese 
statistics are not noted for their accuracy, and applying sophisticated 
mathematical methods to unsophisticated data may prove more elegant 
than accurate; what is worse, this process can lend an air of spurious 
accuracy to what can be at best only an approximation. 
The estimate of capital accumulation 1953-57 
Capital accumulation was estimated for this period first and was 
subsequently extended to the periods 1950-52 and 1958-61. In all cases 
the amount of profits was first estimated for each year, the non-profit 
items were then estimated, and finally the two were combined to yield 
total accumulation. 
It was assumed that profits forwarded by the mills to the state 
were linearly related to output levels. At first sight this may seem an 
heroic assumption, but it is reasonable under the Chinese system of 
organising the economy. Profit is defined as total revenue minus total 
costs. The revenue came from the sales of output which were made on the 
basis of fixed prices; these were rarely altered, so that sales revenue 
is closely linked to physical sales. No difficulty was normally 
experienced in selling what could be produced, either to consumers or 
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state, as demand usually exceeded supply. On the side of costs, the 
assumption was needed that mills operated in a region of constant costs 
of production. This assumption was also reasonable because unused 
capacity existed throughout the period, even in 1956, and this could 
be taken up without extra investment; supplies of ordinary workers x^ ere 
ample and extra labour could be hired without pushing up the wage and cost 
level; and cotton was supplied by the state at regulated prices. 
The surrogate used in place of profit was the output of cotton 
cloth. The output of cotton yarn was assessed and rejected as a possible 
surrogate, since it proved markedly less accurate than cloth when 
predicting the index of accumulation 1952-54. With base 1952=100, the 
reported accumulation for 1953 and 1954 was 120.3 and 140.6; using the 
surrogate of cotton cloth, the estimated profit was 122.4 and 136.6 for 
these two years; using the surrogate of yarn, the estimated figures were 
113.3 and 127.1. 
The results of using cotton cloth as a surrogate were encouraging 
but inconclusive as two years represent a most limited set of observations, 
and in addition there was a possibility that profit was not in practise 
closely related to accumulation. This was only a minor possibility, 
since profit made up over half of accumulation in the textile industry, 
and the non-proft part of accumulation (industrial and commercial taxes, 
depreciation reserves for amortization of fixed assets, return of surplus 
working capital, receipts from any sale of fixed assets, and income 
from other business activities) could in the main be expected to vary 
with output and profits. 
In order to estimate the profits for the period 1953-57, it was 
necessary first to estimate the prof it forwarded to the state in 1953. 
This was done using the surrogate of cotton cloth output by means of: 
21X (1) . S = 5X + 50 
where S = the sum- of profits of central run mills over the five years 
1953-57 = 2,900 million yuan 
X = the profit forwarded by central run mills in 1953. 
This relationship was derived from: 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Profit in central mills X X-8 X+25 X-fS 
100 100 100 100 
Note: The percentages reflect the change in output of cotton cloth. 
Source: [ S.S.B., 1960:99] . 
(2) S = 5X + 
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17X + 25X + 8X - 8X 
100 
Putting (2) into words, this says that the sum of profits 1953-57 
is equal to the profits in 1953 summed over five years plus the 
percentage changes from that level in the other four years. 
But S = 2,900 million yuan 
.•. 2,900 = 5X + ^ 
and X = 535. 
Having estimated X, the profits forwarded in the remaining years 
were obtained by the percentage changes of the surrogate: 
Table A.l. The Estimated Profit Forwarded by Central Run Textile 
Mills, 1953-57 (mill.yuan). 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Total 
535 626 492 669 578 2,900 
The non-profit accumulation of central run mills was next estimated. 
This was done by calculating the average ratio of industrial and 
commercial tax to profit (0.05627) and depreciation reserves etc. to 
profit (0.2055) for state rion firms in all industries in China, 1953-57. 
These ratios w . then applied to the estimated total profit in central 
run textile mills, 1953-57. 
Total acciamulation by non-central mills was obtained by subtraction 
of the estimated accumulation by central run mills (5,128 million yuan) 
from the reported total accumulation for the textile industry. This 
gave a figure for 4,872 million yuan. This figure for accumulation 
was broken down into profit, taxes, and depreciation reserves etc. by 
menas of the ratios of these to accumulation in all state run industries. 
The ratios used were 0.56553, 0.31831 and 0.11625 respectively. At this 
stage Table A.2 was prepared. 
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Table TV. 2. Estimated Capital Accumulation in the Textile Industry, 
1953-57 (mill, yuan) 
Central run textile mills: 
Profit forwarded 2,900 
Industrial and commercial taxes 1,632 
Depreciation reserves etc. 596 
Accumulation by central mills 5,128 
Non-central run textile mills: 
Profit forwarded 2,755 
Industrial and commercial taxes 1,550 
Depreciation reserves etc. 566 
Acciimulation by non-central mills 4,872 
Total accumulation by all textile mills 10,000 
Note: . 1. profits retained by textile mills are excluded; these are 
believed to have been small, but would raise the profit 
figures if included. 
2. minor inconsistencies result from rounding. 
Source: ratios derived from Ecklund G.N. [ 1966:20] . 
The profit component on non-central run mills was then dis-
aggregated into years, using the formula (1) derived above. This 
resulted in an estimated profit for 1953 of 508 million yuan. The 
surrogate of cotton cloth was used to estimate the percentage change in 
profit as before. 
Table A.3. The Estimated Profit Forwarded by Non-central Run Mills, 
1953-57 (mill, yuan) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Total 
508 595 468 635 549 2,755 
The tax and depreciation reserves in the non-central run mills 
were estimated by applying the ratio of each to profit, which was derived 
from the aggregates of state run firms in all industries, to the estimates 
of profits each year in non-central run textile mills. 
No independent check on the estimates exists, but by use of this 
method it was possible to break down the reported 10,000 million y ^ 
accumulation into both years and sub-groups. 
Table A.4 : The Estimated Disaggregat ion of Capital Accumulation in the Textile Industry, 1953-57 (mill 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Total 1953-57 
General Industry and Commerce 
Profit from state enterprises 6,369 8,457 9,404 11,414 11,363 47,007 
Industrial and commercial taxes 4,029 4,753 5,370 6,298 6,000 26,450 
Depreciation reserves etc. 
of state enterprises 1,301 1,503 1,786 2,016 3,057 9,663 
Derived ratios 
Industrial and commercial 
taxes: profit 0.63259J 0.56202 0.57103 0.55178 0.52803 
Depreciation reserves: profit 0.20427 0.17772 0.18992 0.17662 0.26903 
Estimates for the Textile Industry 
Central Run Mills: 
Profit 535 626 492 669 578 2,900 
Industrial and Commercial taxes 338 352 281 369 305 1,645 Depreciation reserves etc. 109 111 93 118 155 586 Accumulation by central run mills 982 1,089 866 1,156 1,038 5,131 
Non-Central Run Mills: 
Profit 508 595 468 635 549 2,755 Industrial and Commercial taxes 321 334 267 350 290 1,562 Depreciation reserves etc. 104 106 89 112 148 559 Accumulation by non-central run 
textile mills 933 1,035 824 1,097 987 4,876 
Total Accumulation by all textile 
industry 1,915 2,124 1,690 2,253 2,025 10,007 
Sources: Ecklund G.N. [ 1966:20] . 
Chiang Kuang-nai [ 1957a] 
Yeh Fang-T'ien [ 1961] , 
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The extensions to 1950-52 
Profit levels were first estimated by use of the surrogate of change 
in the output of cotton cloth, using 1953 as a base year. The level of 
profit in 1953 for both central and non-central mills was estimated 
earlier. 
Table A. 5. The Estimated Profit Forwarded by the Textile Industry 
1950-52 (mill, yuan) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 
Index of surrogate profit 53.7 65.2 81.7 100 Estimated profit from central mills 287 349 437 535 Estimated profit from non-central 
mills 273 331 415 508 
Using these estimates, industrial and commercial taxes and 
depreciation reserves etc. were estimated by means of ratios of each 
to profit, as was done earlier. Unfortunately the profits forwarded 
and depreciation reserves of state enterprises for 1950 and 1951 were 
not separated in the original source. The disaggregation of these two 
items was needed. This was estimated by using the average ratio of 
each to the sum of both in 1952-54. Of the sum of both in 1952-54, 
some 83.05 per cent was profit, it was assumed that this ratio would 
apply in 1950-51 and the dissagregation was made. At this stage the 
ratios of depreciation reserves to profit and industrial and commercial 
taxes to profit could be calculated for all state run enterprises. These 
ratios could then be applied to the profit estimates in the textile 
industry in order to estimate in turn the non-profit part of accumulation, 
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Table A.6. Estimated Capital Accumulation in the Textile 
Industry, 1950-52 (mill, yuan) 
1950 1951 1952 
General Industry and Commerce 
Profits of all state enterprises 723 2,535 4,653 
Depreciation reserves etc. of all 
state enterprises 147 517 1,077 
Industrial and commercial taxes 
of all state enterprises 435 1,433 2,315 
Derived Ratios 
Depreciation reserves: profits 0.20332 0.20410 0.23146 
Industrial and commercial 
taxes: profits 0.60166 0.56573 0.49753 
Estimates for the Textile Industry 
Central run mills 
Profits 287 349 437 
Industrial and commercial taxes 173 197 217 
Depreciation reserves etc. 58 71 101 
Accumulation by central mills 518 617 755 
Non-central run mills 
Profits 273 331 415 
Industrial and commercial taxes 164 187 206 
Depreciation reserves etc. 55 68 96 
Accumulation by non-central mills 492 586 717 
Accumulation by all textile industry 1,010 1,203 1,472 
Source: Ecklund G.N. [1966:20]; Table A.5. 
The extensions to 1958-61 
This period was the most difficult for purposes of estimation. 
The final figures issued for 1958 are probably less accurate than for 
earlier years. Profits were first estimated using the surrogate of 
change in the output of cotton cloth, with base 1957. This resulted in 
Table A.7. 
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Table A.7. The Estimated Profit Forwarded by the Textile Industry, 
1958-61 (mill. yuan) 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Index of surrogate profit 100 112.87 148.51 118.81 59.41 
Estimated profit from 
central run mills 578 652 856 637 34 3 
Estimated profit from 
non-central run mills 549 620 815 652 326 
Source: S.S.B. fl960: 99] ; Field R.M. , [1967: 194]; Table A.4. 
Industrial and commercial taxes and depreciation reserves etc. 
were then estimated on the basis of these estimates of profit. It 
was not possible to use ratio-of-the-year methods to estimate these 
items for the entire period, owing to lack of data. The tax figures 
ceased in 1957 and depreciation reserves figures ceased in 1959. 
Consequently the tax estimates 1958-61 were based on the average ratio 
of tax to profits in the textile industry of the previous four years; 
the depreciation reserves estimates were based on ratio-of-the-year 
methods for 1958-59, and on the average ratio of the previous four 
years (1956-59) for the estimates of 1960-61. It was necessary to assume 
that the historical ratio projected forward would still apply; owing 
to the great changes during the Great Leap Forward this assumption 
is suspect. 
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1958-61 (mill. yuan) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 
(General Industry and 
Commerce 
Profit of all state 
enterprises 18,719 28,590 _ 
Depreciation reserves 




profits 0.17634 0.16684 - -
Estimates for the Textile 
industrv 
Central run mills 
Profit 652 856 687 343 
Depreciation reserves 115 143 135 68 
Industrial and commercial 
taxes^ 361 473 380 190 
Accumulation by central run 
mills 1,128 1,472 1,202 601 
Non-central run mills 
Profit ^ 620 815 652 326 
Depreciation reserves 109 136 128 64 
Industrial and A 
commercial taxes 343 450 360 180 
Accumulation by non-
central run mills 1,072 1,401 1,140 570 
Accumulation by all 
textile mills 2,200 2,873 2 ,342 1,171 
Note: 1. 1958-59 estimated by multiplying row 4 by row 3; 
1960-61 estimated by multiplying row 4 by 0.1970, the average 
ratio of depreciation reserves to profits in central run mills 
1956-59. 
2. Estimated by multiplying row 4 by 0.5531, the average ratio 
of industrial and commercial taxes to profits in central run 
mills, 1954-57. 
3. 1958-59 estimated by multiplying row 8 by row 3; 
1960-61 estimated by multiplying row 8 by 0.1971, the average 
ratio of depreciation reserves to profit in non-central run 
mills, 1956-59. 
4. Estimated by multiplying row 8 by 0.5528, the average ratio 
of industrial and commercial taxes to profits in non-central 
run mills, 1954-57. 
Source: Ecklund G.N. [1966:20]; Table A.7. 
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In 1958 many important changes occurred in China. Among them 
was the decentralisation of all textile mills. It seemed better to 
keep the same format in the tables of 1958-61, so that 'central run' 
in the table for the years 1958-61 refers to the original central run 
mills, which were handed over to local governments to control. 
Important changes were also made in the tax system. In general 
the taxes on industry and commerce were simplified: several taxes were 
combined into one, and taxes were based on prices received by producers 
and distributors, rather than on state wholesale prices as in the past. 
A much less important revision of the tax system had occurred in 1953. 
Since the tax estimates for 1950-52 were based on actual tax receipts 
in those years, it is not felt that the changes in 1953 make much 
difference to the estimates. An effect could only arise if the textile 
industry changed vis-a-vis the rest of industry. The changes in 1958 
were much greater, and the estimates of tax were based on projections 
of the 1954-57 period. As such, the influence of the changes could 
be great, but there appears to be no way of knowing this. 
In general it is felt that the estimates for 1953-57 may be 
reasonable, those for 1950-52 are less so but perhaps remain acceptable, 
but that those for 1958-61 are of a doubtful degree of accuracy. 
